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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
1.1. Background 
A central concern within this dissertation is the firm’s internal decision making, 
particularly in the situation where information relevant to decision making is not contractible. 
This dissertation focuses on the role of individual heterogeneity in the internal decision 
making. The primary interest of previous accounting studies is in information quality, such as 
the quality of performance signals in compensation design. However, information quality is 
determined by the demand and supply, which are associated with decision makers and 
information providers, respectively. Those individuals may have their own preferences 
related to their personal characteristics or their personal relationships with other individuals. 
This dissertation aims to extend the focus of the information quality by considering the 
effects of personal characteristics or relations between employees on information use or 
supply.              
The traditional agency model relies on ex ante incentives to solve moral hazard 
problems. The model of Hölmstrom (1979) offers two insights on the design of incentive 
contracts: (1) risk sharing between principal and agents, and (2) informativeness of 
performance signals. The Hölmstrom model only incorporates individual preferences for risk, 
and largely sidesteps the possibility of agent heterogeneity. Empirical evidence associated 
with the second insight finds that organizational design (e.g.delegation), complicates the 
choices of performance signals (Abernethy et al. 2004; Bouwens and Van Lent 2007; Moers 
2006). More importantly, it is not easy to find appropriate performance signals, and personal 
ex post discretion plays a role (Baker et al. 1994; Prendergast and Topel 1993); this situation 
makes individual heterogeneity salient.    
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There is an increasing amount of evidence that individuals differ from each other on 
multiple dimensions. For example, Ichino and Maggi (2000) find that a given individual’s 
background affects the level of effort. Others show that selecting employees whose 
preferences are in line with those of the firm can help to mitigate control problems (e.g., 
Campbell 2012). In all but the most simple environments, employees work with each other 
and thus in addition to these employees’ own characteristics, interpersonal relations also play 
a role in the work place (Mas and Moretti 2009; Bandiera et al. 2005).  
Individual heterogeneity is a factor in understanding the specifics of the internal 
decision making. This dissertation discusses how personal characteristics and the relations 
among agents affect (1) the way in which individuals use information to make decisions and 
(2) whether individuals are willing to share information. The following three chapters in this 
dissertation use data from the field to shed light on these relations. 
1.2. Outline and Preview  
In chapter 2,
1
 I examine whether managers’ ability affects the informal agreement 
(i.e., relational contracts) that managers maintain in their department by looking at the 
association between managers’ ability and their discretionary decisions in allocating bonuses 
to themselves and to their subordinates. I characterize the relational contracts as on-going 
versus period-by-period contracts by the extent to which individuals (including managers and 
subordinates) trade off long-term gains against short-term payoff. High-ability managers are 
more patient and are more capable of realizing long-term gains than low-ability managers, so 
high-ability (low-ability) is associated with on-going (period-by-period) relational contracts. 
Managers’ bonus decisions are a manifestation of the type of relational contracts in force. I 
consider two (related) decisions: (1) the portion of the bonus pool that managers keep for 
themselves and (2) the degree to which managers differentiate the bonuses they allocate to 
                                                 
1
 This paper is joint work with Margaret Abernethy and Laurence van Lent. 
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their subordinates. I predict that managers’ ability is negatively associated with (1) the 
proportion of the bonus pool that managers keep for themselves, and (2) the degree to which 
department heads differentiate the bonuses they allocate to their subordinates. Using a 
proprietary dataset from a Chinese hospital, we find evidence consistent with the predictions 
on the two types of bonus decisions. 
In chapter 3,
2
 I examine the effects of workforce homogeneity on effort provision and 
learning outcomes using a proprietary dataset from a Chinese manufacturing plant. We obtain 
data on the background of the employees (i.e., their hometown) and on how employees 
entered the firm (using the recruitment channel of referral by current workers or not). We 
argue that workers from the same hometown and referred workers will have lower 
communication and coordination costs when working together. Based on these arguments, we 
measure workforce homogeneity with the degree of hometown homogeneity and the 
proportion of referred workers. We exploit differences in the production layout of the 
manufacturing plant to examine how the effect of workforce homogeneity varies across two 
types of production environments: (1) team-based production with group incentives and (2) 
individual work stations in a manufacturing line along with individual incentives. Our results 
show that workforce homogeneity influences employee learning, but its effect depends on the 
specific production environment along with incentive contracts. However, we do not find 
evidence on the effect of workforce homogeneity on effort provision. 
In chapter 4, I investigate the role of working relations between decision makers and 
information providers, specifically how the working relation affects both decision making 
and information reporting. I use a dataset of used-car loan applications from a car dealership 
in Taiwan where the working relation is shaped by the organizational structures (i.e., 
franchisees or company-owned outlets). Loan applications are submitted via either 
                                                 
2
 This chapter is co-authored with Laurence van Lent and Anne Wu. 
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franchisees or company-owned outlets. The loan rate is the communication device through 
which salespeople influence loan officers’ approval decisions. I argue that loan officers are 
more uncertain about information reporting quality from franchisees than owned outlets’, and 
expect that reporting uncertainty gives rise to both loan officers’ decision biases and 
salespeople’s reporting biases. Consistent with the decision bias hypothesis, I find that loan 
officers, in response to an increase in the loan rate, are more likely to reject franchisees’ 
applications than owned outlets’. Also, franchisees set a lower loan rate but have a higher 
default rate than owned outlets. This finding supports the reporting biases hypothesis that 
salespeople (especially those in franchisees) skew loan rates downward to offset loan 
officers’ decision biases.   
In sum, the three chapters broaden the focus of previous work on the role of 
information quality in internal decision making by emphasizing the effects of personal 
characteristics or relations between employees on information use and information supply.  
1.3. Conclusion 
Firms ex ante design a mechanism to induce agents’ optimal efforts or truth telling. 
This view of mechanism design implies that what we ex post observe in the real world is the 
optimal outcome of the designed mechanism. What my dissertation adds to this framework is 
to demonstrate that inputs (e.g., employees) of this mechanism matters; agent heterogeneity is 
more than a random noise left by the “optimal” mechanism design. Agents are not 
exogenously determined but endogenously chosen by the firm. Hence, my dissertation 
broadly speaks to the match between employees and internal control system. This idea has 
received attention by economists (Lazear 2000), and recently gets more attention in finance 
(Carlin and Gervais 2009) and accounting  (Hales et al. 2014). 
In addition, given that there are many contingencies that firms cannot contract on ex 
ante, firms might apply other means to complement or replace incentive contracts. For 
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example, Hertzberg et al. (2010) find that an Argentina bank applies employee rotation to 
mitigate the misreporting about borrowers’ credit risk, which is not verifiable. However, 
accounting research doesn’t address much about  implications of personnel practice, such as 
hiring, for incentives contracts (Oyer and Schaefer 2011). 
It will be a long journey to understand the role of personnel practices in the internal 
control system. I only consider my dissertation as a step in recognizing the role of agent 
heterogeneity in addition to risk sharing and informativeness of performance signals in 
traditional agency models. A next equally important question that needs to be addressed next 
is how the match between agents and firms characteristics is achieved and whether firms 
apply other control systems to solve or avoid any mismatch between the agent and the firm. 
Empirical research is designed to validate established theory (or to explore avenues 
for theory building). Each theory has different sets of assumptions. Reflecting on the past 
research development, there are many theoretical advances which lack supporting empirical 
evidence. The challenge of empirical work is the access to the right data, which meets the set 
of assumptions in the theory (Bartel et al. 2004). Survey is a common approach to collect data 
on decision making within firms, but surveyed data only accounts for general heterogeneity 
across or within firms with limited specifics of the firms. In addition, it is not clear whether 
the responses are free of any personal biases. As the rich and detailed background 
information of field work allows for a careful assessment of the fit between data and the 
assumption of the theory, I apply field studies in an attempt to narrow the gap between theory 
and empirical research.         
Ichniowski and Shaw (2003) label the approach of field empirical work “insider 
econometrics”. The obvious drawback of this approach is that one is less able to assess the 
generalizability of the results. However, field empirical work offers the greater confidence on 
accuracy of interpretation of empirical results, which is weighted against the drawback. 
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Given the fact that theoretical advancement goes beyond empirical research, I believe that the 
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Chapter 2: Managerial Ability and Discretionary Bonus Decisions3 
 
2.1. Introduction   
Individual preferences and ability are ‘fundamental determinants of decision making 
in economic models’ (Dohmen et al. 2010). The effect of ability on decision making has 
received little attention in the accounting literature despite its relevance for employee sorting 
and contract design. We argue that a key determinant of the different choices that managers 
make when allocating bonuses is ability.
4
 We test this relation in a setting where 
subordinates’ actions can neither be specified ex ante nor ex post verified. In other words, 
managers must rely on a relational contract, which is defined as informal agreements and 
unwritten codes of conduct, to influence the behaviors of individuals within firms (Baker et 
al. 2002). We make a direct link between relational contracts and a manager’s discretionary 
bonus choices. We investigate the association between managers’ ability and their relational 
contracts with subordinates by examining their discretionary bonus decisions.  
We borrow insights from Gibbons and Henderson’s (2012) description of relational 
contracts and identify two types of relational contracts; one is the ongoing contract (i.e., the 
repeated game) where employees maximize long-term payoff by cooperating with each other; 
the other is the period-by-period contract (i.e., the one-shot game) where employees 
maximize short-term gains by taking opportunistic actions. We recognize that a manager 
faces multiple choices when implementing a relational contract. However, bonus decisions 
reflect an important component of a relational contract given their influential role in shaping 
employees’ behaviors (Roberts 2010). When managers are granted the authority to allocate 
                                                 
3
 This chapter is co-authored with Margaret Abernethy and Laurence van Lent. 
4
 We assume that ability is a characteristic that cannot be mimicked either because it is too costly or infeasible to 
do so for any period of time.  
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bonuses, we argue that the bonus decision allows them to communicate to their subordinates 
their preferences for the type of relational contracts they want with their subordinates.   
We choose a rich and somewhat unique setting in which to study the role of ability in 
discretionary bonus decisions. Ability is particularly salient in professionally dominated 
organizations such as hospitals, law and accounting firms and among academics working in 
universities. Our research site is a large hospital that has multiple clinical departments with 
physicians as heads of departments and a group bonus system based on department 
performance. All clinical heads have formal authority but differ in their ability both in 
relation to other clinical heads and to other clinicians working in their departments. They 
have almost complete discretion to determine how the group bonus is distributed within their 
department. There is a fixed bonus pool for each department based on the department’s prior 
performance. Managers can decide on (1) how much they can keep to themselves, and (2) 
how they distribute the remaining bonus to subordinates. While it is not common for a 
manager to decide on how much bonus they keep for themselves, it is this specific feature 
that allows us to test whether managers’ ability affect choices in the implementation of 
relational contracts. This feature also helps us to overcome the empirical difficulty of 
measuring unobserved relational contracts. Therefore, we present evidence on the association 
between managers’ ability and two choices managers make when allocating bonuses.  
The work performed in clinical units also provides a relevant context within which to 
examine relational contracts, namely, it is difficult both to specify ex ante desired actions and 
measure ex post with any degree of accuracy. Professional judgment and expertise is assumed 
to be critical in this context (Freidson 1970; Scott 1982); it is also recognized that 
professionals, such as physicians, invest heavily in their own human capital (Pizzini 2010).  
We argue that high-ability managers are better able to implement ongoing relational 
contracts for two reasons. First, based on prior research, we expect that high-ability managers 
12 
 
are more able to make the right decisions as they have higher levels of knowledge, expertise 
and judgment to guide the actions of their subordinates (Demerjian et al. 2012). Second, 
high-ability managers have the ‘patience’ to engage in a long run game. They recognize the 
long term gains of creating a collaborative work environment where employees cooperate 
rather than compete. Prior empirical research demonstrates that ability varies systematically 
with ‘patience’ (Dohmen et al. 2010). Gibbons and Henderson argue that patience is 
important when choosing the type of relational contract. Managers with patience will prefer 
to implement ongoing relational contracts that have long term payoffs; in other words they 
have the ‘patience’ to wait for the benefits associated with those long term payoffs. Given the 
association between ability and patience, we expect that high-ability managers are more 
willing to implement ongoing relational contracts than low-ability managers. In sum, we 
expect that high-ability managers are both more capable of identifying the right course of 
action for the long run success and have the patience to implement contracts that have long 
term payoffs. Low-ability managers only have the option of period-by-period relational 
contract due to constraints in their ability.  
We link the choice of relational contract to bonus decisions by drawing on Gibbons 
and Henderson’s (2012) description of the Trust game. The bonus decision can be seen as one 
manifestation of the relational contract; it provides a means of communicating the manager’s 
contract preference. We predict that managers who choose an ongoing relational contract will 
communicate their preferences as follows. First, they will keep a smaller share of the bonus 
pool for themselves (i.e., leave more bonuses to subordinates). Keeping a smaller share of the 
bonus shows the manager’s willingness to sacrifice short-term payoff for long-term gains. 
Second, they will distribute the remaining bonus to subordinates more evenly, that is, there 
will be less differentiation among the bonuses provided to subordinates. The even distribution 
of bonus among subordinates encourages cooperation as opposed to competition. We expect 
13 
 
high-ability managers to recognize the long term benefits of maintaining a repeated 
relationship, and that low-ability managers are constrained to a one-shot relationship. While 
high and low ability managers manage their organizations with different preference for time 
horizons (i.e. long-term versus short-term), we would expect in this setting that choices that 
encourage collaboration and cooperation among employees would on average have better 
longer term outcomes (e.g. better patient care, increased reputation of the hospital, etc.) than 
bonus decisions that increase competition and opportunism.   
Our empirical findings are consistent with our predictions. We find that high-ability 
managers keep a smaller share of bonus than low-ability managers, and high-ability managers 
distribute bonus to employees more evenly than low-ability managers. We interpret these 
findings as evidence that managers’ ability is associated with the extent to which they are 
capable of building an ongoing relational contract within the department.  
We recognize, however, that the bonus decision is only one manifestation of the 
choices that a manager makes in the implementation of relational contracts. We also 
recognize that ability is most likely to be highly correlated with power and reputation. Prior 
research examines the influence of managerial power and/or reputation as determinants of 
economic decisions within the firm, so there are possibly alternative theoretical explanations 
for our observed relation between ability and bonus decisions. We elaborate further on 
alternative explanations in relation to our findings in Section 2.4.3 of the paper.  
This study contributes to prior research in a number of ways. By assessing the choices 
managers make in determining discretionary bonuses, we are able to shed some light on the 
question of how relational contracts can be implemented within a firm. We also contribute to 
the growing body of research examining how managerial traits influence the economic 
decisions managers make within the firm (Malmendier and Tate 2009; Jia et al. 2014; 
14 
 
Malmendier and Tate 2005).
5
 And finally we contribute to research examining the 
determinants of subjectivity in performance measurement and compensation decisions. Only 
a few empirical studies directly investigate determinants of discretion in bonus decisions 
(Gibbs et al. 2004; Rajan and Reichelstein 2006; Bol 2011; Ederhof 2010). Our findings 
indicate that managers’ ability is an important personal characteristic determining the way 
they manage their departments. While ability might be correlated with other personal traits 
(e.g., overconfidence), what sets ability apart is that it is difficult to mimic; there are clear 
markers of ability and thus empirically it is possible to identify differences among managers.  
We also study two types of compensation decisions. Prior studies either discuss how 
managers reward themselves (i.e., seek rents) or how managers reward their subordinates.  
Using a setting where relational contracts are likely to exist, we are able to offer a more 
holistic view of the decisions managers make when allocating bonuses.  
2.2. Hypothesis Development 
2.2.1. Relational Contracts 
Firms have formal decision rights, procedures and rules in place to govern 
organizations, but informal rules and expectations also powerfully affect the behaviors of 
individuals within firms (Hermalin 2013). Baker et al. (2002) term the informal agreements 
and unwritten codes of conduct as “relational contracts”.
6
 The classic example of relational 
contracts is the Toyota production system, under which line workers are asked to become 
“active problem solvers”. However, management cannot define in advance exactly which 
problems line workers might find or how problems should be solved. Another example is 
Lincoln Electric’s “fair” principle in bonus payment practice, but there is no manual to define 
exactly what constitutes a fair bonus for a particular worker in a particular year. Those 
                                                 
5
 Prior literature uses physical traits or past experience (e.g., military services or religion) to measure managers’ 
personal traits (e.g., overconfidence, integrity, or dominance) and documents the effect of these different 
characteristics on corporate investment, financial reporting decisions and tax policies. 
6
 The idea of informal agreements is close to what Hermalin (2013) describes as corporate culture  or leadership.  
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employees take the actions based on their understanding of what is expected or acceptable 
within the given firm, namely the relational contracts. 
There are many variations in the forms that relational contracts can take. In our 
research setting, the high degree of discretion in bonus allocation makes the research setting 
resemble the set-up of the Trust game described by Gibbons and Henderson (2012). We thus 
rely on their description of the Trust game to understand how bonus decisions reflect the 
nature of relational contracts. The trust game works as follows. Managers take the initiative 
and play a strategy of either “Trust” or “Distrust”; employees could respond to managers’ 
Trust by playing either “Honor” or “Betray”. However, if managers play Distrust, the game 
ends. The manager’s strategy depends on her anticipation of employees’ responses. This 
anticipation exactly captures the spirit of a relational contract, namely the informal agreement 
and the unwritten codes of conduct. If managers anticipate that employees will respond with 
“Betray”, they will play “Distrust” as an initial move. If managers anticipate employees’ 
response to be “Honor”, they will play “Trust”. The different anticipations result in two types 
of games: repeated game and one-shot game. In the repeated game, managers play Trust and 
employees respond with Honor; in the one-shot game, managers play Distrust and the 
employees end the game.  
We borrow insights from the Trust game to characterize the relational contracts. In a 
repeated game, individuals (managers and employees) view their collaboration as an ongoing 
relationship; thus they care about the consequences of their actions today on the future. On 
the contrary, in a one-shot game, individuals assume that their relationship will end at any 
random point of time, so they limit their attention to actions that affect the current period. For 
exposition purpose, we identify two discrete types of relational contracts: an ongoing 
relational contract (i.e., a repeated game) and a period-by-period relational contract (i.e., a 
one-shot game). Under an ongoing relational contract, individuals work cooperatively to 
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maximize payoff over time. A period-by-period relational contract is a short-term contract 
where individuals maximize their payoff today by taking opportunistic behaviors. We 
recognize, however, the choice of relational contracts is not binary, but a continuum in terms 
of the extent to which the value of long-term relationship outweighs the short-run temptation 
of opportunistic behaviors. 
2.2.2. Managerial Ability and Relational Contracts 
Given the different types of relational contracts, the relevant question is why they 
vary. As opposed to formal contracts enforced by courts, relational contracts are subject to 
individual influence, so managers’ characteristics play a role in establishing the relational 
contracts. We treat managers’ choice of relational contracts as an economic decision. Ability 
is the characteristic that differentiates managers’ cost function of managing their 
organizations. Some management practices are simply too costly or even infeasible for low-
ability managers. The difference in their cost function clearly predicts a separating 
equilibrium where high-ability managers choose different relational contracts from low-
ability managers. We argue that high-ability managers will choose ongoing relational 
contracts, but low-ability managers will choose period-by-period (i.e., one-shot) relational 
contracts.  
The key distinction between ongoing and period-by-period relational contracts is the 
extent to which individuals trade off long-term gains against short-term payoff. As opposed 
to low-ability managers, high-ability managers have sufficient knowledge to identify the right 
course of action for long-run success. At the same time, high-ability managers have the 
expertise that allows them to coordinate subordinates’ actions through appropriate task 
assignment and timely settlement of any conflicts occurring ex post. Not only are high-ability 
managers better at decision making and task execution (Demerjian et al. 2012) they are more 
patient. Empirical research demonstrates that ‘patience’ and ability co-vary. Patience is 
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critical for ongoing relational contracts (Gibbons and Henderson 2012). The patience of high-
ability managers allows them to wait for gains that accrue over the longer term. In other 
words, high-ability managers will choose to establish ongoing relational contracts because 
they are able to both generate long-term payoff and can wait patiently to realize the long-term 
payoff.              
Conversely, low-ability managers are constrained by their lack of knowledge, 
experience, or expertise. They do not have the ability to develop a viable long-term action 
plan or to coordinate subordinates to implement the action plan. In other words, it is less 
likely for low-ability managers to realize high long-term payoff than for high-ability 
managers. In addition, low-ability managers are less patient, so they value the current payoff 
more than long-term benefits. Therefore, low-ability managers will choose period-by-period 
relational contracts because of the limitation of their ability.     
In sum, we expect that managers’ ability affects their choice of relational contracts; 
high-ability managers will choose ongoing relational contracts, but low-ability managers will 
choose period-by-period relational contracts where the payoffs are immediate.  
2.2.3. Managerial Ability and Discretionary Bonus Decisions 
Relational contracts rely on employees’ following the signals or actions of their 
superior (Hermalin 1998). In that sense, managers will need to  communicate, or provide a 
signal, to their employees as to their preferred type of relational contract and ensure that the 
relational contract chosen is implemented (Hermalin 1998). We know that the choice of 
incentive contract influences employees’ behavior (Carlin and Gervais 2009). When 
managers have discretion in the allocation of bonuses, this discretion allows managers to 
signal to their subordinates what is expected. Therefore, we investigate managers’ choices of 
relational contracts by looking at their discretionary bonus decisions. We discuss how two 
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types of discretionary bonus decisions reflect managers’ choice of relational contracts, 
separately.  
When managers have discretion to reward themselves, they can show whether they 
are willing to sacrifice short-term payoff for long-term payoff by deciding how much bonus 
they keep to themselves. If the manager takes a lower share of the bonus pool then she is 
signaling that she prefers actions that have long run benefits over actions that have short-term 
benefits. She signals that she wants a long-term relationship with the subordinates. There is 
the added benefit that subordinates receive a larger share of the bonus pool which would 
reinforce the importance of directing effort to long-term actions. Given that high-ability 
managers are more patient, we predict that high-ability managers are more likely to sacrifice 
short-term benefits for long-term benefits than low-ability managers and this will be reflected 
in the decision of keeping less bonus to themselves. Our prediction relating to the association 
beween managers’ ability and their decisions in allocating bonuses to themselves is 
summarized as follows:   
H1: Ceteris paribus, managerial ability is negatively associated with the share 
of bonus that managers keep for themselves.  
When managers have discretion to distribute bonus among their subordinates, the 
differentials in bonus allocation communicates preferences for competition or cooperation 
(Main et al. 1993; Lazear 1989). Given the fixed bonus pool, bonus allocation is a zero sum 
game. Giving one individual more reduces the other’s bonus. Therefore, large bonus 
differentials create tournament incentives which foster competition among employees rather 
than cooperation (Main et al. 1993). Managers use the decision on bonus differentials to show 
the extent to which they encourage cooperation or competition.  
The realization of long-term payoff depends on the cooperation among employees. 
Competition might encourage individual effort (Lazear and Rosen 1981), but it also 
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encourages uncooperative behaviors or sabotage among employees (Harbring and Irlenbusch 
2011; Lazear 1989).  While high-ability managers have the expertise to develop action plans 
for the long-term success, they also need to create an environment that encourages 
collaboration and cooperation among subordinates. They will create this environment through 
their bonus allocation decision. It follows that high-ability managers’ preference for 
cooperation over competition will result in lower differentials in the bonus allocation to 
subordinates.  
H2: Ceteris paribus, managerial ability is negatively associated with the 
degree of bonus differentials among employees. 
2.2.4. Performance Implications 
This study focuses on how managers’ ability affects their choice of relational contract 
by looking at their discretionary bonus decisions. It is managers’ ability that determines 
managers’ choices when managing their departments. There is evidence that managerial 
ability is related to performance on a number of dimensions (Demerjian et al. 2012). We 
predict that high-ability and low-ability managers choose different relational contracts to 
maximize their own long-term and short-term payoffs. Our arguments imply that managers 
maximize their utility based on different time horizons. It is thus possible that there may not 
be performance difference between high- and low- ability managers in any given time period, 
respectively. However, in the Trust game, the total payoff of managers and employees in the 
repeated game is higher than that in the one-shot game; that is, ongoing relational contracts 
result in larger welfare gains for the firm than period-by-period relational contracts. 
Under an ongoing relational contract, cooperative collaboration is sustained by the 
‘shadow of the future’ (Gibbons and Henderson 2012). Specifically, individuals take actions 
by considering the consequence of their actions on their future payoff. If a manager seek rents 
or exploit employees or employees exploit other employees, the ongoing relational contract 
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will break down. Therefore, it is less likely for managers and employees to take opportunistic 
behaviors under an ongoing relational contract, which directly translates into lower agency 
costs. Under a period-by-period contract, individuals maximize their payoff in the current 
period and pay less attention to the implication for the future. In that sense, it is more likely 
that people seek private benefits at the expense of the department. Hence, period-by-period 
relational contracts imply more opportunism and result in higher agency costs.  
In sum, we predict that ability (along with their chosen relational contracts) is 
positively associated with departmental performance. However, it is not easy to document the 
hospital’s performance, which includes not only financial performance but also quality of 
medical services (e.g., patient outcomes and hospital reputation), some of which can only be 
easily measured in the short term. Due to the complexity of the hospital performance and data 
limitations, we only present limited empirical evidence on financial performance without a 
formal statement of hypothesis. 
2.3. Research Design 
In this section, we first describe the research site, including the design of the incentive 
plan. Next, we describe the sample and the data used to test our hypotheses. We then explain 
how we measure the variables of interest. We also present descriptive statistics.  
2.3.1. Research Site 
We require a research setting with two features: (1) managers’ ability is measurable, 
and (2) the manager has complete discretion to make performance evaluation and 
compensation decisions. Our research site is a large general hospital in China, with 34 
clinical departments. It has the highest rank in the classification system of Chinese hospitals,
7
 
and it is the only general hospital situated in a largely rural area. Each clinical department has 
                                                 
7
 There are nine levels in the classification system of Chinese hospitals. There are three tiers and each tier has 
three subsidiary levels. The classification is based on a hospital’s ability to provide medical care, such as level 
of service provision, size, medical technology, and medical equipment.   
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a physician as a department head. There are three types of clinical departments: medical, 
surgical, and medical support.
8
 The revenues for the hospital over the investigation period 
(i.e., 2007–2010) have grown by 1.86 times.
9
 Revenues come from both outpatient (40%) and 
inpatient services (60%). The hospital has a profit center reporting structure in which all 
patient revenues are allocated to the departments as earned and all direct costs incurred where 
expended.         
The management of clinical departments requires expert clinical knowledge and a 
management structure based on expertise rather than on a formal hierarchical structure. 
What’s more, in this particular hospital, physicians do not have better outside opportunities in 
the region, resulting in low turnover of the medical staff. These long-term working relations 
further increase the salience of relational contracts at our research site. Once the informal 
agreements or unwritten conducucts have been established, they will have far reaching 
influences on employees’ behaviors. Heads of clinical departments all have the same 
hierarchical authority but may differ in their ability.
10
 We expect that the ability of clinical 
heads will vary across departments in our sample.  
We focus only on the clinical staff, which includes both physicians and nurses. For 
each month, the size of the clinical staff ranges from 480 to 496 individuals. Physicians and 
nurses in the clinical departments receive a fixed salary as well as a bonus determined on a 
monthly basis. The hospital has a group bonus system in which the monthly department 
bonus pool is determined by the monthly department profit. There is no explicit formula for 
                                                 
8
 Medical departments include Pediatrics, Nephrology, Neurology and Gastroenterology. Surgical departments 
include Obstetrics and Gynecology, Urology, Orthopedics, Stomatology, and Neurosurgery. Medical support 
departments include Radiology, Ultra-sonography, and Pathology.  
9
 This revenue growth is partially due to the reform of the rural cooperative medical system (RCMS). Under 
RCMS, the government reimburses the medical spending of listed major medical treatment for those living in 
rural areas. 
10
 Ability as reflected in the expertise of physicians is also of value for the hospital because it is instrumental in 
attracting patients and thus revenue to the hospital. Patients are unable to objectively evaluate service quality 
and thus are attracted to hospitals with high-ability physicians. 
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allocating individual bonuses within the departments. The hospital does not set any 
individual-level performance indicators for either physicians or nurses. The general guideline 
is that department heads should reward a given subordinate according to his contribution to 
the department. However, the hospital does not document any individual-level performance 
data (e.g., revenue generated, number of patients treated, and quality of treatment). 
Nonetheless, there is one clear rule that limits the department head’s bonus: it cannot be more 
than 3.5 times the average bonus of all subordinates within the department. Apart from this 
restriction, the allocation of the bonuses within the department is completely at the discretion 
of the department head. The department head has to make two decisions: (1) the fraction of 
the bonus pool she keeps for herself and (2) how much to differentiate the bonuses among 
subordinates in the department.
11
 We study the role of ability in both these decisions.  
2.3.2. Data  
The hospital provided us with proprietary archival data. Data are available with 
respect to (1) monthly departmental performance, such as revenue, profit, and cost;
12
 (2) 
monthly salary and bonus data at the individual level; and (3) personnel data, including age, 
tenure, and gender.
13
 In addition to the proprietary archival data, we collect information from 
the hospital’s website on the physicians’ personal details including prizes and their 
memberships in medical professional associations. The hospital also identifies “star” 
physicians on the website. We rely on these data to measure managers’ ability. Data are 
available from 2007 to 2010. Our data cover those formally employed by the hospital, 
including physicians and nurses. We have data for each nurse, physician, and head on a 
monthly basis grouped by department. The average department size in terms of the number of 
                                                 
11
 There is nothing that restricts the sharing of compensation information within the hospital although the 
information is not publicly available. As in most organizations, people care about their relative compensation 
and thus are incentivized to seek information about others’ compensation through informal communication 
channels. We expect this to be the case in our setting.  
12
 The cost data is at an aggregated level and does not separate out direct costs from hospital overhead costs. 
13
 In our sample, only four department heads (out of 34) are female. 
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individuals, which includes heads and subordinates, is 16. The ratio of variable bonus to fixed 
pay at the department level is 2.5 (see Table 1), suggesting that bonuses are an economically 
meaningful part of total compensation.
14
 Each department head’s average salary is about 
twice the average salary of subordinates (see Table 3). There are 230 unique physicians and 
290 unique nurses in our sample.  
<Insert Table 1 here> 
2.3.3. Variable Measurement 
Explanatory Variable: Managerial Ability 
Department heads are the unit of analysis. They all have the same formal authority to 
make department bonus pool allocation decisions; what varies between the department heads 
is their ability. Given prior research demonstrating that the number of ‘stars’ (i.e. a proxy for 
ability) in a team influences team performance, we take also measure of subordinates’ ability 
(Groysberg et al. 2011). We compute the ability of the head and of her subordinates. We have 
two ways to account for subordinates’ ability in our analyses: (1) including heads’ own 
ability and subordinates’ ability (as a control variable) and (2) including the ability of heads 
relative to their subordinates’s ability, namely relative ability. We compute the relative ability 
poxy by measuring the distance between the head’s credentials and those of the subordinates.  
Our ability proxies use observable markers of ability, namely verifiable indicators of 
expertise, competence, reputation and experience. Based on prior research, we use age, 
tenure, education level, and the ranking of the graduate school at which the individual 
completed his degree as indicators of ability (Finkelstein 1992; Bunderson 2003). Table 2 
presents descriptive statistics on these indicators. Age and tenure reflect experience; 
similarly, education level and the graduate school ranking capture competence or expertise in 
an individual’s professional domain. We also use the number of prizes won, the number of 
                                                 
14
 The size of the bonus relative to the fixed salary is consistent with the evidence in Cooke (2004).  
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memberships in professional associations, and whether a given individual is identified as a 
‘star’ physician on the hospital’s website to capture the professional prominence. Together, 
we have seven indicators of ability, which are listed in Appendix 1.  
We construct our empirical measure of “Ability” as follows. First, we perform a 
principal component analysis (promax rotation) on the seven indicators using the physician 
sample, which includes both heads and subordinate physicians.
15
 The seven indicators load 
on three factors, labeled Prestige, Experience, and Education. The rotated factor pattern 
(untabulated) is consistent with the correlation among the seven ability indicators (see Table 
2, Panel A); Membership, Prize, and Star are highly correlated and load on the factor we 
label “Prestige”; Tenure and Age load on the factor we label Experience; Edu_level and 
Edu_ranking load on the factor we label Education. The three factors explain more than 80% 
of the variation in the seven indicators.   
<Insert Panel A of Table 2 here> 
Next, we compute the factor score on each factor for each physician. Hence, each 
physician in the sample has three factor scores, namely for (1) Prestige, (2) Experience, and 
(3) Education. Note that these factor scores have been standardized and allow for 
comparison, but the absolute value of these score does offer an economic interpretation. After 
computing the factor scores of each physician, we use two different methods to create the 
head’s ability measure: (1) the aggregate ability for heads and subordinates and (2) the 
relative ability (Ability_Gap) on each factor. Figure 1 in Appendix 2 schematically illustrates 
the way in which we construct Ability by using the head’s and subordinates’ ability scores.  
<Insert Figure 1 here> 
                                                 
15
 Presumably, department heads have professional skills similar to other physicians, but not to nurses. Nurses 
typically do not have the capacity to decide on the medical treatment or coordinate physicians. Thus, we do not 
include “nurses” when constructing our empirical measure of ability. 
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The head’s aggregate ability (Head_Ability) is the sum of her raw ability score across 
three factors, Head_Prestige, Head_Experience, and Head_Education. Similar to the head’s 
aggregate ability, the subordinate physicians’ aggregate ability (Sub_Ability) is the sum of 
Sub_Prestige, Sub_Experience, and Sub_Education. We use Ability_Gap (i.e., the “relative” 
ability) to describe the head’s ability relative (Head_Ability) to that of the subordinate 
physicians (Sub_Ability). Ability_Gap is the difference between the head’s and the 
subordinate physicians’ aggregate abilty scores. Each head ultimately has six related ability 
scores to construct her Ability_Gap, Head_Prestige, Head_Experience, Head_Education, 
Sub_Prestige, Sub_Experience, and Sub_Education. Given that the head’s relative ability can 
be described vis-à-vis the ability of any member of subordinate physicians, we take the 
maximum score on each factor among subordinate physicians for each department as the 
subordinates’ ability score.  
Clearly, managers’ ability does not vary much over time. Given this time invarient 
feature of managers’ ability, our empirical tests do not rely on change in ability but exploit 
the variations in ability “between” department heads (i.e., cross-sectional tests).  
Relational Contracts: Discretionary Bonus Decisions  
To understand the association between managers’ ability and the relational contracts, 
it is important to capture the component of a bonus that best reflects managers’ choice of 
relational contracts. Recall that the head determines her own bonus; we want to determine if 
she allocates herself an abnormally large share or a lower share. For the allocation bonus 
decision for subordinates we also need a benchmark that will determine the degree of 
differentiation from what would normally be expected. Thus, we use the abnormal bonus to 
capture the part of bonus which deviates from what each individual expects to earn. Based on 
each individual’s abnormal bonus, we further construct two measures that capture (1) the 
abnormal size of the bonus of the manager (Head_Abnm) and (2) the standard deviation of 
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abnormal size of bonus of subordinates (Sub_Abnm). Head_Abnm reflects the extent to which 
heads give up short-term bonus in exchange for long term gains; Sub_Abnm represents the 
degree of heads’ preference for cooperation over competition among subordinates. We treat 
these two measures as manifestation of relational contracts.   
The hospital policy states that bonuses should be based on each individual’s 
“contribution” to the department. To separate abnormal bonus from the total bonuses, our 
empirical strategy is to find the objective referent distribution that might resemble a 
“contribution” distribution. We measure abonormal bonus as the deviation from the referent 
distribution. Fixed salary generally represents the average of a given individual’s productivity 
and thus reflects their contribution to the department’s performance.
16
 Given that there is no 
objective individual performance information available from our research site, we propose 
that the distribution of fixed salary within the department is a reasonable approximation for 
the unobservable normal bonus distribution. For example, the department head usually 
receives a higher salary than the subordinates. Accordingly, subordinates might expect the 
department head to receive a bonus relative to their higher salary. The normal bonus does not 
contain any indication of managers’ choice of relational contracts. As decribed in the bonus 
policy, a valid referent distribution should reflect the individuals’ relative average 
productivity within a department.
17
  
As the bonus pool and the number of employees vary across departments, we need to 
have a scale-free measure to capture the variations in abnormal bonus between departments. 
Given the departmental bonus pool system, what matters is the slice (i.e., the share) of the 
departmental bonus pool that each individual receives. Therefore, our computation of bonus 
                                                 
16
 Department heads do not have discretion in deciding the physicians’ or nurses’ salaries. There is a salary 
schedule in which the prescribed salaries vary with objective achievements that include the education level, 
tenure, and professional certification of a staff member.   
17
 Allocating the bonus equally to each individual within a department is not a good referent distribution because 




decisions is based on the slice measure. We use the “salary slice” (a proxy for each 
individual’s relative contribution to the department) as the appropriate benchmark to 
determine the size of the abonormal bonus for both the head of the department and the 
subordinates within the department. We take the salary slice
18
 within the department as the 
benchmark and take the difference between the bonus slice (Paid_Bonus_Slice) and the 
salary slice (Salary_Slice) as the abnormal bonus slice for each individual. We define paid 
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where subscript i represents each individual, j the department, and t the calendar 
month.  
Turning to the measurement of managers’ choices of relational contracts with two 
types of bonus decisions, we construct the head’s abnormal bonus slice (Head_Abnm) as the 
difference between actual paid bonus slice and salary slice. With respect to the indication of 
cooperation or competition among subordinates, we are interested in the extent to which the 
department head differentiates between subordinates when allocating the remaining bonus to 
subordinate. We measure the department head’s choices for the degree of subordinates’ 
cooperation as the dispersion of the subordinates’ abnormal bonus slices. Specifically, we 
compute the standard deviation of the subordinates’ abnormal bonus slice within a given 
                                                 
18
 The salary slice is smaller than the maximum bonus slice restricted by the hospital’s compensation policy. 
Since the salary slice is not above the enforced cap, the deviation from the salary slice is still at the manager’s 
discretion. Salary slice is qualified to be used to determine the referent distribution.   
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department and use this measure as the proxy for the type of relational contracts which 
managers demostrate in the subordinates’ bonus allocation decision (Sub_Abnm). We assume 
that each department head uses the salary slice as the “referent distribution,” but we 
recognize that this may not be the case in practice. However, since we are interested in 
variations in managers’ choice of relational contracts across department heads, holding our 
computation of abnormal bonus constant across departments helps to capture the variation in 
managers’ choices.  
2.3.4. Descriptive Statistics 
Panel B of Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics of the ability measures. The 
department head’s score on the Prestige factor (1.51) is higher on average than the 
subordinates’ (−0.08). However, this is not the case for Experience and Education factors. 
Evidently, to the extent that the ability of heads and subordinates differs, Prestige is the root 
cause.  
<Insert Panel B of Table 2 here> 
Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics of the bonus allocation. Panel A of Table 3 
shows that the average proportion that the department heads keep for themselves 
(Paid_Bonus_Slice) is 21%. The average maximum bonus percentage prescribed by hospital 
policy would amount to 26% (untabulated). In other words, the department heads, on 
average, do not award themselves the maximum amount possible. Panel C of Table 3 also 
shows that high-ability heads on average allocate a lower bonus to themselves and 
differentiate less among their subordinates than low-ability heads.  
<Insert Table 3 here> 
Table 4 presents the Pearson correlations among variables. There is a negative and 
significant relation between department head’s relative ability (Ability_Gap) and the 
manifestation of relational contracts in two types of discretionary bonus decisions 
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(Head_Abnm, r =−0.36, p<0.01; Sub_Abnm, r =−0.14, p<0.01). This finding too is consistent 
with our hypothesis that high-ability managers (low-ability managers) prefer to maintain an 
ongoing relational contracts (a period-by-period relational contract).  
<Insert Table 4 here> 
2.4. Empirical Models and Results 
 We describe the empirical models and the findings for hypotheses H1 and H2 in 
Ability and Discretionary Bonus Decisions before turning to the tests regarding the 
performance implications of managers’ ability in Performance Effect of Ability.   
2.4.1. Managerial Ability and Discretionary Bonus Decisions 
We test whether differences in ability between heads explain their discretionary bonus 
decisions. We use the abnormal component of managers’ bonus decisions as the dependent 
variable and ability as the variable of interest. We have two models with different dependent 
variables. First, we use the head’s abnormal bonus slice (i.e., Head_Abnm). Second, we use 
the standard deviation of subordinates’ abnormal bonus slice (i.e., Sub_Abnm). We specify 
our two empirical models for H1 and H2 as follows:  
Head_Abnmjt=α0 + α1 Abilityjt+ α2 Dep_Profitjt+α3 Dep_Sizejt  + α4 Physician_ratiojt  
                      + α5 Dep_Medicinej + α6 Dep_Surgeryj + εjt                                         (4) 
Sub_Abnmjt= β0 + β1 Abilityjt+ β2 Dep_Profitjt+ β3 Dep_Sizejt  + β4 Physician_ratiojt   
                    + β5 Dep_Medicinej + β6 Dep_Surgeryj + εjt                                        (5) 
where subscript j represents each department, and t the calendar month. Models (4) 
and (5) are estimated at the department level by pooled OLS regression with robust standard 
errors clustered by department. 
 We include as control variables measures of the department’s current performance, 
department size, and other department characteristics because these variables might 
systematically affect managers’ decisions on abnormal bonus. We include current department 
profit (Dep_Profit), which determines the bonus pool. We include the department size, the 
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number of physicians and nurses (Dep_Size) and the proportion of physicians 
(Physician_ratio). Finally, we use two proxy variables, Dep_Medicine and Dep_Surgery, to 
capture any task, clinical, or risk differences between departments that have the potential to 
influence discretionary bonus decisions. Finally, we include year fixed effects.
19
 
 We have four specifications that differ with respect to the measure of ability. First, we 
include the heads’ and subordinates’ aggregate ability scores (e.g., Head_Ability and 
Sub_Ability). Second, we include the heads’ and subordinate’s raw ability scores on three 
factors. In this specification, there are six variables: Head_Prestige, Head_Experience, 
Head_Education, Sub_Prestige, Sub_Experience, and Sub_Education. Third, we include the 
heads’ relative ability scores on three factors, namely Ability_Gap_Prestige, 
Ability_Gap_Experience, and Ability_Gap_Education. Fourth, we include a single relative 
ability measure, Ability_Gap.   
We base our prediction and interpretations on the first specification where controlling 
for subordinates’ ability (Sub_Ability) we examine the association between departmental 
heads’ ability (Head_Ability) and discretionary bonus decisions. Hypotheses H1 and H2 
predict that Head_Ability is negatively associated with Head_Abnm and Sub_Abnm, 
respectively.  
While we did not hypothesize the effect of the head’s relative ability on the abnormal 
bonus of the head’s discretionary bonus decisions separately, it is straightforward to predict 
that the head’s relative ability is negatively correlated with the abnormal component of the 
head’s discretionary bonus decisions given that the head’s relative ability is the difference 
between the head’s and the subordinates’ aggregate ability. 
                                                 
19
 We check whether our results are sensitive to the inclusion of month fixed effects, which potentially capture 
the impact of hospital-wide profits on the discretionary bonus decisions. Untabulated results are qualitatively the 
same as reported in the primary tables. Details are available upon request. 
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The results of Models (4) and (5) are generally consistent with our hypotheses. With 
respect to the abnormal bonus that the head keep to herself, we hypothesize that Head_Ability 
is negatively associated with Head_Abnm. Table 5 (Panel A) reports the findings of the four 
specifications of Model (4). The results in column (1) of Table 5 Panel A show separate 
effects of the head’s and the subordinates’ aggregate ability. In column (1), the coefficient for 
Head_Ability is significantly negative (−1.102, p<0.01). Heads with high aggregate ability 
have lower abnormal bonus slices than heads with low aggregate ability. While the head’s 
aggregate ability (Head_Ability) reduces Head_Abnm, the subordinate’s aggregate ability 
(Sub_Ability) increases Head_ Abnm (0.850, p<0.1). This result shows that it is not only the 
head’s ability but also the subordinates’ ability that matters when managers decide on the 
type of the relational contracts. Consistent with our H1, keeping all else equal, when dealing 
with subordinates with the same ability, high-ability heads retain a smaller abnormal bonus 
slice than low-ability heads.  
<Insert Panel A of Table 5 here>  
Overall, the negative relationship between Head_Ability and Head_Abnm is consistent 
with our hypothesis. Heads with high ability prefer to give up more bonus to subordinates in 
exchange for future return than heads with low ability, and hence they retain a smaller 
abnormal bonus slice than heads with low ability. 
With respect to the bonus decisions in differentiating between subordinates, we 
hypothesize that a head’s ability reduces the degree of discretionary differentiation in 
subordinates’ bonus. The results of Model (5) are reported in Panel B of Table 5. In column 
(1), the coefficient for Head_Ability is significantly negative (−0.198, p<0.01). Column (1) 
indicates that the head with high aggregate ability (Head_Ability) differentiates between 
subordinates to a lesser extent than the head with low aggregate ability. However, unlike our 
findings for the head’s abnormal bonus slice (Head_Abnm), the subordinates’ aggregate 
32 
 
ability (Sub_Ability) does not affect the head’s decisions in differentiating between 
subordinates’ bonuses.  
<Insert Panel B of Table 5 here>  
Overall, the negative relationship between Head_Ability and Sub_Abnm is consistent 
with our hypothesis. Heads with high ability do not want to encourage competition among 
subordinates when they maintain an ongoing relational contract and hence differentiate 
between the subordinates’ bonuses to a lesser extent than heads with low ability choosing a 
period-by-period relational contracts within their department.  
As a whole, the findings support our prediction that the head’s ability is negatively 
associated with (1) the abnormal bonus slice they keep to themselves and (2) the extent to 
which they differentiate when allocating bonuses among subordinates. We interpret those 
findings as evidence that high-ability managers maintain an ongoing relational contract by 
rewarding themselves less and differentiating subordinates less, and that low-ability 
managers are constrained to a period-by-period relational contracts where they reward 
themselves more and differentiate their subordinate more.   
2.4.2. Performance Effects of Managerial Ability  
We hypothesize that managers’ ability is associated with the type of relational 
contracts, and their choice will ultimately influence departmental performance. We are 
interested in the performance effect of different types of relational contracts. However, 
relational contracts are unobservable and discretionary bonus decisions only capture part of 
the contracts. To evaluate the performance implications, we test the performance effects of 
managers’ ability which drives the choice of relational contracts.
20
 We use managers’ ability 
as the independent variable, and financial performance (i.e., Dep_Revenue and Dep_Profit) 
                                                 
20
 Relational contracts are unobservable, and discretionary bonus decisions only capture part of the contracts. In 
that sense, managers’ ability is a better proxy for the choice of relational contracts.  
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as the dependent variable.
21
 We use Model (6) to test the performance consequences of 
discretionary bonus decisions.  
Performancejt=γ 0+ γ1Abilityjt +γ2Dep_Sizejt+ γ3 Physician_ratiojt+ γ4 Dep_Medicinej   
                                   + γ5 Dep_Surgeryj + εjt                                                                        (6) 
where subscript j represents each department, and t the calendar month. Model (6) is 
estimated at the department level by pooled OLS regression with robust stand errors clustered 
by department. The control variables are similar to those in Models (4) and (5).  
Note that Model (6) only shows the association between performance and managers’ 
ability, but does not allow us to draw any causality between them. We predict a positive 
association between the head’s ability and performance (i.e., γ1>0).  
Since subordinates’ ability might affect managers’ discretionary bonus decisions, we 
take this factor into account when evaluating performance implications of managers’ ability. 
We present the empirical results of Model (6) in Table 6. Panels A and B of Table 6 present 
the details of our estimations with the departmental profit (Dep_Profit) and the departmental 
revenue (Dep_Revenue) as the dependent variable, respectively.  
We treat ability either as a continuous variable in columns (1) and (2) or a binary 
viable in column (3) in each panel. In columns (1) and (2) of each panel, we do not find 
significantly positive association between managers’ ability and departmental performance, 
either Dep_Profit or Dep_Revenue. However, when we treat managers’ relative ability as a 
binary variable in column (3), we find that managers with high relative ability are associated 
with higher departmental profits and revenues, respectively (0.046, p<0.1 Panel A; 0.187, 
p<0.1 Panel B). Recognizing the multi-dimensional performance of the hospital and the 
concern with different time horizons, Table 6 provides limited evidence on the performance 
effect of managers’ ability. However, the evidence is consistent with the prediction that high 
                                                 
21
 Hospitals are not only concerned with financial performance, but also with the quality of treatment and 
operating efficiency. However, we do not have access to these data.   
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managerial ability (associated with ongoing relational contracts) is associated with better 
organizational performance than low managerial ability (jointly with period-by-period 
relational contracts).  
<Insert Table 6 here> 
2.4.3. Discussions of Alternative Explanations 
The theoretical foundations of our study are based on the assumption that ‘ability’ 
determines the choices managers make in determining bonus allocations. We view these 
choices as a manifestation of different types of relational contracts. Our arguments are based 
on Gibbons and Henderson’s (2012) description of the Trust game. The major limitation of 
our empirical design is that we do not have a direct measure of the relational contracts in 
force. Alternative arguments are plausible for both types of bonus decisions. We discuss our 
empirical findings in relation to prior literature on the association between personal 
characteristics and discretionary bonus decisions. As managerial ability is correlated with 
their power and reputation, we assess whether these two alternative personal characteristics 
explain our findings.  
Managerial power theory (MPT) would predict that the powerful managers are able to 
seek rents for themselves, so they will keep more bonuses for themselves (Bebchuk et al. 
2011). However, our empirical finding that high ability managers keep a smaller share of 
bonus for themselves than low ability mangers is contradictory to what MPT predicts.  
Another possible mechanism is the disciplining effect of reputation. Reputable 
managers are concerned about potential adverse economic consequence derived from their 
reputation loss (e.g., lower likelihood of career advancement or fewer outside opportunities), 
so they will avoid rewarding themselves with “excessive” bonus (Kuhnen and Niessen 2012). 
In other words, reputable managers will keep less bonus to themselves than managers with 
low reputation. However, it is not clear how managers’ reputation affect the way managers 
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allocate bonus to their subordinates. One possible prediction is that high reputation allows 
managers to justify their discretionary bonus decisions and they are more able to create 
tournament incentives with larger bonus differentials among employees. This conjecture 
results in the positive association between managers’ reputation (ability) and the degree of 
bonus differentials among subordinates, which is inconsistent with our finding.  
In sum, neither managerial power nor reputation explains our empirical findings on 
both types of bonus decisions in a consistent way. Although our empirical analyses are 
subject to some limitations, we do not find that alternative explanations explain our empirical 
findings.  
2.5. Conclusion 
The primary purpose of this study is to examine whether managerial ability influences 
the choice of relational contracts as manifested in discretionary bonus decisions. Data from a 
large hospital in China allow us to study this relation. The hospital grants decision rights to 
clinical managers of departments to allocate bonuses both to themselves and to their 
subordinates. Ability is particularly salient in professionally dominated organizations such as 
hospitals and is thus likely to be an important determinant of behavior.  
In our setting we find that high-ability managers keep less abnormal bonus slice and 
differentiate their subordinates to a lesser extent than low-ability managers. Theoretical 
predictions relating to relational contracts are consistent with these findings. In essence, 
higher ability managers not only have the expertise and judgment to implement repeated 
relational contracts which require collaboration and cooperation among employees in the 
long run, they have the patience to wait for the long term benefits that accrue from these 
contracts. The bonus decision allows the manager to establish the informal agreement within 
the department that long run actions are desired and that the returns from such actions will 
accrue higher payoffs than short run actions.  
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Based on descriptions of the Trust game, we would expect that ongoing relational 
contracts, implemented to create a collaborative working environment, would deliver greater 
long term benefits for the department/hospital than a competitive environment. While we are 
not able to design a direct test on the association between performance and relational 
contracts, our results do provide support for prior research demonstrating that ‘ability’ is 
correlated to positive economic outcomes (Dohmen et al. 2010).  
Our study contributes to prior research in a number of ways. First, we shed some light 
on one dimension of relational contracts by examining how different types of managers 
influence the choices made in the implementation of relational contracts. We contribute to 
empirical research on performance evaluation and compensation design, particularly those 
studies concerned with subjectivity (Bol 2011; Ederhof 2010). We also contribute to more 
recent research in accounting on the effect of managerial traits on economic decisions (Jia et 
al. 2014; Benmelech and Frydman In press) and the literature examining how ‘ability’ affects 
managerial decision making more widely. Our study also speaks to prior research on 
hospitals, particularly studies concerned with the adverse consequences when physicians 
dominate decision making (Ramanujam and Rousseau 2006).  
We limit our study to the impact of discretionary bonus decisions on the financial 
performance of the department; others have demonstrated that physicians with high levels of 
ability and expertise can have a beneficial effect on other professionals in the clinical unit as 
well as on the quality of the work performed (Ramanujam and Rousseau 2006; Nembhard 
and Edmondson 2006). Our results would suggest similar conclusions; high ability physician 
managers are more likely to create a collaborative environment focused on long term 
outcomes than a competitive environment focused on short term outcomes. It is unclear from 
our limited performance data what is most desirable from the perspective of the hospital.  
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A potential limitation of our study is that we use data from one large hospital in 
China. However, we have no reason to believe that our findings would not hold in other large 
hospitals where the decision-making structure is dominated by highly trained physicians. We 
only measure financial performance outcomes. Data restrictions did not enable us to measure 
quality outcomes at the department level, although future research could incorporate both 
efficiency and effectiveness outcomes. Despite these potential limitations, this study 
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Appendix 1: Definitions of Ability Indicators 
Factors of Ability 
 
Variable Description 
Prestige Membership The number of memberships of medical 
professional associations, which is shown on 
the hospital’s website 
Prizes The number of prizes, which is shown on the 
hospital’s website 
Star Dummy variable, 1 if the hospital’s website 
indicates the individual is a star 
Education Edu_level Education level, ranges from doctoral degree 
(100) to high school diploma (60).
22
 The larger 
value means higher education level. 
Edu_ranking Based on the top 100 medical schools in China, 
the indicator ranges from 0 to 100. 100 
represents the best medical school. Any 
medical school not listed in the top 100 
medical schools is coded 0. The larger value 
means higher ranking of the school.  
Experience Tenure The number of years employed at the hospital 
Age 
 
The individual’s age 
 
                                                 
22
 Those employees with high school diplomas work in medical support departments and have special skills in 
operating the equipment and analyzing the images. 
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Appendix 2: Ability Composition 
Figure 1 
















Head_Ability (A) =the department head’s aggregate ability 
=Head_Prestige+Head_Experience+Head_Education 
=a1+a2+a3 
Sub_Ability (B) =the subordinates’ aggregate ability 



















Appendix 3: Variable Descriptions 
Variable Description 
Dep_Profit =the current departmental profit 
Dep_Revenue =the department monthly revenue 
Dep_Bonus_Pool 
 
=the department bonus based on department monthly 
performance 
=sum of the all individuals’ bonus in the department 
Dep_Sum_Salary =sum of the all individuals’ salary in the department 
Paid_Bonus_Slice =the ratio of each individual’s bonus to the sum of all 
individuals’ bonus in the department  
Salary_Slice =the ratio of each individual’s salary to the sum of all 
individuals’ salary in the same department 
Abnm_Bonus_Slice =Abnormal bonus slice=Paid_Bonus_Slice-Salary_Slice 
Head_Dis =the head’s abnormal bonus slice, which is the 
difference between the head’s actual bonus slice and 
her salary slice 
Sub_Dis =the standard deviation of subordinates’ abnormal bonus 
slice 
Head_Prestige =the department head’s factor score on Prestige factor 
Head_Experience =the department head’s factor score on Experience factor 
Head_Education =the department head’s factor score on Education factor 
Sub_Prestige =the subordinates’ factor score on Prestige factor 
Sub _Experience =the subordinates’ factor score on Experience factor 
Sub _Education =the subordinates’ factor score on Education factor 
Ability_Gap_Prestige =the department head’s relative ability on Prestige factor 
Ability_Gap_Experience =the department head’s relative ability on Experience 
factor 
Ability_Gap_Education =the department head’s relative ability on Prestige factor  
Head_Ability =the department head’s aggregate ability  
Sub_Ability =the subordinates’ aggregate ability  
Ability_Gap =the department head’s aggregate ability relative to the 
subordinates 
High_Ability =Dummy variable, 1 if the Ability_Gap is larger than the 
median; other wise 0 
Dep_Size = the total number of subordinates including physicians 
and nurses 
N_physician =the number of physicians 
N_nurse =the number of nurses 
Physician_ratio =N_physician/Dep_Size 
Dep_Medicine =Dummy variable, 1 if the department is a medical 
department (such as Pediatrics); otherwise 0 
Dep_Surgery =Dummy variable, 1 if the department is a surgical 




Table 1 Summary Statistics on Variables at the Department Level  
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Median Maximum 
Dep_Profit* 396,520 392,169 −1,790,577 302,512 3,442,268 
Dep_Revenue* 1,802,587 1,274,811 37,967 1,555,671 7,576,272 
Dep_Bonus_Pool* 116,697 89,448 1,205 91,949 681,808 
Dep_Sum_Salary* 46,060 27,749 5,124 39,650 183,489 
Head_Abnm  4.85 5.84 −22.06 3.59 24.51 
Sub_Abnm  2.02 1.72 0.31 1.57 16.92 
Dep_Size 15.58 9.43 2 13 41 
N_physician 7.33 4.04 2 7 22 
N_nurse 8.25 6.74 0 7 27 
*The values of Dep_Profit, Dep_Revenue, Dep_Bonus_Pool, and Dep_Sum_Salary have been rescaled because 
of confidentiality. The monetary unit is RMB (￥). 
 
Variable Definitions 
Dep_Profit =the departmental profit, which is the basis for bonus pool calculation 
Dep_Revenue =the department monthly revenue 
Dep_Bonus_Pool 
 
=the department bonus based on department monthly performance 
=the sum of the all individuals’ bonus in the department 
Dep_Sum_Salary =the sum of the all individuals’ salaries in the department 
Head_Abnms =the head’s discretionary bonus slice 
Sub_Abnm =the standard deviation of the subordinates’ discretionary bonus slice 
Dep_Size =the total number of subordinates including physicians and nurses 
N_physician =the number of physicians 





Table 2 Summary Statistics on Ability Indicators (Physician Sample) 
Panel A: Correlation among Ability Indicators 
  Membership Prize Star Edu_level Edu_ranking Tenure Age 
Membership 1             
                
Prize 0.61 1.00           
  (0.00)             
Star 0.63 0.79 1.00         
  (0.00) (0.00)           
Edu_level 0.04 0.04 0.08 1.00       
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)         
Edu_ranking 0.11 0.10 0.13 0.52 1.00     
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)       
Tenure 0.16 0.14 0.10 −0.33 −0.27 1.00   
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)     
Age 0.18 0.17 0.13 −0.28 −0.21 0.94 1.00 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)   
P-values are in parentheses. 
 
Panel B: Summary Statistics on Ability Measure (Factor Score) (N=1,422) 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Median Maximum 
a1 Head_Prestige 1.51 2.15 −0.28 0.68 5.80 
a2 Head_Experience 0.65 0.54 −0.41 0.60 2.02 
a3 Head_Education 0.16 0.81 −1.96 0.55 1.98 
A Head_Ability 2.32 2.52 −1.58 1.60 8.52 
b1 Sub_Prestige −0.08 0.43 −0.26 −0.24 1.48 
b2 Sub_Experience 1.02 0.75 −1.15 1.09 2.37 
b3 Sub_Education 1.23 0.89 −1.96 0.88 3.21 
B Sub_Ability 2.17 1.20 −1.58 2.35 4.64 
a1-b1 Ability_Gap_Prestige 1.59 2.07 −0.94 0.01 6.04 
a2-b2 Ability_Gap_Experience −0.37 0.79 −2.17 −0.32 1.22 
a3-b3 Ability_Gap_Education −1.07 1.09 −2.70 −1.12 2.33 
A- B Ability_Gap 0.15 2.16 −3.08 −0.59 5.83 
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Table 3 Bonus and Bonus Slice 
Panel A: Head Sample (N=1,422) 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Median Maximum 
Salary* (￥) 5,345 1,637 2,420 5,421 9,389 
Paid_Bonus* (￥) 17,426 7,878 294 16,343 63,910 
Paid_Bonus_Slice (%)  21.09 14.08 3.72 17.45 77.62 
Salary_Slice (%)  16.24 10.61 2.88 13.34 54.88 
Abnm_Bonus_Slice (%) 4.85 5.84 −22.06 3.59 24.51 
*The values of Salary and Paid_Bonus have been rescaled because of confidentiality.  
Panel B: Subordinate Sample (Physicians and Nurses) (N=21,020) 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Median Maximum 
Salary* (￥) 2,786 577 223 2,704 6,996 
Paid_Bonus* (￥) 6,802 3,538 0 6,246 42,859 
Paid_Bonus_Slice (%)  5.65 4.66 0.00 4.35 64.50 
Salary_Slice (%) 5.98 5.01 0.17 4.52 52.26 
Abnm_Bonus_Slice (%) −0.33 2.13 −25.71 −0.25 23.53 
*The numbers of Salary and Paid_Bonus have been rescaled because of confidentiality.  
Panel C: Descriptive Statistics of Differences between High and Low Ability Sample 





Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Diff. in Mean 
Dep_Profit* 478,897 420,698 313,211 341,671 165,685 *** 
Dep_Revenue* 2,142,829 1,444,308 1,458,494 962,047 684,335 *** 
Head_Abnm  2.84 5.51 6.88 5.46 −4.04 *** 
Sub_Abnm  1.67 1.20 2.39 2.09 −0.72 *** 
Dep_Size 16.75 8.98 14.39 9.73 2.36 *** 
N_physician 7.98 4.64 6.67 3.20 1.30 *** 
N_nurse 8.77 6.43 7.72 7.01 1.05 *** 
*The values of Dep_Profit, and Dep_Revenue have been rescaled because of confidentiality. The monetary unit 
is RMB (￥). *,**,*** Indicate statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels, 
respectively. 
 
Variable definitions: See Appendix 3. 
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Table 4 Pearson Correlation Table (N=1,422) 
  (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i) (j) (k) (l) (m) (n) (o) (p) (q) (r) (s) (t) 
(a)Dep_Profit 1                                    
                                       
(b)Dep_Revenue 0.72 1                                  
  (0.00)                                    
(c)Dep_Bonus_Pool 0.78 0.75 1                                
  (0.00) (0.00)                                  
(d)Paid_Bonus 0.60 0.47 0.63 1                  
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)                    
(e)Salary 0.29 0.36 0.28 0.24 1                
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)                  
(f)Dep_Size 0.57 0.65 0.82 0.20 0.31 1                            
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)                              
(g)N_physician 0.62 0.50 0.67 0.19 0.27 0.79 1                          
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)                            
(h)N_nurse 0.44 0.60 0.74 0.17 0.27 0.93 0.50 1                        
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)                          
(i)Paid_Bonus_Slice −0.41 −0.57 −0.57 −0.06 −0.37 −0.76 −0.63 −0.68 1                      
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)                        
(j)Head_Abnm −0.22 −0.34 −0.30 0.14 −0.65 −0.48 −0.42 −0.42 0.73 1                    
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)                      
(k)Sub_Abnm −0.36 −0.38 −0.40 −0.10 −0.28 −0.52 −0.42 −0.47 0.50 0.31 1                 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)                   
(l)Head_Prestige 0.30 0.28 0.21 0.25 0.52 0.15 0.31 0.02 −0.18 −0.37 −0.19 1               
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.37) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)                 
(m)Head_Experience 0.00 −0.04 −0.04 0.05 0.16 −0.07 0.01 −0.10 0.00 −0.07 0.07 0.05 1             
  ( 0.85 ) (0.12) (0.13) (0.08) (0.00) (0.01) (0.66) (0.00) (0.88) (0.01) (0.01) (0.04)               
(n)Head_Education 0.05 0.17 0.02 0.09 0.40 0.07 −0.09 0.15 −0.22 −0.25 −0.38 0.23 −0.19 1           
  (0.05) (0.00) (0.38) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)             
(o)Sub_Prestige −0.14 −0.24 −0.17 −0.01 0.09 −0.18 −0.12 −0.17 0.07 −0.07 0.02 0.29 0.44 −0.01 1          
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.66) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.48) (0.00) (0.00) (0.85)            
(p)Sub_Experience 0.23 0.15 0.27 0.16 0.05 0.22 0.32 0.12 −0.24 −0.08 −0.18 0.22 0.28 0.03 0.21 1      
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.09) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.20) (0.00)       
(q)Sub_Education 0.35 0.43 0.36 0.27 0.24 0.37 0.33 0.33 −0.38 −0.20 −0.28 0.33 −0.15 0.18 −0.09 −0.13 1    
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)      
(r)Head_Ability 0.27 0.29 0.18 0.25 0.61 0.14 0.24 0.05 −0.22 −0.41 −0.27 0.94 0.20 0.48 0.34 0.26 0.30 1   
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.08) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)     
(s)Sub_Ability 0.36 0.33 0.38 0.30 0.24 0.35 0.40 0.25 −0.41 −0.23 −0.32 0.48 0.22 0.16 0.42 0.60 0.63 0.51 1  
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)    
(t)Ability_Gap 0.12 0.15 −0.00 0.13 0.58 −0.04 0.06 −0.09 −0.03 −0.36 −0.14 0.83 0.11 0.47 0.16 −0.03 0.00 0.88 0.04 1 




Table 5 Regressions of Two Types of Abnormal Bonus on Ability 
Panel A: Regression of the Head’s Abnormal Bonus on Ability  
Head_Abnmjt=α0 + α1 Abilityjt+ α2Dep_Profitjt+ α3N_physicianjt+ α4 N_nursejt 
                                  + α5 Dep_Medicinej+ α6 Dep_Surgeryj + εjt                                                                      (4)                                             
Robust standard error is clustered at the department level and reported in parenthesis. We construct the subordinates’ 
ability by taking the maximum score on each factor among the subordinates. *,**,*** Indicate statistical 
significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively.   
 Head_Abnm Head_Abnm Head_Abnm Head_Abnm 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Head_Ability -1.102***    
 (0.218)    
Sub_ Ability  0.850*    
 (0.459)    
Head_Prestige  -1.052***   
  (0.249)   
Head_Experience  -2.828***   
  (0.999)   
Head_Education  -1.103   
  (0.803)   
Sub_Prestige  0.527   
  (1.080)   
Sub_Experience  1.600*   
  (0.892)   
Sub_Education  1.046   
  (0.740)   
Ability_Gap_Prestige   -1.092***  
   (0.233)  
Ability_Gap_Experience   -2.073***  
   (0.748)  
Ability_Gap_Education   -1.153**  
   (0.514)  
Ability_Gap    -1.115*** 
    (0.223) 
Dep_Profit 2.604 0.810 1.301 2.202 
 (2.442) (2.162) (2.206) (2.399) 
Dep_Size 1.610 0.876 -0.124 1.177 
 (4.150) (3.772) (3.954) (3.840) 
Physician_ratio -1.996 -2.718 -2.838 -2.280 
 (2.712) (3.065) (2.387) (2.457) 
Dep_Medicine -2.159 -3.506 -3.670* -2.515 
 (2.311) (2.457) (2.044) (2.074) 
Dep_Surgery 2.604 0.810 1.301 2.202 
 (2.442) (2.162) (2.206) (2.399) 
Year fixed effects Included Included Included  Included  
Observations 1,422 1,422 1,422 1,422 
Adjusted R
2 




Table 5 Regressions of Two Types of Abnormal Bonus on Ability (continued) 
Panel B: Regression of Dispersion of Subordinates’ Abnormal Bonus on Ability 
Sub_Abnmjt= β0 + β1 Abilityjt+ β2 Dep_Profitjt+ β3 N_physicianjt  + β4 N_nursejt   
                    + β5 Dep_Medicinej + β6 Dep_Surgeryj + εjt                                              (5) 
Robust standard error is clustered at the department level and reported in parenthesis. We construct the subordinates’ 
ability by taking the maximum score on each factor among the subordinates. *,**,*** Indicate statistical 
significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
  Sub_Abnm Sub_Abnm Sub_Abnm Sub_Abnm 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Head_Ability -0.198***    
 (0.070)    
Sub_ Ability  0.061    
 (0.077)    
Head_Prestige  -0.052   
  (0.059)   
Head_Experience  -0.206   
  (0.241)   
Head_Education  -0.739***   
  (0.187)   
Sub_Prestige  -0.187   
  (0.325)   
Sub_Experience  0.017   
  (0.129)   
Sub_Education  0.037   
  (0.117)   
Ability_Gap_Prestige   -0.164**  
   (0.071)  
Ability_Gap_Experience   -0.120  
   (0.149)  
Ability_Gap_Education   -0.376***  
   (0.132)  
Ability_Gap    (0.0775) 
    (0.099) 
Dep_Profit −0.063 0.019 −0.269 −0.143 
 (0.320) (0.330) (0.307) (0.321) 
Dep_Size -1.342** -1.549*** -1.838*** -1.558** 
 (0.549) (0.447) (0.636) (0.613) 
Physician_ratio -0.088*** -0.097*** -0.097*** -0.093*** 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.018) (0.017) 
Dep_Medicine -1.786 -2.042** -1.995 -2.024 
 (1.137) (0.909) (1.232) (1.268) 
Dep_Surgery -2.535** -1.848** -2.541** -2.674** 
 (1.140) (0.797) (1.216) (1.261) 
Year fixed effects Included Included Included Included 
Observations 1,375 1,375 1,375 1,375 
Adjusted R
2




Table 6 Regression of Performance on the Heads’ Ability  
Panel A: Profit and Ability 
Performancejt=γ 0+ γ1Abilityjt +γ2Dep_Sizejt+ γ3 Physician_ratiojt+ γ4 Dep_Medicinej   
                                   + γ5 Dep_Surgeryj + εjt                                                                     (6) 
Robust standard error is clustered at the department level and reported in parenthesis. We construct the subordinates’ 
ability by taking the maximum score on each factor among the subordinates. *,**,*** Indicate statistical 
significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels, respectively.  
  Dep_Profit Dep_Profit Dep_Profit 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Head_Ability 0.007   
 (0.005)   
Sub_Ability 0.011   
 (0.013)   
Ability_Gap  0.008  
  (0.005)  
High_Ability   0.046* 
   (0.023) 
Dep_Size 0.011*** 0.012*** 0.011*** 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
Physician_ratio 0.056 0.091 0.060 
 (0.054) (0.054) (0.054) 
Dep_Medicine -0.082* -0.062 -0.085 
 (0.046) (0.052) (0.053) 
Dep_Surgery -0.073 -0.049 -0.058 
 (0.045) (0.047) (0.047) 
Year fixed effects Included Included  Included  
Observations 1,422 1,422 1,422 
Adjusted R
2






Table 6 Regression of Performance on the Heads’ Ability (continued) 
Panel B: Revenue and Ability 
Performancejt=γ 0+ γ1Abilityjt +γ2Dep_Sizejt+ γ3 Physician_ratiojt+ γ4 Dep_Medicinej   
                                   + γ5 Dep_Surgeryj + εjt                                                                     (6) 
Robust standard error is clustered at the department level and reported in parenthesis. We construct the subordinates’ 
ability by taking the maximum score on each factor among the subordinates. *,**,*** Indicate statistical 
significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels, respectively.  
  Dep_Revenue Dep_Revenue Dep_Revenue 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Head_Ability 0.034   
 (0.023)   
Sub_Ability 0.016   
 (0.045)   
Ability_Gap  0.038  
  (0.023)  
High_Ability   0.187* 
   (0.101) 
Dep_Size 0.031*** 0.034*** 0.031*** 
 (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) 
Physician_ratio -0.366 -0.275 -0.404* 
 (0.227) (0.183) (0.221) 
Dep_Medicine -0.044 0.007 -0.092 
 (0.111) (0.110) (0.140) 
Dep_Surgery -0.166 -0.100 -0.146 
 (0.103) (0.091) (0.091) 
Year fixed effects Included Included  Included  
Observations 1,422 1,422 1,422 
Adjusted R
2

















 We investigate whether the homogeneity of a given firm’s workforce is associated with 
employee learning and their provision of effort. A workforce is more homogenous when it is 
made up of employees who are more similar on specific characteristics. Firms face a tradeoff 
between the costs and benefits of workforce homogeneity. On the one hand, a more homogenous 
workforce facilitates communication among employees, ultimately allowing workers to learn 
from each other and improve mutual monitoring. On the other hand, when employees are more 
alike, they might find it easier to collude against their bosses, hide information and conspire to 
reduce effort. 
We expect the effect of workforce homogeneity to depend on the unsolved control 
problems of incentive contracts. Firms use incentive contracts to mitigate the most salient 
conflicts-of-interest between employees and their principal. Even well-designed incentive 
contracts cannot address all agency problems, however, and we focus our attention on those 
which remain unsolved. We examine the effect of workforce homogeneity in a setting that offers 
different types of incentive contracts to workers employed in either of two production 
environments. These two production environments are at opposite ends of the spectrum, namely 
a production line with individual workstations and team production in which group members 
perform highly-related tasks. Consequently, we study the influence of incentive contracts and 
production environment jointly.   
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 As Baron and Kreps (2013) observe, firms may foster similarity among their employees 
for many reasons related to psychological or sociological complementarities. Consequently, 
employees more easily share information and find opportunities to work together when the 
workforce is more homogenous. Thus, when their jobs require significant amounts of 
cooperative effort or employees are in frequent contact and need to share abundant information, 
a more homogenous workforce reduces communication costs and facilitates cooperation (Prat 
2002; Ichino and Maggi 2000). By sharing information, employees increase the scope for 
learning from each other’s experiences. In addition, the more frequent interactions between 
coworkers in a homogenous workforce are likely to strengthen mutual monitoring.  
Workforce homogeneity, however, raises its own set of control problems. When 
employees are more similar, the probability increases that they collude and “sabotage” the firm’s 
monitoring systems (Towry 2003). Similarity also reduces the potential to learn from each 
other’s differences, potentially hampering innovation. We argue that whether the costs or the 
benefits of workforce homogeneity will dominate depends on the unsolved control problem in 
each production environment.  
We study the effects of workforce homogeneity using proprietary data from a 
manufacturing plant (referred to as PCM), which is located in a Special Economic Zone in 
China. This plant offers three features that we exploit in our tests. First, the PCM plant is 
structured in two different production environments (corresponding to different parts of the 
manufacturing process). In the first setting, workers are arranged in a production line. Each work 
station in the line performs a relatively stand-alone activity (with inventory buffers between 
stations to ensure that workers are isolated from upstream disruptions). In the production line, 




quality of the work done by earlier work stations. Consistent with the concern for quality in this 
setting, employees are subject to an individual incentive contract, in which each worker’s bonus 
increases in individual production efficiency, but the bonus is reduced when quality is poor. 
When workers share their information with others in the production line, employee learning 
about quality improves, but sharing information also exposes coworkers to bonus penalties. By 
colluding with each other, employees can prevent quality information from being shared. 
In the second setting, the work is organized in groups in which employees perform highly 
related tasks. Collaboration in the group is important for achieving desired outcomes and group 
members can learn about improving efficiency from the experience of working together with 
coworkers. In this setting, employees are subject to a group incentive contract, in which each 
member’s bonus increases in group-level efficiency. Group incentive contracts are vulnerable to 
individual team members free-riding on the efforts of others. Mutual monitoring among team 
members, however, reduces the scope for free-riding. Group members can, however, also collude 
to game the system, for example by reducing effort on those aspect of performance that are not 
measured in the incentive system. 
Second, firms in Special Economic Zones rely strongly on migrant workers, who tend to 
come from rural areas with few opportunities for non-agricultural employment and with limited 
schooling facilities. The jobs offered are usually for unskilled work, which matches the 
background of most migrants. Prospective workers come from across mainland China and thus 
have different hometowns; i.e. different places where they were born and raised. Regional 
differences are strong in China and extend over such important dimensions as language, food, 




employees captures many of those worker attributes that we a priori expect to influence the 
degree of workforce homogeneity.  
 Third, competition for labor is fierce with demand for unskilled labor exceeding supply in 
the local factor markets. Firms, including PCM, employ multiple strategies to recruit new 
personnel. One important channel is referrals. Current workers frequently encourage job 
candidates to apply for a job at PCM. The literature on recruitment sources has documented that 
current employees seek out in particular those candidates who they believe will be a good fit 
with the firm (Weller et al. 2009). In addition, we rely on prior studies which show that 
socialization processes after the new employee has been recruited are more intense as 
supervisors and peers tend to pay more attention to referred employees (Zottoli and Wanous 
2000). Socialization helps new employees to understand what is defined as expected behavior in 
the firm. In this sense, more intense socialization yields a more homogenous workforce. We thus 
use the recruitment channel (by referral or not) as an observable indicator for otherwise difficult 
to observe dimensions in which employees might be similar. A higher proportion of referred 
workers, then, increase workforce homogeneity.  
 Our setting thus provides us not only with two very different production environments, 
but also with two plausible empirical proxies to capture workforce homogeneity (namely, the 
hometown background of employees and the proportion of referred workers). To investigate the 
effect of workforce homogeneity on effort and learning in the two production environments, we 
split our sample into two samples corresponding to each setting and examine our predictions 
about workforce homogeneity separately within each sample. Throughout the study, we refer to 




sample (GROUP), whereas the Production line sample (LINE) comprises those employees 
working on independent activities under an individual incentive contract.  
        In the LINE sample, the unsolved control problem is the potential for coworkers to collude 
by not sharing information about quality. Information sharing, however, is a necessary ingredient 
for learning. We therefore examine how workforce homogeneity influences two types of 
learning, namely about more efficient work procedures and about quality. In the GROUP sample, 
the unsolved control problem is potential free riding on the efforts of team members. A more 
homogenous workforce is expected to improve mutual monitoring. Therefore, in this sample, we 
examine the effect of workforce homogeneity on effort choice. We also consider whether 
workforce homogeneity affects learning about efficiency. Information sharing is not an 
unresolved control problem in this sample, and homogeneity should improve the communication 
among group members necessary for learning. However, homogeneity also reduces the scope for 
learning from others in the group, simply because when group members have less diverse 
experiences from which they can learn. In GROUP, quality is not measured and therefore we 
cannot analyze how workforce homogeneity affects learning about quality. 
 Our results are broadly consistent with the hypothesis that workforce homogeneity is 
associated with employee learning, but we do not find evidence on the association between 
workforce homogeneity and the provision of effort. In the LINE sample, we find that workforce 
homogeneity (when measured using referral ratio) decreases learning about quality. In the 
GROUP sample, we find that a more homogenous workforce improves group learning about 
efficiency. We interpret these findings as demonstrating that studying the effects of workforce 
homogeneity requires finely grained data on the structural arrangements in the firm. It turns out 




workstations with the associated incentive contracts). The specifics of the production 
environment might reverse the sign on the effect of workforce homogeneity on learning.  
 Our study extends the accounting literature in three ways. First, we document that 
workforce homogeneity has different learning consequences depending on the organization 
design of the firm. This finding complements Campbell (2012) who shows that firms can resolve 
control problems by selecting employees whose preferences are aligned with those of the firm. 
Building on this important insight, we document that a more homogenous workforce can have 
both positive and negative effects on firm performance depending on the specifics of the 
production environment.  
 Second, we highlight that workforce homogeneity does not only matter in determining 
the employee’s effort, but also influence their learning. We document that homogeneity can both 
improve the communication and information exchange that is needed for learning as well as that 
it can harm learning (arguably) by enabling collusion with coworkers.  
 Third, our study provides insights relating to earlier experimental evidence on monitoring 
in teamwork environments (Towry 2003; Zhang 2008). This earlier work focuses on “team 
identity”, i.e., a psychological attachment of team members to the team, and investigates the 
effectiveness of monitoring systems while manipulating team identity. We provide an economic 
perspective and argue that when team members are more homogenous, communication within 
the group improves and, in turn, so does employee learning. A homogenous workforce increases 
the likelihood that a team identity arises. At the same time, our findings show that workforce 
homogeneity might be less beneficial when employees are not working in a team but in 




3.2. Hypothesis Development 
3.2.1. The Effect of Homogeneity on Effort and Learning 
 Firms have to tradeoff the costs and benefits of workforce homogeneity. Baron and Kreps 
(2013) suggest that most firms are vexed by the question of how much uniformity among 
employees to impose across subunits and locales. The costs of imposing homogeneity on the 
workforce include those associated with not reflecting in the control systems the potentially 
varied tasks in which employees are involved. Campbell (2012) is one of the first studies to 
provide evidence on the potential benefits of homogeneity, namely that firms can reduce control 
problems by selecting employees who share the objectives of the firm. To the extent that firms 
are successful in this pursuit, the resulting workforce will become more homogenous—at least 
on the dimensions of the beliefs, values, and objectives the employees share (Van den Steen 
2010). Ultimately, as the objectives of firm and workforce overlap more, the conflict of interest 
between bosses and subordinates abates and the firm needs to rely less on contractual solutions 
(such as, monitoring systems, performance measures, and incentives) to induce workers to 
provide effort on the job. Homogeneity may also help to establish a social norm or identity 
(Akerlof and Kranton 2005; Akerlof and Kranton 2008), which in turn can be beneficial to 
inducing employees to work (Abernethy et al. 2014).   
Homogeneity of the workforce does not only affect effort through the reduction of 
within-firm agency problems. A more homogenous workforce is able to coordinate activities 
more efficiently, raising the scope for cooperation among coworkers. Homogeneity provides the 
common ground necessary for the exchange of ideas and information as well as for mutual 




 Workforce homogeneity, however, is not just expected to affect employee effort. 
Learning as well is likely a function of homogeneity. Employees can accumulate knowledge 
while performing their duties via both individual experience and the experience of working with 
others (Reagans et al. 2005). Workforce homogeneity is expected to matter foremost in the 
learning by working with others. Again, language is an important mechanism in this type of 
learning. A common language helps to improve communication efficiency (easing the task of 
learning to coordinate with coworkers) and facilitates the sharing of knowledge between 
coworkers. In a more homogenous workforce, workers will be better able to understand subtle 
non-verbal codes, gestures, and facial expressions. Together, this improved understanding 
smoothens the interaction between coworkers necessary for learning.  
Learning, however, also depends on coworkers to have different knowledge and/or 
experience. Diversity in talents, backgrounds, and skills fosters the kind of experimentation 
learning theory suggests to be crucial for generating new knowledge (Hayes et al. 2006; 
Vanhaverbeke et al. 2006). In balance, which of these effects of workforce homogeneity on 
learning dominates, will depend on the specifics of the production environment. If workers 
conduct relatively routine, well-defined tasks in a highly standardized setting then homogeneity 
is likely to improve learning (given its beneficial effects on coordination and mutual 
understanding). In an environment that is more uncertain, featuring ambiguity and non-routine 
tasks that require combining knowledge and information from many different sources to create 
new knowledge, homogeneity plausibly harms learning.  
The improved opportunities for collusion present another significant potential costs to 
having a more homogenous workforce. Economic theory clarifies that collusion can only be a 




(Mookherjee 2013) Collusion is more probable among agents who for some reason believe that 
they can rely on the counterparty’s promises to act together against the principal. Arguably, these 
beliefs will be stronger in case of coworkers who understand better their mutual backgrounds and 
(language) codes.  
In sum, workforce homogeneity can reduce control problems, increase effort provision, 
and support employee learning. At the same time, homogeneity makes it easier for workers to 
collude against the principal and reduces the opportunity for workers to learn from each other’s 
differences. In the next section, we attempt to predict which of these forces dominates in the two 
production environment and incentive contract arrangements available within our setting. 
3.2.2. Homogeneity in the LINE Sample 
The production tasks for each worker on the line are simple and require only routine 
actions. The key dimensions of worker output (namely their efficiency and quality) are easy to 
measure. Individual incentive contracts are high-powered and penalize workers if they increase 
efficiency at the expense of quality. Thus, in the context of PCM’s line production, we do not 
expect that eliciting optimal effort on the job is a salient contracting problem.  
At the same time, however, in the line production setting, individual productivity 
improvements mainly come from the worker’s own experience on the job. Indeed, as all work 
stations perform their own unique part of the production process, co-workers do not have much 
relevant information about how to improve the efficiency of those tasks that are not their own. 
Thus, we do not expect learning about efficiency to be affected by the workforce homogeneity of 
the production line.  
That said, in line production, “downstream” work stations receive the output of 




observed at later stages in the production line. Workers, in this fashion, accumulate timely, 
private information about upstream quality, which could be used to improve the manufacturing 
process. For this benefit to materialize, downstream workers need to report their private quality 
information to quality inspectors or shift supervisors.  
The incentive contract in the LINE sample specifies a penalty for quality defects. 
Reporting quality problems to inspectors imposes penalties on the workers who are responsible 
for poor quality. In production lines with high workforce homogeneity, the opportunity for 
workers to collude with each other against supervisors (to withhold the quality information) is 
significant. Without information sharing, learning about quality will be impaired. A more 
homogeneous workforce increases the probability that individuals collude; reporting on poor 
quality reduces the bonus of co-workers, and thus decreases their welfare. By withholding this 
information today, workers count on receiving a reciprocal treatment in the future when their 
own quality might be impaired. What’s more, downstream workers could mask defects or make 
provisionary repairs. This type of behavior is more likely when employees find it easy to 
communicate with each other and coordinate their exploitative actions.  
In addition, private quality information is more likely to be revealed to inspectors and 
supervisors when disputes among co-workers in the line arise. In these cases, bosses have to 
intervene and settle disputes or disagreements. These kinds of frictions between workers disrupt 
the otherwise strong incentives to hide private quality information. Supervisors, in the course of 
the intervention, become more familiar with the details of the production process and obtain 
better insights to potential quality problems. Disputes are more likely to happen when workers 
come from different backgrounds, do not share each other’s dialect or have different views of the 




workers. When the workforce is more heterogeneous, disputes will be more often resolved in a 
formal way, by involving a supervisor, rather than by informally ironing out any differences.  
Taking these arguments together, our prediction is that workforce homogeneity in a given 
production line impairs the workers’ learning about quality. Workers find it easier to coordinate 
their actions against the firm when they are more similar. They are more likely to prevent the 
leakage of quality information, which in turn will penalize their bonus payments. Learning about 
efficiency, on the other hand, is determined by the workers experience performing his own task 
and is unaffected by the homogeneity of the workforce in the same production line. 
H1a: (LINE setting) Workforce homogeneity is negatively associated with 
learning about quality. 
H1b: (LINE setting) Workforce homogeneity is not associated with learning 
about efficiency. 
3.2.3 Homogeneity in the GROUP Sample 
In the GROUP environment, employees are members of a formal working group, which 
is responsible for completing a distinct part of the production process. To complete the team 
task, employees need to work together and coordinate their individual activities. The 
performance of the group is measured and rewarded at the group-level only. While this joint 
performance measure encourages members to help each other and to “internalize” the spillover 
effects of their actions in the group, it also opens the door to free-riding problems (Baker et al. 
1988). Individual group members bear the full costs when they increase effort, but only receive a 
fraction of the benefits (which decreases in the size of the group). Thus, the individual worker’s 
effort choice is a salient problem in the GROUP sample.  
One consequence of homogeneity is that it reinforces the working of peer pressure. In 




prevalent (Kandel and Lazear 1992). Indeed, firms are likely to spend resources on mechanisms 
that enforce group norms that counteract the free riding problem (Waldman 2013). Workforce 
homogeneity may also help to breed altruism in the workplace. Rotemberg (1994) shows that 
when workers are altruistic and the firm uses group incentives, each worker increases effort 
levels because the effect of higher effort on the pay of other workers is internalized. In 
Rotemberg’s model, workers can choose to become altruistic toward specific individuals and it is 
more likely that such happens when team members are more alike (Pedone and Parisi 1997; 
Lewis 1998).   
 Group members improve their productivity not only by becoming more experienced in 
carrying out their own assigned tasks, but also by their interactions with coworkers (Mas and 
Moretti 2009a). In particular, group members are encouraged to share knowledge within the 
group and to learn about coordinating their tasks as measured performance depends on group-
level output. Several studies have pointed out that team homogeneity matters as it improves 
communication among the members and reduces coordination problems (Prat 2002; Hamilton et 
al. 2003; Dahlin et al. 2005).  
On the other hand, there is also evidence that productivity gains are larger when the team 
members are more diverse in skill (Mas and Moretti 2009; Hamilton et al. 2003). Thus, while 
workforce homogeneity is important to foster the socialization processes that facilitate learning 
and provide pressure on group members to keep up with the efforts of their coworkers, it is also 
necessary that workers have different skills or talents.  
 Our prediction about which of these two effects of homogeneity on learning dominates, 
uses the specifics of the research setting. Learning in the PCM setting is much more about 




than it is about creating, say, an innovative component of a PC motherboard. Thus, in our setting, 
we expect that the effect of homogeneity on the ease of communication with group members 
dominates. We thus predict that a greater degree of homogeneity at the group-level, reduces free-
riding problems and improves group learning. 
H2a: (Group setting) Workforce homogeneity is positively associated with the 
provision of effort at the group-level. 
H2b: (Group setting) Workforce homogeneity is positively associated with 
learning about efficiency at the group-level. 
3.3. Research Setting, Empirical Measures, and Data 
 The research site for this study is PCM, a passive component manufacturing firm located 
in Shenzhen (in the Guangdong province), a Special Economic Zone on the southern coast of 
China. PCM was established in 2005 and produces components that are used in motherboards of 
personal computers. The production technology is not difficult to replicate and does not require a 
large upfront investment. In other words, the entry barriers to the industry are low and product-
market competition is fierce. At the same time, PCM’s manufacturing process is labor-intensive 
albeit that most employees are low-skilled. Productivity improvements occur through on-the-job 
learning by employees, who accumulate task-specific knowledge.  
3.3.1. Local Labor Market Conditions  
 In China, the workforce consists of a large pool of unskilled labor with relatively low 
productivity (Meng 2012). Workers often leave their regions of origin in the rural areas in 
Western or Central China and migrate to industrial cities (in particular those located in the 





 As more and more firms enter China to benefit from its abundance of (cheap) labor, 
increasingly, personnel has become scarce in some locations. This holds true especially in 
Shenzen. The growing demand for labor in these Special Economic Zones has increased labor 
costs rapidly in the coastal areas. Indeed, in response, some firms are moving their 
manufacturing to western China, closer to those areas where supply is still strong.  
 PCM deals with these tightening conditions on the local labor market by relying on 
various recruitment strategies. Traditional ways to attract labor such as campus visits and the 
posting of vacancies on jobseeker websites are complemented with a policy that uses the current 
workforce to encourage job candidates to apply for a job at PCM. Current PCM workers benefit 
from referring new hires as having more personnel reduces the excessive workloads as well as 
the pressure on current employees to work overtime.  
Employee turnover is high at PCM, which in part is due to the Chinese policy of hukou 
(Meng 2012). Under this policy, individuals have to register in the city where they were born. 
Changing the registered residence (i.e., hukou) is difficult, so it usually remains the individual’s 
official residence. The registered residence recognizes an individual’s entitlements to schooling, 
the right to buy real estate, as well as other social welfare benefits only within the place of 
residence. Thus, individuals tend to be born and raised in the same region, which we label the 
hometown. Effectively, the hukou system constrains labor mobility between urban and rural 
areas. As migrant workers have limited civil rights outside their hometown, they tend to not stay 
long in any other city.  
3.3.2. Measuring Workforce Homogeneity 
 We propose two empirical measures of workforce homogeneity (HMGN). The first, 




personnel records of the firm. Our second measure, referral ratio, is the fraction of referred 
workers in a group or specific production line.  
Hometown Homogeneity (SAMEHOME) 
 A given individual’s hometown is an official record maintained by the Ministry of Public 
Security that cannot easily be changed. Specifically, the record will not be modified if a person 
lives and works in a province outside their (original) hometown. We rely on this official record 
to measure a worker’s hometown. Figure 1 is a map of China with the dispersion of the 
hometowns (in this case, the home province) of PCM workers. Table 1 provides more detailed 
evidence. 
<Insert Figure 1 and Table 1 here> 
            Over 50 percent of PCM employees originate from three provinces: Guangxi (21 
percent), Hunan (19 percent), and Henan (17 percent). The remainder of the workforce has a 
hometown in one of 16 different provinces. We construct a group-level measure (akin to the 
Herfindahl index of market power) of the degree of hometown homogeneity (SAMEHOME). In 
particular, we measure the size of a “hometown subgroup” in relation to a “group”. In our 
GROUP sample, the group is defined in a straightforward manner as the members of a given 
team that are subject to a common performance measure of group output. However, in the LINE 
sample, we define the set of workers who are employed in the same production line as a “group”.  






















                                           (1) 
 Sp is the fraction of group members from province p in the group, np represents the 




the group. SAMEHOME ranges from 1/N, when all group members come from different 
provinces, to 1, when all are from the same province.  
Referral Ratio (RFLratio) 
 We believe that the fraction of workers who join the firm based on a referral by current 
workers also provides a valid measure of workforce homogeneity. This belief is grounded in 
economic theory and in work on socialization processes. Labor markets exhibit substantial two-
sided information asymmetry. Employees have limited information about possible employers 
and employers cannot gain complete information about job applicants (Stigler 1962). By relying 
on current workers to recruit new employees firms are likely to improve the match between 
candidates and the firm and reduce information asymmetry (Fernandez et al. 2000). Prior work 
on recruitment channels shows that current employees are able to provide candidates with the 
kind of insider information about the job that is difficult to obtain otherwise (Pieper 2014; 
Jovanovic 1979). Prospective employees are thus better able to decide whether they will fit the 
firm and get along with their future colleagues. Current workers also have incentives to ensure 
that the job candidates are a good match to the firm, as the applicant’s performance will reflect 
on them. 
            Similar incentives exist post-hire, as the current employee works to ensure that the new 
entrant has the resources and information to do well. Through informal training and mentoring, 
referral hires experience stronger socialization (Granovetter 1973; Louis 1980). Some evidence 
exists that peer pressure is exerted to ensure that new entrants conform to organizational goals 
and to increase the likelihood that they will stay longer with the firm (Kugler 2003). Together 
these matching and socialization mechanisms associated with recruiting new employees through 




3.3.3. Compensation at PCM 
 PCM’s worker incentive plan comprises a fixed salary and a monthly bonus. Bonuses are 
formula-based, but their computation differs between the two production environments. In the 
LINE sample, the plan awards individual workers a bonus based on their efficiency and the 
defect rate of their work. Specifically, efficiency is computed by comparing the standard hours 
allowed for actual output quantities (Standard Labor Hours) and the actual hours used to 
produce these actual outputs (Actual Labor Hours). The difference between standard and actual 
labor hours is labeled Efficiency Points. Analogously, the Defect Points are computed based on a 
schedule that prescribes the standard rework/repair time for each defect. The individual bonus 
increases with the Efficiency Points and decreases with the Defect Points. Indeed, the formula 
specifies that the bonus equals (Efficiency Points * Bonus Rate) – (Defect Points * Penalty Rate). 
 In the GROUP sample, the plans are based on efficiency only (i.e., there is no penalty for 
defective products). In addition, performance is measured at the group level. Thus, Efficiency 
Points are computed by comparing standard labor hours allowed for the actual group output with 
actual labor hours worked by the group. The group bonus equals Efficiency Points * Bonus Rate. 
3.3.4. Measures of Outcomes  
 We use information from the bonus plans to compute Efficiency and Quality measures of 
output. Specifically, we measure Efficiency as the ratio of standard labor hours allowed for the 
actual level of output (Standard Labor Hours) to the actual labor hours spent on manufacturing 
the actual output quantities (Actual Labor Hours). Using fewer actual hours to produce the same 
amount of actual output improves Efficiency. PCM workers earn a bonus when Efficiency 
exceeds unity; this same value is also used to identify inefficient workers. In the LINE sample, 




GROUP sample, PCM measures Efficiency at the group-level only and we use the superscript G. 












Efficiency                                                                       (2.2) 
 PCM refers to the product of Defect Points (in hours) and Penalty Rate as the Defect 
Penalty. This quantity is the basis of PCM’s measure of quality in the LINE sample. Recall that 
PCM only measures quality in these specific parts of the manufacturing process. Importantly, the 
sampling rule to detect quality defects does not vary significantly across products, production 
lines, or work stations. Quality, then, is the ratio of Defect Penalty to Standard Labor Hours. To 







Quality *1                                                                        (3) 
3.3.5. Measures of Experience and Learning 
 Workers can improve Efficiency as well as Quality by learning from their own experience 
or by learning from the experience of working with others (Reagans et al. 2005; Mas and Moretti 
2009). Individual experience (iTENURE) is measured as the number of months a given worker 
has been employed by the firm. Measuring the experience of working together with others 
(gTENURE) involves somewhat more subtlety. Group members tend to form subgroups along 
the lines of shared (demographic) characteristics within the overall group (Gibson and 
Vermeulen 2003; Lau and Murnighan 2005). At PCM, the worker’s hometown is one of their 




working together based on hometown-subgroups. The key justification for this choice is that 
coordination and communication are much easier within a subgroup than between subgroups; it 
is, however, the exposure to the different expertise of the other subgroup that determines 
learning. Therefore, learning from others will depend on how long members of one subgroup 
have had the opportunity to work together with other subgroups—i.e., it is the overlap between 
the experiences of the subgroups comprising a group that matters. We measure gTENURE by 
first identifying the most experienced worker in each subgroup (the “subgroup representative”). 
We then compute the minimum tenure across these subgroup representatives as this will give us 
a measure of the time that the subgroups have been able to work together.  
We measure learning by assessing how Efficiency and Quality change in relation to these 
two experience measures. 
3.3.6. Data 
 The data used for this study are proprietary and provided by PCM. We obtain data on (1) 
monthly performance for each group (in the GROUP sample) and for each individual (in the 
LINE sample), (2) monthly salary and bonus at the individual level, (3) employee characteristics, 
including tenure, gender, education level, hometown, and the referral status. These data are 
available from 2007 to 2009. We have 1,530 unique employees in the LINE sample; 1,334 of 
these individuals started their employment contract in the sample period (i.e., 2007-09). In the 
GROUP sample, we have data on 340 new employees out of 390 unique individuals.  
 LINE Sample Characteristics 
 Table 2 provides summary statistics on the employees in the LINE sample. The 
proportion of male employees is 0.57. These individuals have enjoyed on average some years of 




junior high school). The monthly bonus is on average ¥136.71. Bonus payments vary 
considerably, however. The standard deviation is 178.51 and monthly payments range between 
−¥428.13 and ¥1,493.80. Note that bonus payments will be negative whenever the actual labor 
hours spent on a task exceed the standard labor allowed. In addition, PCM imposes a (quality) 
penalty for defective output. The dispersion in bonus payments reflects corresponding 
differences between employees in Efficiency and Quality. Indeed, while mean and median 
Efficiency are about 1.2, some workers complete their task 10 times faster than the standard labor 
hours available. Similarly, some workers are able to complete their job without quality defects 
(corresponding to the maximum value of Quality), while others incur a substantial penalty for 
faulty work. 
<Insert Table 2 here> 
 The summary statistic of tenure is limited to new employees. The maximum tenure 
observed per new employee ranges between 1 and 34 months, with a median of 5 months.
24
 The 
average maximum tenure is longer for those employees who have been referred by coworkers 
(mean=7.1 months) than for those who have been recruited into the firm on their own accord 
(mean=6.05 months). The correlation between Efficiency (Quality) and individual experience 
(i.e., iTENURE) is positive and significant (corr.=0.37, p<0.01 and corr.=0.17, p<0.01, 
respectively). These correlations are consistent with the idea that employees learn to become 
more efficient and to avoid defects over time.  
 Measured separately for each production line, hometown homogeneity is on average 0.23, 
but some groups are completely homogenous (SAMEHOME =1.00). 
GROUP Sample Characteristics 
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 Turning to the group production environment, the proportion of women is (1−0.24=) 
0.76. The average level of education is roughly equivalent to junior high school (mean value of 
EDUCA=2.26). The average monthly bonus payment is about ¥118.10, but payments vary 
significantly. The sample minimum (maximum) bonus payment is −¥518.86 (¥473.14). Recall 
that PCM does not measure quality in the group production environment. Negative bonuses, 
therefore, are the result of groups needing longer to complete their tasks than standards allow. 
<Insert Table 3 here> 
As performance is only measured at the group level, we do not have summary statistics 
on Efficiency for the individual group members. Panel C of Table 3, however, reports that group-
level Efficiency ranges between 0.54 and 4.63, and is on average 1.28, suggesting that groups 
tend to complete their activities within the allotted time. Group-level tenure (gTENURE) is not 
significantly associated with group-level Efficiency, suggesting that on average no learning from 
others in the group takes place.  
 The median maximum tenure observed per new employee is 4.5 months for non-referred 
workers and 7 months for referred workers. The hometown homogeneity index varies 
substantially across groups, and ranges between the values of 0.12 and 1.00.  
3.4. Empirical Models and Results 
 The empirical predictions on how workforce homogeneity affects employee learning and 
their provision of effort depend on the joint specifics of the production environment and the 
incentive contracts. Consequently, we introduce our empirical analyses for each of our two 
samples (LINE and GROUP) separately. We examine the LINE production environment in 




3.4.1. LINE Sample: Empirical Models and Findings 
In the LINE sample, we investigate the effect of workforce homogeneity on individual 





) measured at the individual level reflect learning outcomes, but we are 
particularly interested in Quality. As the LINE production environment suggests, learning about 
quality varies with information environment of the production line. The information environment 
is determined by all the workers on the production line. Hence, the workforce homogeneity 
(HMGN) is measured at the “group” level with two proxies, hometown homogeneity 
(SAMEHOME) and the fraction of referred workers (RFLratio). We specify the empirical model 
with the theoretical construct of workforce homogeneity denoted by HMGN, but we conduct the 
analyses with two abovementioned empirical proxies. We specify our models for the LINE 
sample as follows:  
Quality
L
 i,t+1= α0+ α1 iTENUREit + α 2HMGNgt +α3 HMGNgt*iTENUREit  
+CONTROL variables+ εit ,                                                         (4.1) 
Efficiency
L
i,t+1= β0+ β1 iTENUREit + β2HMGNgt + β3 HMGNgt*iTENUREit 
+CONTROL variables+ εit ,                                                         (4.2) 
            where subscript i represents individual, and t the calendar month, respectively. Models 
(4.1) and (4.2) are estimated at the individual level by individual fixed effect OLS regressions 
with robust standard errors. Employees’ ability is the most important individual heterogeneity 




). Including individual fixed effects 
controls for time-invariant unobservable heterogeneity and deals with the concern about ability 
differences among individuals. To examine learning effects, it is important to capture each 
individual’s complete “learning profile”. We accomplish this by using the sample of new 




Seru et al. 2010).
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 We include as control variables other group characteristics, including the 
number of workers on the same production line (SIZE), average education level (AVG_EDUCA), 
average tenure (AVG_TENURE), and the fraction of male workers (AVG_GENDER). Year and 
production line fixed effects are also included.  
            We expect that employees accumulate their knowledge via their own experience 




 over time 
(i.e., α 1>0 and β1>0). We model the effect of tenure on performance as a linear-log function, so 
we use the logarithm of iTENURE in our models. We predict that individual learning about 
quality is a negative function of homogeneity of a workforce on a given production line. Hence, 
we include the interaction term between HMGN and iTENURE in Models (4.1) and (4.2), but 
only expect the coefficient in model (4.1) to be negative (i.e., α3<0).  
The results of Models (4.1) and (4.2) are presented in Table 4, and we discuss the results 
separately. Panel A of Table 4 shows that individual experience (iTENURE) is positively 
associated with Quality
L
 across all specifications. We expect that workforce homogeneity 
decreases learning about quality. We present empirical results with two different homogeneity 
proxies, SAMEHOME and RFLratio, respectively. We do not find a significant coefficient for the 
interaction term between SAMEHOME and iTENURE in column (3), but column (5) shows a 
significantly negative coefficient for the interaction term between RFLratio and iTENURE, 
indicating that the fraction of referred workers decreases the extent to which employees improve 
production efficiency over time (−0.135, p<0.05). This finding is consistent with H1a that 
workforce homogeneity is negatively associated with individual learning about quality.  
<Insert Panel A of Table 4 here> 
                                                 
25
 Otherwise, the estimation will be biased by the left-censored observations. That is, we exclude those workers who 




Similarly, Panel B of Table 4 presents robust positive coefficients for iTENURE, 
consistent with the idea that workers improve their efficiency by accumulating more individual 
experience. We do not expect that workforce homogeneity affects learning about efficiency in 
the LINE setting. Consistent with this prediction of H1b, we do not find significant coefficients 
for the interaction terms between SAMEHOME and iTENURE in column (3) and between 
RFLratio and iTENURE in column (5). The empirical evidence indicates that workforce 
homogeneity is not associated with individual learning about efficiency.  
<Insert Panel B of Table 4 here> 
In sum, we find that employees improve the production quality and efficiency by 
accumulating individual experiences. However, employees on the production line made up with 
a more homogeneous workforce (when measured using referral ratio) improve their production 
quality to a lesser extent than employees working with fewer referred workers around them.  
Our current set of analyses cannot distinguish between learning and sample attrition 
explanations for our results (Seru et al. 2010). In addition to learning about quality and/or 
efficiency, employees become over time better able to assess their “fit” with the firm, their 
assigned tasks, and their collaboration with coworkers. As employees learn about whether they 
are a good match to the job, increased sorting is expected, with those who do not fit the work 
well expected to leave the firm. We plan to further explore the effect of sample attrition (or 
employee “learning about fit” in subsequent version of this paper). For now, we only highlight 
that our findings can be explained by both learning on the job and by mismatched employees 




3.4.2. GROUP Sample: Empirical Models and Findings 
            In the GROUP sample, the unit of analysis is group calendar-month and all variables are 
measured at the group level. Accordingly, we use group performance (i.e., Efficiency
G
) as the 
dependent variable, which captures the outcome of effort provision and learning. The variable of 
interest is workforce homogeneity (HMGN), which is measured as either hometown 
homogeneity (SAMEHOME) or the referral ratio (RFLratio). We specify our model as follows:   
Efficiency
G
g,t+1= γ0+γ1SIZEgt+γ2gTENUREg+γ3 HMGNgt  +γ4 HMGNgt* SIZEgt 
+γ5HMGNgt * gTENUREgt +CONTROL variables+ εgt ,                (5) 
            where subscript g represents each group, and t the calendar month, respectively. Model 
(5) is estimated at the group level by pooled OLS regressions with robust standard errors 
clustered by group. We include as control variables group characteristics, including average 
education level (AVG_EDUCA), dispersion of education level (STD_EDUCA), dispersion of 
tenure (STD_TENURE) and the fraction of male workers (AVG_GENDER). Group and year 
fixed effects are also included.   
            The free-rider problem of group incentive suggests a negative association between group 
size (SIZE) and Efficiency
G
 (i.e., γ1<0), as shirking is expected to be more frequent in a large 
group than in a small group. We expect that homogeneity of group members (HMGN) could 
mitigate the free-rider problem. Thus, we include the interaction term between SIZE and HMGN 
and predict the coefficient to be positive (i.e., γ4 >0).  
            The learning effect implies a positive association between group tenure (gTENURE) and 
Efficiency
G
 (i.e., γ2>0). When group members work together longer, they coordinate with each 




homogeneity of group members. Therefore, we predict the coefficient for the interaction term 
between gTENURE and HMGN to be positive (i.e., γ5 >0).  
            We test Model (5) with different proxies for HMGN, and present the empirical results 
using SAMEHOME or RFLratio as an empirical proxy in Panels A and B of Table 5, separately. 
We discuss the effect of workforce homogeneity on effort provision and learning about 
efficiency based on columns (5) in two panels of Table 5. With respect to the provision of 
employees’ effort, we predict that workforce homogeneity (i.e., SAMEHOME or RFLratio) 
mitigates the free-riding problem. We do not find a significantly positive coefficient either for 
the interaction term between SAMEHOME and SIZE or between RFLratio and SIZE. This 
finding is inconsistent with our prediction of H2a that workforce homogeneity is positively 
associated with the provision of effort at the group-level. 
<Insert Panels A and B of Table 5 here>  
            Turning to the learning effect (about efficiency), we expect that group homogeneity 
increases the positive association between gTENURE and Efficiency
G
. The statistic significance 
of the simple effect of gTENURE depends on the proxy for HMGN. The results in column (5) of 
Panel A of Table 5 show a significantly negative simple effect of gTENURE (-0.239, p<0.01), 
but the coefficient is insignificant when the test is conducted with RFLratio (column (5) in Panel 
B of Table 5). Note that in a regression with interaction terms, the coefficient on the simple 
effect represents the partial effect of gTENURE on Efficiency
G
 whilst holding HMGN (either 
SAMEHOME or RFLratio) constant at zero. The coefficients on the two separate interaction 
terms (i.e., SAMEHOME*gTENURE and RFLratio*gTENURE) are significantly positive (1.352, 
p<0.01 in Panel A; 0.617, p<0.01 in Panel B, respectively). Thus, the effect of gTENURE on 
Efficiency
G




To obtain some further insights on these relations, we compute the marginal effects of 
gTENURE across the range of practical values of SAMEHOME and RFLratio, separately. The 
value of SAMEHOME ranges from 0.12 to 1. The marginal effect of gTENURE is positive when 
SAMEHOME is between 0.2 to 1, and becomes statistically significant when SAMEHOME 
equals 0.4. The marginal effect of gTENURE turns positive when RFLratio is above 0.2 (out of 
the range from 0 to 0.5) and becomes statistically significant at RFLratio=0.45. 
These findings suggest that whether a group of people can improve their efficiency 
through accumulating experience of working with their coworkers relies on group homogeneity. 
A working group with a high degree of heterogeneity encounters frictions in communicating and 
coordinating with coworkers, so the group performance may not even improve as the group 
tenure increases. Taken together, consistent with H2b, these findings demonstrate that the effects 
of workforce homogeneity on group learning about Efficiency
G
 are not trivial.   
3.5. Conclusion 
            A new literature on the significance of employee types on incentive outcomes is 
emerging (Oyer and Schaefer 2011; Lazear 1998; Ichniowski et al. 1997; Collins and Clark 
2003; Bartling et al. 2012; Carlin and Gervais 2009). We build on recent work and in particular 
shed light on how workforce homogeneity interacts with the specific combination of incentive 
contracts and production environments. We document that the effect of workforce homogeneity 
differs between production environments along with different incentive contracts. The evidence 
offers insight on the interplay between workforce homogeneity and organizational designs. 
Workforce homogeneity is not exogenously determined.Our findings have implications for 




influence the characteristics of the workforce by selecting hiring channels and by carefully using 
group dynamics to influence both the provision of effort and learning.  
            Indeed, the primary purpose of this study is to examine whether workforce homogeneity 
affects employee learning and the provison of effort.  We study this question by exploiting three 
features of our research site: (1) the variety of hiring channels, (2) diverse workforce hometown, 
and (3) the presence of two production environments with associated incentive contracts.  We 
document empirical evidence on the effects of the degree of workforce homogeneity on learning 
and effort.          
            Workers with similarity bear low costs in communicating and coordinating with each 
other. The low coordination costs bring either benefits or costs. In the LINE setting, we find that 
hometown homogeneity (measured by the fraction of referred workers) enables workers to 
collude to hide information and hinder production quality improvement across individual 
experience, but we do not find the same evidence when the homogeneity is proxied by 
hometown homogeneity. In the GROUP setting, our empirical evidence does not support the idea 
that workforce homogeneity creates strong mutual monitoring to mitigate the free-rider problem; 
meanwhile a working environment either with a high degree of hometown homogeneity or with a 
high fraction of referred workers indeed facilitates group learning about efficiency. In sum, we 
find workforce homogeneity plays a role in information sharing (i.e., learning effects) and this 
specific mechanism depends on the particular organizational design, which is the union of 
incentive contracts and production environments.  
            We derive our conclusion from field data of one particular manufacturing plant. 
However, we do recognize that management practices differ across firms, so we caution readers 




of this field study is that it offers finely grained data in connection with the possibility for 
researchers to obtain an intimate understanding of the specifics of the production environment in 
which the workers interact in their day to day operations. As such, we attempt to open the black 
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Appendix 1: Variable Descriptions 
Variables Description 
Efficiency =standard labor hours/actual labor hours 
Quality = -Defect penalty / standard labor hours 
REFERRAL =indicator variable, 1 if the worker is referred by an existing 
worker; 0 otherwise. 
HMGN =workforce homogeneity, measured either as hometown 
homogeneity (SAMEHOME) or the fraction of referred employees 
(RFLratio) 
RFLratio =the fraction of referral workers within a group 
=number of referral workers/ total number of workers 
SAMEHOME =hometown homogeneity of a group 
SIZE =the number of group members 
iTENURE =individual tenure 
gTENURE = group tenure, the overlap tenure among subgroups in the group 
=the minimum tenure among the maximum tenure of all 
subgroups 
RFLratio*SIZE =the interaction term between RFL_Ratio and SIZE 
SAMEHOME*SIZE =the interaction term between SAMEHOME and SIZE 
RFLratio*gTENURE =the interaction term between RFLratio and gTENURE 
SAMEHOME*gTENURE =the interaction term between SAMEHOME and gTENURE 
RFLratio*iTENURE =the interaction term between RFLratio and iTENURE 
SAMEHOME*iTENURE =the interaction term between SAMEHOME and iTENURE 
STD_TENURE =the standard deviation of individual tenure within a group 
EDUCA =Education level, ranges from 1 (primary school) to 5 (bachelor 
degree) 
AVG_EDUCA =the average of education level 
STD_EDUCA =the standard deviation of education level 
GENDER =dummy variable, 1 if the worker is male; 0 otherwise. 








Table 1 Employees’ Hometown Distribution (by Province) 
Province Number of workers (%) 
Guangxi 399 20.78 
Hunan 373 19.43 
Henan 319 16.61 
Hubei 149 7.7 
Guangdong  137 7.14 
Jiangxi 111 5.78 
Sichuan 86 4.48 
Guizhou 80 4.17 
Shanxi 80 4.17 
Gansu 78 4.06 
Yunnan 41 2.14 
Hainan 21 1.09 
Anhui 20 1.04 
Shandong 14 0.73 
Fujian 5 0.26 
Shanxi 4 0.21 
Jiangsu 1 0.05 
Hebei 1 0.05 
Heilongjiang 1 0.05 




Table 2 Summary Statistics of the LINE Sample 
Panel A: Individual Characteristics (N=7,319) 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Median Maximum 
Efficiency
L
 1.26 0.49 0.00 1.20 10.04 
Quality
L
 -0.18 0.23 -3.00 -0.12 0.00 
BONUS 136.71 178.51 -428.13 83.60 1493.80 
GENDER 0.57 0.50 0.00 1.00 1.00 
EDUCA 2.34 0.69 1.00 2.00 5.00 
Panel B: Maximum Tenure per Each New Employee (in month) 
Referral Status N Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Median Maximum 
Non-Referral 1122 6.05 5.31 1.00 4.00 34.00 
Referral 164 7.10 5.44 1.00 5.00 25.00 
Panel C: Group (Production Line) Characteristics (N=375) 
 Variable Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Median Maximum 
AVG_Efficiency
L
 1.25 0.28 0.04 1.25 2.18 
AVG_Quality
L
 -0.18 0.12 -0.83 -0.16 0.00 
SIZE 19.52 9.00 1.00 19.00 47.00 
RFLratio 0.12 0.14 0.00 0.08 1.00 
SAMEHOME 0.23 0.12 0.11 0.19 1.00 
AVG_TENURE 9.36 5.99 1.00 8.47 41.52 
STD_TENURE 5.80 4.39 0.00 4.91 23.47 
AVG_EDUCA 2.34 0.21 2.00 2.33 3.25 
STD_EDUCA 0.65 0.22 0.00 0.68 1.41 
AVG_GENDER 0.59 0.22 0.00 0.58 1.00 
Panel D: Pearson Correlation Table (P-values are in parentheses.) 
  (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i) (j) 
(a)Efficiency
L
 1                   
                      
(b)Quality
L
 0.12 1                 
  (0.00)                   
(c)iTENURE 0.37 0.17 1               
  (0.00) (0.00)                 
(d)EDUCA -0.07 -0.06 -0.07 1             
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)               
(e)GENDER -0.04 -0.20 -0.11 0.21 1           
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)             
(f)REFERRAL 0.03 0.02 -0.09 -0.06 -0.03 1         
  (0.02) (0.14) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01)           
(g)SAMEHOME -0.02 0.14 0.18 -0.03 0.00 -0.03 1       
  (0.10) (0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.87) (0.00)         
(h)AVG_TENURE 0.30 0.19 0.64 -0.11 -0.17 0.01 0.28 1     
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.32) (0.00)       
(i)AVG_EDUCA -0.22 -0.05 -0.28 0.26 0.12 -0.01 -0.10 -0.44 1   
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.51) (0.00) (0.00)     
(j)AVG_GENDER -0.16 -0.09 -0.29 0.08 0.39 -0.06 0.00 -0.44 0.31 1 





Table 3 Summary Statistics of the GROUP Sample  
Panel A: Individual Characteristics (N=1,869) 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Median Maximum 
BONUS 118.10 132.72 -518.86 110.02 473.14 
GENDER 0.24 0.42 0.00 0.00 1.00 
EDUCA 2.26 0.65 1.00 2.00 5.00 
Panel B: Maximum Tenure per Each New Employee (in month) 
Referral status N Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Median Maximum 
Non-Referral 286 6.10 4.66 1.00 4.50 34.00 
Referral 54 7.13 4.56 1.00 7.00 21.00 
Panel C: Group Characteristics (N=110) 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Median Maximum 
Efficiency
G
 1.28 0.43 0.54 1.28 4.63 
Quality
G
 NA NA NA NA NA 
RFLratio 0.14 0.12 0.00 0.14 0.50 
SIZE 16.84 6.75 1.00 18.00 38.00 
SAMEHOME 0.25 0.12 0.12 0.22 1.00 
gTENURE 1.14 0.79 0.00 1.10 3.69 
AVG_TENURE 1.65 0.51 0.46 1.63 3.74 
STD_TENURE 0.70 0.26 0.00 0.69 1.53 
AVG_EDUCA 2.25 0.15 1.67 2.26 2.67 
STD_EDUCA 0.61 0.22 0.00 0.63 1.04 
AVG_GENDER 0.26 0.16 0.00 0.26 0.67 
Panel D: Pearson Correlation Table (P-values are in parentheses.) 
  (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i) (j) 
(a)Efficiency
G
 1                   
                      
(b)SIZE -0.08 1                 
 (0.39)                   
(c)RFLratio 0.09 0.25 1               
  (0.36) (0.01)                 
(d)SAMEHOME -0.18 -0.56 -0.01 1             
  (0.06) (0.00) (0.88)               
(e)gTENURE 0.13 -0.11 0.00 0.42 1           
  (0.18) (0.23) (0.99) (0.00)             
(f)AVG_TENURE 0.24 -0.11 0.04 0.32 0.73 1         
  (0.01) (0.26) (0.68) (0.00) (0.00)           
(g)STD_TENURE 0.00 0.32 0.35 -0.21 -0.26 -0.15 1       
  (0.97) (0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.01) (0.12)         
(h)AVG_EDUCA 0.18 0.20 0.10 -0.19 -0.01 -0.02 0.07 1     
 (0.05) (0.03) (0.32) (0.05) (0.93) (0.86) (0.47)       
(i)STD_EDUCA 0.11 0.29 0.04 -0.30 -0.14 -0.13 0.00 0.78 1   
 (0.24) (0.00) (0.71) (0.00) (0.16) (0.19) (0.97) (0.00)     
(j)AVG_GENDER 0.03 -0.33 -0.24 0.10 -0.21 -0.13 -0.10 0.07 -0.04 1 




Table 4 Learning Effects in the LINE Sample 
Panel A: Learning about Quality 
Quality
L
 i,t+1= α0+ α1 iTENUREit + α 2HMGNgt +α3 HMGNgt*iTENUREit  
+CONTROL variables+ εit                                                                    (4.1) 
This model is estimated at the individual level by individual fixed effect regression. Robust standard error is 
reported in parenthesis. *,**,*** Indicate statistical significance at the 10% , 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 













   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
iTENURE + 0.034*** 0.034*** 0.056*** 0.034*** 0.055*** 0.077*** 
  
 











SAMEHOME*iTENURE −     -0.116     -0.116 





    
-0.025 0.242* 0.237* 
  
    
(0.043) (0.138) (0.139) 
RFLratio*iTENURE −         -0.135** -0.135** 
  




-0.012 -0.013 -0.013 -0.012 -0.011 -0.011 
  
 
(0.011) (0.015) (0.015) (0.011) (0.012) (0.015) 
AVG_TENURE 
 
0.004** 0.004** 0.005** 0.004** 0.005** 0.005*** 
  
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
AVG_EDUCA 
 
0.090*** 0.090*** 0.087*** 0.092*** 0.090*** 0.087*** 
  
 
(0.033) (0.033) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) 
AVG_GENDER 
 
-0.002 -0.002 -0.0004 -0.006 -0.013 -0.011 
  
 
(0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.036) (0.037) (0.036) 
 Constant 
 
-0.457*** -0.452*** -0.488*** -0.458*** -0.501*** -0.531*** 
  
 
(0.095) (0.109) (0.111) (0.095) (0.102) (0.120) 
Observations    5,857 5,857 5,857 5,857 5,857 5,857 
Number of individuals 
 
1,334 1,334 1,334 1,334 1,334 1,334  
Individual fixed effects 
 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects 
 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Production line fixed 
effects 
 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 






Table 4 Learning Effect in the LINE Sample (continued) 
Panel B: Learning about Efficiency 
Efficiency
L
i,t+1= β0+ β1 iTENUREit + β2HMGNgt + β3 HMGNgt*iTENUREit 
+CONTROL variables+ εit                                                                       (4.2) 
This model is estimated at the individual level by individual fixed effect regression. Robust standard error is 
reported in parenthesis. *,**,*** Indicate statistical significance at the 10% , 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
iTENURE + 0.194*** 0.194*** 0.210*** 0.194*** 0.170*** 0.186*** 
  
 











SAMEHOME*iTENURE  NS     -0.084     -0.086 
  





    
-0.004 -0.319* -0.323* 
  
    
(0.082) (0.191) (0.190) 
RFLratio*iTENURE NS         0.159 0.160 
  




0.063*** 0.063*** 0.063*** 0.063*** 0.062*** 0.061*** 
  
 
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.022) 
AVG_TENURE 
 
-0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.0035 -0.003 
  
 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
AVG_EDUCA 
 
-0.033 -0.033 -0.035 -0.033 -0.031 -0.033 
  
 
(0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) 
AVG_GENDER 
 
-0.059 -0.059 -0.058 -0.060 -0.052 -0.051 
  
 
(0.041) (0.041) (0.042) (0.043) (0.043) (0.044) 
Constant 
 
0.667*** 0.671*** 0.645*** 0.667*** 0.717*** 0.696*** 
  
 
(0.151) (0.160) (0.166) (0.151) (0.155) (0.168) 
Observations 
 
 5,857 5,857 5,857 5,857 5,857 5,857 
Number of individuals 
 
1,334 1,334 1,334 1,334 1,334 1,334  
Individual fixed effects 
 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects 
 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Production line fixed 
effects 
 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 






Table 5 Effort and Learning Effects in the GROUP Sample 
Panel A: The Effect of Hometown Homogeneity (SAMEHOME) 
Efficiency
G
g,t+1= γ0+γ1SIZEgt+γ2gTENUREg+γ3 HMGNgt  +γ4 HMGNgt* SIZEgt  
 +γ5HMGNgt * gTENUREgt +Control variables+ εgt                             (5)  
This model is estimated at the group level by pooled OLS regression. Robust standard error is clustered at the 
group level and reported in parenthesis. *,**,*** Indicate statistical significance at the 10% , 5% and 1% levels, 
respectively. 













(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
SIZE − -0.018* -0.024** -0.025 -0.029*** -0.039 
  
 
(0.008) (0.009) (0.018) (0.009) (0.027) 
gTENURE + 0.008 0.067 0.068 -0.223** -0.239** 
  
 
(0.060) (0.089) (0.093) (0.080) (0.101) 
SAMEHOME 
  
-1.258* -1.311 -4.016** -4.677* 
  
  
(0.684) (1.045) (1.508) (2.566) 
SAMEHOME*SIZE +     0.005   0.047 
  




SAMEHOME*gTENURE +       1.258** 1.352** 
  




0.227** 0.201* 0.200* 0.038 0.016 
  
 
(0.089) (0.101) (0.102) (0.099) (0.110) 
STD_TENURE 
 
0.099 0.119 0.118 -0.059 -0.074 
  
 
(0.080) (0.085) (0.086) (0.070) (0.080) 
AVG_EDUCA 
 
1.106 0.987 0.993 0.951 0.993 
  
 
(0.723) (0.775) (0.812) (0.769) (0.847) 
STD_EDUCA 
 
-0.011 -0.027 -0.032 -0.043 -0.093 
  
 
(0.424) (0.450) (0.474) (0.457) (0.514) 
AVG_GENDER 
 
-0.942*** -0.665* -0.663* -0.609* -0.584 
  
 
(0.249) (0.306) (0.311) (0.332) (0.334) 
Constant 
 
-0.763 -0.214 -0.214 1.003 1.100 
  
 
(1.307) (1.315) (1.328) (1.335) (1.369) 
Observations   110 110 110 110 110 
Group fixed effects 
 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  
Year fixed effects 
 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  









Table 5 Effort and Learning Effects in the GROUP Sample (continued) 
Panel B: The Effect of Referral Ratio (RFLratio) 
Efficiency
G
g,t+1= γ0+γ1SIZEgt+γ2gTENUREg+γ3 HMGNgt  +γ4 HMGNgt* SIZEgt  
 +γ5HMGNgt * gTENUREgt +Control variables+ εgt                            (5)  
This model is estimated at the group level by pooled OLS regression. Robust standard error is clustered at the 
group level and reported in parenthesis. *,**,*** Indicate statistical significance at the 10% , 5% and 1% levels, 
respectively. 













(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
SIZE − -0.018* -0.018* -0.025 -0.017* -0.028 
  
 
(0.008) (0.008) (0.014) (0.008) (0.016) 
gTENURE + 0.008 0.013 0.022 -0.078 -0.098 
  
 
(0.060) (0.06) (0.065) (0.072) (0.056) 
RFLratio 
  
-0.224 -0.852 -0.748 -2.037** 
  
  
(0.491) (0.574) (0.631) (0.860) 
RFLratio*SIZE +     0.0405   0.070 
  




RFLratio*gTENURE  +       0.448** 0.617*** 
  




0.227** 0.215* 0.213* 0.260** 0.274*** 
  
 
(0.089) (0.101) (0.103) (0.090) (0.086) 
STD_TENURE 
 
0.099 0.108 0.154 0.128 0.215* 
  
 
(0.080) (0.095) (0.102) (0.097) (0.099) 
AVG_EDUCA 
 
1.106 1.097 1.023 1.113 0.990 
  
 
(0.723) (0.706) (0.681) (0.700) (0.659) 
STD_EDUCA 
 
-0.011 0.000 0.005 -0.018 -0.016 
  
 
(0.424) (0.420) (0.426) (0.420) (0.426) 
AVG_GENDER 
 
-0.942*** -0.951*** -0.896*** -0.888*** -0.769** 
  
 
(0.249) (0.229) (0.253) (0.224) (0.268) 
Constant 
 
-0.763 -0.715 -0.515 -0.780 -0.456 
  
 
(1.307) (1.319) (1.279) (1.294) (1.236) 
Observations   110 110 110 110 110 
Group fixed effects 
 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  
Year fixed effects 
 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  








The Role of Reporting Uncertainty in Information Communication: 






Chapter 4: The Role of Reporting Uncertainty in Information 




Decision rights and information do not always reside in the same party (Aghion and 
Tirole 1997; Baker et al. 1999; Bolton and Scharfstein 1998). When the information in 
question is not verifiable, this separation gives rise to “uncertainty” among decision makers 
(DMs) about the quality of the information being reported by information providers (IPs). 
The quality of reporting is determined by (1) the IPs’ reporting objectives or (2) the IPs’ 
reporting patterns or styles. The DMs’ uncertainty about reporting quality is thus particularly 
prevalent when they are unfamiliar with the IPs. Specifically, “reporting uncertainty” is 
defined as the extent to which DMs are able to form an expectation about the quality (e.g., 
informativeness) of the information received and hence decreases as their familiarity with the 
IPs increases.
26
 This uncertainty affects not only how DMs use the information, but also how 
the IPs report it. This study examines the role of reporting uncertainty in the information 
communication between DMs and IPs.
27
  
I used data on used-car loan applications from a car dealership in Taiwan (referred to 
as CAR) to empirically examine this issue. CAR runs its used-car loan business through two 
business channels: franchisees and company-owned outlets. There are three parties involved 
in the application process, namely, borrowers, salespeople, and loan officers. All of the loan 
officers are employed by CAR, but the salespeople work at two different business channels. 
                                                 
26
 One example of such uncertainty is when two different IPs have the same information and report it in the 
same way, but the DM has different levels of understanding with the two IPs and hence interprets the same 
information from the two IPs differently. 
27
 This idea is also termed “ambiguity” or “Knightian uncertainty” (Neamtiu et al. 2014; Williams in press). 
DMs’ reporting uncertainty in this study relates to their knowledge rather than to the nature of the information. 






This study focuses on the information communication between the salespeople (i.e., the IPs) 
and loan officers (i.e., the DMs). The loan officers’ working relationships with the 
salespeople are shaped by organizational structure: they may or may not be colleagues 
depending on whether the salespeople work at a company outlet or a franchise. Intuitively, 
loan officers are closer to the salespeople in outlets than to those at franchises, and they also 
have better knowledge about the former group’s reporting objectives and styles.  
In this setting, the interest rate of a loan (“loan rate”) is an aggregate measure of the 
borrower’s credit risk, as set by the salespeople, and it provides loan officers with additional 
information for their loan approval decisions. The loan rate represents a communication 
device, then, through which salespeople report a borrower’s credit risk to loan officers.
28
 The 
central argument of this study is that closer working relationships offer loan officers more 
knowledge in assessing the quality of the information being reported, and they thus 
experience less uncertainty when using information from company outlets to make decisions. 
Building on this, this study presents evidence on (1) how organizational structures affect the 
extent to which loan officers rely on loan rates to make loan approval decisions and (2) 
whether franchise salespeople set loan rates differently than salespeople working in company 
outlets.  
Fischer and Verrecchia (2000) suggest that when the capital market is uncertain about 
a manager’s reporting objectives, this uncertainty adds noise to the financial report and 
reduces the value relevance of the manager’s report. However, as opposed to their 
predictions, empirical evidence in recent finance and accounting literature demonstrates that 
uncertainty results in behavioral biases in terms of processing the information (Williams in 
                                                 
28
 The loan rate in the loan approval setting is analogous to a financial report in capital markets, which is the 





press). People dislike uncertainty and exhibit uncertainty aversion in assuming the worst 
case: they take action to avoid the worst-case outcome (Epstein and Schneider 2008; 
Williams in press).  
In a loan approval setting, loan officers are concerned about accepting bad loans. 
When they do not possess sufficient knowledge to assess the reporting quality of the loan rate 
as a credit risk measure, they impose a “belief” that the salespeople are unwilling to reflect 
the borrower’s credit risk in the interest rates; in other words, that the salespeople are 
compressing the borrower’s credit risk in setting the interest rate. This is the worst-case belief 
because it increases the likelihood of bad loans being approved. Moreover, this belief actually 
causes loan officers to view loan rates as being informative, because one unit of loan rate 
indicates a higher credit risk in cases where salespeople are reluctant to report a borrower’s 
riskiness. Specifically, the bias arising from the worst-case belief is that loan officers view 
information (i.e., the loan rate) as being informative. Since the worst-case belief is associated 
with uncertainty about the reporting, loan officers will view franchisees’ information as being 
more informative than company outlets’ information. Hence, I predict that loan officers 
respond to franchisees’ information more strongly than to outlets’ information. I term this 
prediction the decision bias hypothesis. 
At the other end of the spectrum, salespeople anticipate the loan officers’ response to 
information of uncertain reporting quality (i.e., a higher likelihood of loan rejections) and 
take action to mitigate the adverse effects of decision biases. In their role as the loan rate 
setters, they assess the borrower’s credit risk and determine the loan rate. Foreseeing that loan 
officers overvalue the level of risk embedded in the loan rates offered, salespeople will trend 
those rates downward to correct for decision bias in the information use. Since loan officers 





franchisees versus that from company outlets, franchise salespeople are more prone to skew 
the loan rate downward than outlet salespeople. Therefore, I expect that loan rates submitted 
by franchisees to loan officers are lower than those submitted by company outlets. I term this 
the reporting bias hypothesis. 
The empirical strategy for documenting the role of reporting uncertainty is to treat the 
information use and reporting in company outlets as a benchmark for analyzing whether these 
behaviors vary between the two business channels. In other words, the decision and reporting 
biases are measured in terms of “relative” magnitude instead of absolute scale. Note that 
these empirical tests rely on the premise that what differs between franchisees and outlets is 
the degree of loan officers’ uncertainty about the quality of the salespeople’s reporting. I 
discuss this issue in more detail in the section on the research setting (and in Section 4.4.4). 
The empirical findings are consistent with the decision bias and reporting bias 
hypotheses. Specifically, I find that the negative association between loan officers’ approval 
decisions and loan rates is stronger for franchise loans than for company outlet loans and that 
franchise salespeople set lower loan rates than those in outlets. An additional analysis of loan 
defaults captures the net effect of the combination of decision and reporting biases on loan 
performance. I find that the default rate is higher for franchise loans than for outlet loans. 
This particular finding not only corroborates the reporting bias hypothesis, but also suggests 
that the extent to which franchise salespeople skew the loan rate downward exceeds the 
magnitude of the loan officers’ decision biases. This “excess” reporting bias by franchisees 
has a negative consequence: they face higher levels of loan defaults.         
This study documents the role of reporting uncertainty in information communication 
within firms. Empirical evidence on the implications of uncertainty for information use is 





setting (Williams in press). Moreover, it is not clear how those findings apply to internal 
decision making, especially with regard to the sources of uncertainty. This study contributes 
to the literature on the information role of personal relationships. Prior studies suggest that 
personal relationships (e.g., school ties) that have been established based on common past 
experiences offer a channel for private information transfer and result in an information 
advantage (Brochet et al. 2013; Cohen and Frazzini 2008; Cohen et al. 2010).
29
 This study, 
by contrast, highlights the effect of one specific type of personal relationship, as shaped by 
organizational structures, and documents how working relationships bias information 
processing. 
In addition, the previous empirical studies that have investigated information use in 
decision making seem to take information supply as exogenously given.
30
 This study sheds 
light on the interaction between the DMs and IPs in transferring information. This idea is not 
new. Prior literature on voluntary disclosure (Verrecchia 1983) or participative budgeting 
(Chow et al. 1988) has highlighted such strategic interactions with analytical models or lab 
evidence. However, I present instead empirical evidence from naturally occurring data on the 
effects of reporting uncertainty on information use and reporting simultaneously and argue 
that the anticipation of decision bias results in downward biases in setting loan rates. The 
evidence substantiates the general understanding of the interrelation between information use 
and information supply. 
Previous studies on organizational structures have discussed the determinants of a 
firm’s choice for franchised operations or company-owned outlets (Brickley and Dark 1987; 
Campbell et al. 2009; Lafontaine 1992; Martin 1988). The main determinants include 
                                                 
29
 The role is trivial in this setting because information is aggregated and quantified to loan rates. 
30
 Liberti and Mian (2009) focus on a setting where there are subjective and objective signals and investigate 





information asymmetry between headquarters and local units and the difficulty of monitoring 
local units. Taking this choice as exogenously given, this study finds that organizational 
structures shape people’s mutual understanding (or working relationships) and are associated 
with biases in processing information. This study highlights the ex post costs associated with 
the choice of organizational structures.
31
 
4.2. Hypothesis Development 
4.2.1. Reporting Uncertainty and Organizational Structures 
In a firm, the business is run through local units. Those units have information about 
local markets and customers that is important input for corporate decisions, and they occur in 
different organizational structures, depending on the way firms expand their businesses. 
Firms can expand by either franchising or running their own outlets (Martin 1988), so DMs 
receive information from either franchisees or company-owned outlets. Franchisees operate 
as independent organizations separate from the franchisor; outlets act as subordinate units 
under the parent company’s control. The distinct organizational structures shape the levels of 
knowledge DMs have about the IPs in the local units. In the research setting for this study, 
CAR, in which franchisees and outlets co-exist side-by-side, loan officers have more 
knowledge about salespeople’s objectives and behaviors in the company outlets than in the 
franchised operations for various reasons.    
One important reason is associated with the varying degree of CAR’s management 
control over the two business channels. CAR designs the incentive systems for salespeople in 
company outlets, so loan officers have sufficient knowledge about how salespeople in those 
outlets are rewarded. However, in the case of the franchisees, CAR only signs the franchise 
                                                 
31
 Several studies investigate the relationship between organizational form and information characteristics, for 





contract for listed services with the franchise owner and has little control over how they are 
operated. More importantly, loan officers have only limited knowledge about how 
salespeople are rewarded in franchisees, and this insufficient knowledge increases their 
uncertainty about the quality of the reporting, especially the reporting objectives.   
In addition to the greater knowledge derived from company management control 
when dealing with outlets, loan officers’ understanding of salespeople’s reporting behavior 
benefits from closer proximity,
32
 common language, and a shared culture determined by the 
firm’s boundary (Grinblatt and Keloharju 2001). As applied to capital markets, one 
implication of proximity is that investors are more likely to invest in firms close to them 
because of their familiarity with those firms (so-called “home biases”) (Coval and Moskowitz 
1999). Extending that to this research setting, CAR is in closer organizational proximity to 
the company outlets than to the franchisees. That closer proximity creates advantageous 
conditions for personal interactions.
33
 It is easier for people to sense others’ styles through 
frequent face-to-face interactions than through impersonal contacts (e.g., emails). Loan 
officers have a more enhanced understanding of salespeople in outlets than of franchise 
salespeople.  
Moreover, people within the same firm share a common language and the same 
culture (Crémer et al. 2007; Van den Steen 2010b). Language, no doubt, is the most 
important component in information communication for increasing mutual understanding. 
Each firm has specific “codes” (i.e., a common language) to facilitate coordination between 
agents (Arrow 1974); this specificity decreases communication costs within a firm but 
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and Mian (2009), this study treats a firm’s boundaries as a determinant of organizational distance.  
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The assertion that corporate culture differs from firm to firm can be illustrated by the 
frequency with which mergers fail due to cultural conflicts (Van den Steen 2010a; Weber and 
Camerer 2003). Van den Steen (2010b) defines culture as shared beliefs and values, which 
implies fewer differences among individuals.
35
 Specifically, people with shared beliefs follow 
a similar logic and have the same priorities in doing their work. The missions, strategies, and 
incentive structures of organizations are all part of their culture. Franchisees, as independent 
organizations, have their own objectives separate from those of the DMs, and that difference 
in objectives creates difficulties for the DMs in understanding IP behavior.  
In sum, tighter management control, closer proximity, common language, and shared 
beliefs increase DMs’ understanding about IPs in the same company. Note that the nature of 
loan officers’ knowledge associated with working relationships may not be directly related to 
the parameter of interest (i.e., a borrower’s credit risk in the setting) but refers to a general 
understanding about salespeople’s reporting objectives and behaviors.  
4.2.2. Reporting Uncertainty and Information Use 
There are two different predictions about how DMs will respond to information when 
they are uncertain about the quality of the reporting. The first view treats reporting 
uncertainty as additional noise in the information processing (Fischer and Verrecchia 2000). 
Under that interpretation, DMs will view information of highly uncertain reporting quality as 
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 Weber and Camerer (2003) show that specific codes are developed over time and, more importantly, that 
these codes are only specific to a particular group and differ across groups, consistent with the notion of a 
common language within a firm. In a lab experiment, a pair of subjects (i.e., a manager and an employee) with 
the same set of pictures has to learn to jointly identify a subset of the entire set of pictures. To do this, they have 
to develop a common way of quickly describing the pictures so that the manager can direct the employee to pick 
up a pre-specified picture. In the beginning, the pair uses long expressions to describe the pre-specified picture. 
However, they shorten their expressions over time, and the employee learns to pick up the right picture sooner. 
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 People who work at the same firm have been hired under the same screening process and work under a 





more noisy (less precise) than information of less uncertain reporting quality. This argument 
predicts that they will put less weight on the information coming from franchisees than on 
that reported by company outlets. This prediction is primarily supported by the analytical 
model in Fischer and Verrecchia (2000), but there are  few empirical studies that document 
this view. Instead experimental and empirical evidence demonstrates people’s biased 
response to uncertainty.   
In one classic experiment, Ellsberg (1961)
36
 demonstrated how people were averse to 
uncertainty (ambiguity). When they make judgmental decisions, such as assessing reporting 
quality, the degree of uncertainty aversion is driven primarily by the state of their general 
knowledge about the given subject (Fox and Tversky 1995; Heath and Tversky 1991).
37
 The 
more people know, the less uncertain they feel. This suggests that DMs’ knowledge about IPs 
increases their confidence in their own judgment regarding reporting quality and reduces their 
uncertainty aversion.  
Uncertainty-averse DMs tend to maximize utility under a worst-case belief (Epstein 
and Schneider 2008).
 
Put differently, DMs do not know whether the worst-case outcome will 
occur or not; however, they choose to believe that it will occur and take corresponding action 
to protect themselves.
38
   
                                                 
36
 Ambiguity aversion can be illustrated by the classic experiment performed by Ellsberg (1961). In his two-urn 
experiment, Urn I has 50 red balls and 50 black ones; Urn II has 100 balls, but the ratio of red to black balls is 
unknown. Participants bet on the urn and the color of the ball jointly. A bet on RedI means that the participant is 
choosing to draw a ball from Urn I and will receive a prize if the ball is red but no prize if it is black. Most 
people prefer to bet on RedI rather than RedII and BlackI rather than BlackII. Ellsberg claims that people feel 
uneasy about bets when they must guess at the odds. Since they are uncertain about the proportion of red to 
black balls in Urn II, they avoid betting on it. This is termed “ambiguity aversion.” Caskey (2009) defines 
ambiguity aversion as a distaste for random outcomes that depend on an unknown probability distribution. 
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 Uncertainty aversion is triggered by contexts in which there is a contrast between states of knowledge, rather 
than by innate personal traits (Fox and Tversky 1995).  
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 Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) explicitly model DMs’ utility function as maximizing the minimum expected 





The definition of worst-case belief depends on the decision context. One 
manifestation in the capital market is investors’ asymmetric reactions to good and bad news. 
With information that conveys good news, investors tend to be suspicious as to their payoff 
(i.e., a worst-case belief) and believe that the information is unreliable.
39
 Therefore, they 
overreact to bad news, believing that it is precise, and underreact to good news, since they do 
not think good news can be precise. In sum, when DMs are uncertain about the quality of the 
information they receive, they choose to believe what is worse for their payoff.  
In loan approval decisions, loan officers, by job design, are responsible for keeping 
default rates under control. In other words, their objective function is to minimize losses from 
loan defaults. They are therefore concerned about accepting bad loans. To a loan officer, the 
worst outcome is that a borrower turns out to truly be risky after the loan has been approved: 
such a case increases losses from loan defaults. That worst outcome is most likely to occur 
when salespeople are sluggish in increasing loan rates in response to a borrower’s higher 
underlying credit risk. The reluctance (perceived or real) to reflect credit risk in the loan rate 
suggests that the changes in the borrower’s underlying credit risk are larger than what the 
change in the loan rate would suggest. The worst-case belief about reporting quality in this 
setting is actually that the loan rate is informative. Hence, decisions are based to a larger 
extent on information of higher reporting uncertainty because of the worst-case belief that the 
reported credit risk measure is informative about the borrower’s credit risk.  
The uncertainty about reporting quality results in decision biases associated with the 
worst-case belief. Since loan officers are more uncertain about the reporting quality from 
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franchisees than from company outlets, they exhibit a higher degree of worst-case belief in 
interpreting franchise information than they do in using outlet information. Since the degree 
of a worst-case belief is associated with the perceived informativeness of the loan rate, loan 
officers’ approval decisions are more strongly influenced by information submitted by 
franchisees than that supplied by outlets. I state the decision bias hypothesis as follows: 
H1: Ceteris paribus, the negative association between loan approval decisions 
and reported borrower credit risk is stronger for franchise loans than for 
company outlet loans. 
4.2.3. Reporting Biases 
I now turn to discussing how IPs report their information in response to the 
anticipation of DM bias. In the loan approval setting, salespeople provide the information 
(i.e., they are the IPs), and loan officers use that information to make decisions (i.e., they are 
the DMs). Their interaction occurs through the reporting of the information (i.e., the risk 
measure reported), which is similar to a financial report in capital markets, in which firm 
managers provide investors with financial information for investing decisions. 
Loan officers are uncertain about the quality of the reporting, so they have a biased 
view about the informativeness of the reported risk measure and are less likely to approve 
loans in response to it. Anticipating this undesirable effect on loan approval probabilities, 
salespeople (especially those in franchises) try to mitigate the adverse consequences 
associated with reporting uncertainty. I argue that salespeople, anticipating loan officers’ 
biases in using the information they provide, distort their reporting to offset the effect of 
decision bias. 
The loan rate is the device that salespeople use to communicate a borrower’s credit 
risk to loan officers. Decision biases occur when loan officers “overvalue” the level of risk 





information to make their decision. Accordingly, salespeople will downplay the level of risk 
by skewing the loan rate downward. I will use an example to demonstrate how this 
anticipation works in a loan approval setting. Suppose the borrower’s true level of credit risk 
is “medium” and the point at which loan officers decide to reject a loan is “high.” If they 
were not worried about loan officers’ decision biases regarding their reporting, salespeople 
would truthfully report the medium level of risk to loan officers. But since they know loan 
officers overvalue the level of risk reported, they are concerned that this borrower will be 
viewed as a high risk and the loan will be rejected. The salespeople therefore report a “low” 
level of risk to the loan officers, thereby demonstrating a “reporting bias.” The loan officers 
overvalue the level of risk, as expected, and escalate the borrower’s low level of risk to a 
medium level: however, they still accept the loan because the case remains below the point 
for loan rejections.  
Anticipating the above situation, salespeople will trend a borrower’s credit risk 
downward (e.g., from medium to low) when initially reporting information to offset loan 
officers’ decision biases in overvaluing the level of risk. Since loan officers exhibit a higher 
degree of worst-case belief toward the risk measures reported by franchisees than toward 
those reported by company outlets, I predict that franchisees skew their risk measures 
downward to a greater extent than outlets. I state the reporting bias hypothesis, which 
concerns the salespeople’s response to the effect of loan officers’ uncertainty about the 
quality of reporting (which accordingly results in the anticipated decision bias), as follows:  
H2: Ceteris paribus, franchise salespeople underreport borrower credit risk to 





4.2.4. Biases and Decision Outcomes 
In equilibrium, it is not clear whether reporting biases could perfectly offset decision 
biases or whether the two biases together actually affect decision outcomes. In many models 
of financial reporting, biasing activities do not affect the value relevance of the financial 
reporting (Verrecchia 1983). If DMs and IPs could fully anticipate the distribution of each 
other’s biases, the two types of biases would cancel each other out on average and decision 
outcomes would still be efficient as a whole. These models assume that the users of the 
reports (1) develop rational expectations and (2) have perfect common knowledge about 
preparers’ reporting objectives. Fischer and Verrecchia (2000) show that violations of the two 
assumptions affect the value relevance of information and ultimate decision outcomes.  
This study examines the role of reporting uncertainty (i.e., uncertainty about the 
precision of reported information), which is exactly the violation of the second assumption. 
In this loan approval setting, the loan officers do not have perfect common knowledge about 
the IPs’ reporting objectives and behaviors. This insufficient knowledge results in uncertainty 
aversion on their part, which leads to a biased view about a risk measure’s informativeness. I 
predict that reporting uncertainty affects the ultimate outcome of approval decisions. In other 
words, the two types of biases are not perfectly offset. However, it is not clear ex ante 
whether decision biases or reporting biases are more dominant. Therefore, I do not develop 
any specific predictions about how reporting uncertainty affects decision outcomes through 
the two types of biases. 
4.3. Research Design 
4.3.1. Research Setting  
The research site for this study is CAR, a car dealership in Taiwan. CAR has multiple 





car loans through two business channels: its own company outlets and franchisees.
40
 The 
company has 964 salespeople working in 66 company-owned outlets, under 6 regional 
offices, and 346 franchise operations across Taiwan.
41
 Figure 1 shows CAR’s organizational 
structure. Loan officers work at either regional offices or headquarters. Headquarters, 
regional offices, and company outlets all fall under CAR’s legal entity: franchise operations 
do not.
42
 I rely on this feature as a proxy for the different degrees of DMs’ reporting 
uncertainty. The separation between decision rights and information and distinctive 
coexistence of the two business channels make CAR’s used-car loan business an appropriate 
setting for studying issues related to reporting uncertainty. 
<Insert Figure 1 here> 
Incentive Structures  
CAR charges franchisees the capital charge rate (i.e., the cost of capital), and 
franchisees are the residual claimants of any remaining profit for loan rates above that rate. 
The capital charge rate is the same across applications within a given franchise operation but 
differs across franchisees. It varies based on a “franchisee rating” set by CAR in annual 
evaluations. Any losses associated with loan defaults (one of the evaluation items) 
downgrade a franchisee’s rating and increase the capital charge rate they will be charged for 
the next period. Loan defaults thus do not affect franchisees’ short-term monetary payoffs but 
do negatively impact future payoffs as a result of the downgraded rating, forcing them to pay 
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 The used-car market suffers from the adverse selection problem (Akerlof 1970). CAR offers franchisees 
particular services, such as quality checks and warranties, to reduce buyers’ concerns about the quality of the 
used cars. CAR does not supply used cars to the franchisees and is not involved in incentivizing the selling of 
used cars. CAR’s insufficient knowledge of how franchisees reward their salespeople might contribute to its 
uncertainty about their reporting. 
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 Untabulated descriptive statistics show that the median tenure for salespeople is 6 years, and the mean is 3.5 
years; 82% of salespeople are male. 
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 Headquarters designs the franchise contracts and signs the contracts with franchisees. However, franchise 
operational activities are handled by CAR’s company outlets and regional offices. For example, it is the 





higher capital charge rates to CAR. By contrast, at the company outlets, salespeople’s 
bonuses increase in conjunction with the loan amounts approved, but not with the loan rates. 
Similarly, loan defaults do not directly affect salespeople’s monthly bonuses, but will affect 
the year-end “employee rating,” which is associated with future salary increases and 
promotion options.          
Under the aforementioned incentive structures, both franchisees and outlets would 
like to communicate favorable information about a borrower’s credit risk so as to get loan 
applications approved (for their own monetary benefit). At the same time, both types of 
organizations are penalized for withholding unfavorable information or distorting 
information, limiting salespeople’s incentives for strategically manipulating information. 
More importantly, skewing the loan rate downward is costly for franchisees. It is not clear a 
priori whether both channels still have some incentives for manipulating information or there 
is a systematic difference in their incentives for misreporting borrowers’ credit risk.  
Although franchisees and company outlets differ on several dimensions with respect 
to the economic incentives for misreporting, those differences do not generate a clear 
prediction as to which channel’s information is of poorer quality. In other words, despite the 
fact that incentive structures are designed to counteract salespeople’s economic incentives for 
misreporting information, uncertainties still exist regarding the quality of the reporting. One 
salient difference between the two channels is the loan officers’ degree of knowledge and 
confidence in assessing reports. As argued, loan officers are more uncertain about 
information from franchisees than from outlets. 
For salespeople, setting the loan rate (i.e., the reporting information) is a difficult 
decision. Salespeople (especially those in franchisees) have an incentive to charge borrowers 





likelihood of loan officers rejecting the application. This trade-off is more pronounced for 
franchisees than for outlets, because franchisees keep any profit above the capital charge rate. 
This trade-off is also an important factor contributing to loan officers’ uncertainty about the 
quality of reporting from franchisees.           
The loan officers’ key responsibility is to analyze the profiles of loan applications and 
reject risky borrowers. Their bonuses decrease in the event of losses from defaults and 
increase in line with the loan amounts approved. They cannot be so strict as to reject good 
loans but have to be careful enough to reject bad loans. The fact of whether an application is 
from a franchisee or company outlet does not affect their bonus. The objective functions loan 
officers perform remain constant no matter where the loan originates.
43
 In addition, loan 
officers’ approval decisions are not based on an objective credit rating score model. 
Essentially, their greatest concern is about accepting bad loans (i.e., Type II errors), 
while salespeople care much more about having good loans rejected (i.e., Type I errors), 
since the latter type of error decreases their short-term monetary payoff.
44
 This conflict of 
interest between salespeople and loan officers is designed to minimize the total cost of the 
two errors combined (Sah and Stiglitz 1986) and does not vary between the two business 
channels. Although the objectives themselves are the same across the two business channels 
for both loan officers and salespeople, loan officers know more about how outlet salespeople 
deal with these conflicting objectives than they do about how franchise salespeople will.  
Decision Process and Information Structure       
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 Rewarding loan officers based on loan profitability encourages them to accept risky loans to earn higher risk 
premiums. However, that is not what CAR expects loan officers to do. Therefore, the profitability of loans is not 
designed into their objective function. 
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 As mentioned, accepting bad loans also decreases salespeople’s long-term payoffs through a lower employee 
or franchisee rating. This long-term incentive might mitigate the degree of conflict of interest between loan 





There are two stages in the loan approval process and three parties (i.e., borrowers, 
salespeople, and loan officers) involved at different stages. In Stage 1, a salesperson settles 
on a loan rate with a borrower, and the borrower decides whether or not to apply for the loan. 
In Stage 2, the salesperson submits the application to a loan officer, who decides whether to 
accept or reject the application. The official approval process is the same for the two business 
channels.  
This study focuses on the information communication between the salespeople and 
the loan officers: Stage 2 of the decision-making process. At Stage 1 of the process, there is 
an inherent information asymmetry about the borrower’s credit risk between salespeople and 
borrowers. However, this asymmetry exists equally in both business channels, and there is no 
clear evidence that the problem is systematically different between the two channels. Since 
the empirical focus in this study is on a comparison of the two business channels, the issue of 
information asymmetry between salespeople and borrowers can be ignored.  
The loan officers’ ability to access information on the borrowers is the same for the 
two business channels. They have access to a database for checking a borrower’s unusual 
transactions with other financial institutions, such as any overdue credit card payments.
45
 In 
addition, they know the loan terms (e.g., loan rates and loan amount) and the borrower’s 
personal information, as provided on application forms. They also receive additional 
documents on the borrower’s credit risk.
46
 One important aspect for loan officers is whether 
or not a borrower has a stable income, so salespeople will provide documents such as tax 
returns and salary slips to demonstrate financial status. Other information is also relevant but 
difficult to document.
 
Some borrowers are self-employed or run small businesses, and there 
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 This database is maintained by the Joint Credit Information Center in Taiwan. It contains nationwide credit 
information and provides credit records to member institutions. 
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 Personal information includes name, gender, age, and residential addresses. Those items are standard 





are no official records about their income when transactions are done on a cash basis. 
Borrowers’ personal lending conditions and credit reputations within the local neighborhood 
also play a critical role, but these variables, too, are difficult to confirm. Salespeople consider 
the relevant information in setting the loan rate. The loan interest rate is thus still informative, 
along with the other information available to the loan officers, in terms of the borrower’s 
credit risk.  
Ultimately, it is up to the loan officers to decide whether or not to accept the loan 
application. In the assessment process, they might raise some clarifying questions or ask for 
supplementary documents. However, it is not practically feasible for loan officers to adjust 
loan rates after salespeople have agreed to the terms with borrowers. Their decision rights are 
limited to approving or rejecting the loans. 
4.3.2. Data 
The dataset in this study covers all loan applications initiated in 2010 and 2011. It 
tracks the entire loan application process and includes applications that were withdrawn by 
borrowers in Stage 1 and rejected by loan officers in Stage 2. Data are available with respect 
to (1) loan characteristics, such as the loan amount (Amount), payment duration (Term), loan 
interest rates (Rate), and final outcome (Default); (2) observable decisions, including loan 
officers’ approval decisions (LoanAccept) and borrowers’ withdrawal decisions 
(BorrWithdrawal); and (3) salespeople’s characteristics, including gender (EmpGender) and 
tenure (EmpTenure).  
Salespeople’s characteristics refer only to the characteristics of salespeople in 
company outlets, because the characteristics of franchise salespeople were not available to 
the car dealership (CAR) or to this study. The data limitations do not come from researcher’s 





characteristics that capture their credit risk. This limitation might affect the empirical tests for 
the reporting bias hypothesis, but not necessarily for the decision bias hypothesis. I discuss 
this further in Section 4.4.4.   
I constructed three samples: the full, application, and approval samples. The sample 
construction is exhibited in Figure 2. The full sample includes all applications in Stage 1: that 
is all borrower applications, both those submitted and then withdrawn and those that were 
never withdrawn. The application sample (i.e., applications not withdrawn by the borrowers) 
includes all applications in Stage 2 that were either approved or rejected by loan officers. The 
full and application samples are used for primary empirical tests. Finally, an additional 
analysis of loan defaults is conducted with the approval sample, comprised of only approved 
loan applications, some of which ultimately went to default.  
<Insert Figure 2 here> 
The data was retrieved at the end of 2012, so not all loans have complete payment 
histories. Therefore, I construct a further sample that is limited to approved loans with 
complete payment histories.  
All data are the outcomes in equilibrium. This study argues that it is the decision 
biases that drive reporting biases. However, the sequence of decision and reporting biases can 
never be directly tested with data observed in equilibrium. I rely on the institution 
background to evaluate the possibility of reversed sequence. Setting low interest rates might 
reduce the payoff for franchisees but does not necessarily affect company outlets. Therefore, 
ex ante I do not expect that franchisees have stronger economic incentive to set a lower loan 
rate than outlets. It is less likely that reporting biases occur before decision biases.  
4.3.3. Variable Measurement 





Loan interest rates (Rate) represent the cost of credit risk. The higher the borrower’s 
credit risk, the higher the loan rate. Although salespeople provide loan officers with several 
kinds of documentation (i.e., disaggregate information), the loan rate reflects aggregate 
information about the borrower’s credit risk. Hence, loan officers take the loan rate as a 
measure of the borrower’s credit risk and use this risk measure for their loan approval 
decisions. In other words, salespeople can influence loan officers’ assessment of the 
borrower’s credit risk by setting the loan rate. I take the loan rate (Rate) as a proxy for the 
information reported by the salespeople to the loan officers about a borrower’s credit risk.        
The loan interest rate is not a perfect proxy, however, since it includes a profitability 
element, namely the risk premium. Nonetheless, this level of noise is no different between the 
two business channels, so it is unlikely to affect the empirical inference. Moreover, since loan 
profitability is not included in the loan officers’ incentive structure, the risk premium element 
probably does not interfere with the information about the borrower’s credit risk.  
The reporting bias hypothesis suggests that franchise salespeople are more reluctant to 
report a borrower’s credit risk than outlet salespeople are, and thus keep loan rates low. With 
such reluctance at work, a borrower would have to carry a truly high level of risk for the 
salespeople to raise the loan rate. Accordingly, the level of risk included in a unit of loan rate 
is higher than would normally be expected. This suggests that the franchise loan rates are 
more informative about borrower’s credit risk than company outlet rates. Note that it is the 
downward reporting bias in setting loan rates that increases the informativeness of the loan 
rates in terms of credit risk. Empirical evidence on the information content of loan rates could 
further validate the reporting bias hypothesis.  





Loan officers decide whether or not to approve a loan application: LoanAccept is an 
indicator variable indicating a loan officer’s acceptance or rejection of a loan. Borrowers can 
also always withdraw their applications, and BorrWithdrawal is a binary variable identifying 
whether they have chosen to discontinue the loan process. The ultimate outcome of an 
approved loan is whether it is in default or not. Default is the corresponding indicator 
variable. For approved loans with complete payment histories, it indicates the occurrence of 
bad debt expenses. For approved loans without complete payment histories, Default refers to 
cases where a borrower has an overdue payment.  
Measure of Uncertainty about Reporting Quality 
Building on the argument that when loan officers have general knowledge about 
salespeople, it reduces their uncertainty about the quality of the reporting, I rely on the 
business channel (fChannel) through which the loan application arrives to measure the loan 
officers’ uncertainty. Loan officers know whether a loan application has come from a 
franchisee or a company outlet. fChannel is an indicator variable distinguishing loan 
applications from franchisees (fChannel=1) from those submitted through outlets 
(fChannel=0).  
Appendix 2 shows the geographic distribution of company outlets, as well as the 
number of loan applications per region from both business channels across counties in 
Taiwan. CAR has at least one outlet in each county, with the number of outlets in each region 
related to the size of the population. For example, there are multiple outlets in the two highly 
populated cities, Taipei and Kaohsiung, but only one in several less-populated counties. Since 
the demographics of each county may differ, I identify the geographic locations of 
franchisees and outlets, hoping to account for this heterogeneity by including “location” fixed 





While the specific location (i.e., address) of each company outlet could be identified, 
those of the franchisees were not available for this study. However, the franchise salespeople 
must submit their applications to salespeople in a specific outlet. In other words, there is a 
corresponding outlet salesperson for each franchise application. This allowed me to identify 
the relative location of the franchisees by determining which company outlet they were 
closest to. For the franchise operations, then, the location fixed effect is at the county level 
when there is only one company outlet and at a smaller district when there is more than one. 
4.3.4. Descriptive Statistics 
Tables 1 and 2 present summary statistics for the full sample and the application 
sample, respectively. There are 86,040 loan applications, of which 63% and 37% are from 
franchisees and company outlets, respectively. Both franchisees and outlets are substantial 
business channels. In the full sample, 15.7% of applications were withdrawn by the 
borrowers (Panel A, Table 1). Of the remaining applications, 86% were approved by loan 
officers (Panel A, Table 2). The average loan amount in the full sample was NT $284,740 
(around US $9,500). The average annual loan rate (Rate) was 13.4%, with an average 
payment term of 2.6 years (Panel A, Table 1).  
<Insert Table 1 and Table 2 here> 
The summary statistics for the approval sample are reported in Table 3. The average 
default rate of the approval sample is 2%, which decreases to 1.2% in the sub-sample limited 
to approved loans with complete payment histories (Panel A, Table 3). Loans from 
franchisees exhibit a higher default rate than loans from company outlets in the entire 
approval sample, including both complete and incomplete payment histories (Panel B, Table 
3). However, loans from franchisees show a lower default rate for the approval sample with 





<Insert Table 3 here> 
There are some differences in the borrower withdrawal rate and loan approval rate 
between franchisees and company outlets. Panel D of Table 1 shows that outlets (16.1%) 
have a higher borrower withdrawal rate than franchisees (15.5%). This result is consistent 
with what the reporting biases hypothesis would predict. Since franchisees set lower loan 
rates than outlets do, franchisee borrowers are less likely to withdraw their applications than 
outlet borrowers are. In Panel D of Table 2, the loan officers’ approval rate is slightly higher 
for franchisees (86.3%) than for outlets (85.3%). On the whole, although franchisees have a 
lower borrower withdrawal rate and a higher approval rate than outlets, their default rate is 
higher for the entire approval sample (Panel B, Table 3).  
No matter which sample is used for analysis, franchise loan rates are statistically 
lower than outlet loan rates. This finding is in line with the idea that franchise salespeople 
skew their loan rates downward to a greater extent than salespeople in company outlets. 
Furthermore, the interest rate for approved loans is lower for franchisees than for outlets 
(Panel B, Table 3). This suggests that at the same loan rate, loan officers are more likely to 
reject franchise loans than outlet loans, consistent with the result that the loans approved for 
franchisees have a lower loan rate on average.  
As the Pearson correlation table shows (Table 4), the correlation between Default and 
Rate is positive and significant (corr. =0.09, p<0.01), and Rate is significantly and negatively 
correlated with LoanAccept (corr. = -0.17, p<0.01). These correlations are consistent with the 
idea that loan rates reflect a borrower’s credit risk. Although the loan rate is a measure of the 
borrower’s credit risk, it also contains salespeople’s biases. One should be cautious in 
drawing any inference from the differences in the borrowers’ “true” levels of risk between the 





it would appear that franchisees have less risky loans. Yet, the higher default rate of those 
loans in the entire approval sample directly contradicts this inference. 
<Insert Table 4 here>  
4.4. Empirical Models and Results 
I use the application and full samples to test the decision bias and reporting bias 
hypotheses, respectively. In addition, I conduct an analysis of the loan defaults to evaluate an 
alternative explanation for the results of the reporting bias hypothesis and examine the net 
effect of the two types of biases on loan outcomes (Default).  
4.4.1. Decision Bias Hypothesis 
I used the application sample to test whether the association between loan officers’ 
approval decisions and the reported risk measure varies between franchisees and company 
outlets. I include LoanAccept as a dependent variable, which indicates whether the 
application is approved by a loan officer or not. Loan rate (Rate) is the proxy for a borrower’s 
credit risk as reported by salespeople. I expect the association between LoanAccept and Rate 
to differ between the two channels (fChannel). To test the difference, I also include the 
business channel (fChannel) and the interaction term between fChannel and Rate. I specify 
the empirical model for the decision bias hypothesis as follows:  
LoanAccepti= α1 Ratei+ α2 fChannelj+ α3 Ratei*fChannelj+ Σαi Controli 
+LocationFEk  +YearFE t+εi ,                                                          (1)                      
where subscript i represents each loan application, j the business channel (i.e., 
franchisee or outlet), k the location that indexes the geographic district, and t the calendar 
year in which the salespeople filed the application.
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Model (1) is estimated at the loan application level using a linear probability model 
with standard errors clustered by salesperson.
48
 Each loan application has only one 
observation in the dataset, but a single salesperson is likely to deal with multiple loan 
applications. Thus, the standard errors are clustered at the salesperson level. In addition to 
year fixed effects, location fixed effects are included to control for borrower preferences and 
the market competition specific to geographic districts.
49
 
I include characteristics related to loan applications as additional control variables. 
Loan characteristics include the loan amount (Amount), payment term (Term), and borrower’s 
gender (BorrGender). These loan characteristics also affect loan officers’ evaluation of a loan 
applicant’s level of risk.
50
  
Since the loan rate represents the borrower’s credit risk as priced by salespeople, loan 
officers use it as a risk measure in making loan approval decisions. The riskier the loan 
application, the less likely it is to be accepted by loan officers (i.e., α1<0). The decision bias 
emerges because of loan officers’ uncertainty about the reporting quality of the loan rate as a 
risk measure. The decision bias hypothesis predicts that information from franchisees is 
subject to a greater degree of worst-case belief than information from company outlets. Loan 
officers are more likely to reject franchise applications than outlet applications when faced 
with an increase in the loan rate, because they view franchise loan rates as more informative 
than outlet rates. Hence, the empirical prediction would be that LoanAccept is more 
                                                 
48
 Since the coefficient for the interaction term of non-linear models might be misleading (Ai and Norton 2003), 
I report results estimated by a linear probability model as the primary tests. I also re-estimate the empirical 
model using logit regressions and test the difference in the average marginal effects of loan rates between the 
two channels as robustness checks. Detailed results are reported in Table 8.    
49
 As mentioned, there are salespeople in company outlets who deal with franchise applications. I use that match 
to identify the corresponding outlets for franchisees.  
50
 CAR only knows the characteristics for salespeople in its company outlets. Salespeople’s characteristics 
include their gender (EmpGender) and tenure (EmpTenure). Therefore, the primary empirical model does not 





negatively sensitive to Rate for franchisees than for outlets (i.e., α3<0). Table 5 presents the 
results of Model (1).  
<Insert Table 5 here> 
Column (3) of Table 5 reports the results of the full model, which includes an 
interaction term. The main effect of Rate on LoanAccept indicates a negative association 
between loan approval decisions (LoanAccept) and borrower’s credit risk (Rate) (-1.613, 
p<0.01) only for the outlet loan applications (fChannel=0). Given that the coefficient for the 
interaction term between Rate and fChannel is also significantly negative (-0.441, p<0.01), 
the negative association between LoanAccept and Rate also holds for franchise loan 
applications.
51
 This negative coefficient for the interaction term (i.e., α3) shows that in 
response to an increase in loan rates, loan officers are less likely to accept franchise 
applications than outlet applications, which is consistent with the prediction of H1 that 
LoanAccept is more negatively sensitive to Rate for franchise loans than for outlet loans.  
This study investigates whether loan officers use franchisee information differently 
than outlet information, so it focuses on the Rate coefficient as a measure of how DMs 
respond to information. Another interesting issue to look at is whether there is a significant 
difference in the likelihood of loan acceptance between the two business channels. The 
coefficient for fChannel (i.e., α2) is significantly positive (0.061, p<0.01). The combined 
findings suggest that when Rate is 13.83%, the likelihood of loan approval is the same 
between franchisees and company outlets. When Rate goes above or below 13.83%, franchise 
loans are either less or more likely to be approved, respectively, than outlet loans.              
Columns (4) and (5) of Table 5 report results for franchisees and company outlets, 
respectively. This sub-sample analysis allows the coefficients for all variables to vary 
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between the two channels and is used to validate the results in column (3). Consistent with 
the prediction, the coefficients on Rate are significantly negative for both franchisees and 
outlets (-2.034, p<0.01; -1.617, p<0.01, respectively). Also, as the decision bias hypothesis 
predicts, the magnitude of the coefficient on Rate is significantly larger for franchisees than 
for outlets (χ2=20.00, p<0.01). The separate analyses with applications from each channel are 
consistent with the results reported in column (3).  
In sum, I find that loan approval decisions for franchises are more responsive to the 
information provided than those for outlets. This finding supports the idea that loan officers 
are more uncertain about the quality of the information from franchisees, so they make their 
approval decisions based on a belief that franchise risk measures are more informative and 
react more strongly to the information. Consistent with the decision bias hypothesis, the 
negative association between loan officers’ approval decisions (LoanAccept) and the reported 
risk measure (Rate) is stronger for franchisees than for outlets. 
4.4.2. Reporting Bias Hypothesis 
The reporting bias hypothesis implies that given the same borrower, a salesperson in a 
franchise sets a lower loan rate than a salesperson in a company outlet does. I use the full 
sample to test whether the loan rates are significantly lower for franchise loans than for outlet 
loans. I include Rate as the dependent variable and fChannel as the main explanatory 
variable. The empirical model for the reporting bias hypothesis is summarized in Model (2).   
Ratei= β1 fChannelj+ Σ βi Controli+LocationFEk+YearFE t +νi ,                              (2)  
where subscript i represents each loan application, j the business channel (i.e., 
franchisee or outlet), k the location that indexes the geographic district, and t the calendar 





Model (2) is estimated at the loan application level using OLS regressions with 
standard errors clustered by salesperson. Year and location fixed effects are both included. 
Since loan rates are also determined by other loan terms offered by salespeople and 
salespeople’s abilities to evaluate credit risk, loan characteristics are also included in Model 
(2).  
Importantly, the difference in borrower characteristics between the two channels 
might affect the empirical results. The location fixed effects control for borrower 
characteristics (e.g., wealth or education) specific to the geographical districts. I also control 
for the loan amount (Amount), which is associated with borrower preferences for the class 
and condition of used cars. These controls decrease the likelihood that this estimation is 
influenced by any systematic differences in borrower characteristics between the two 
channels.  
I expect that, all other things being equal, franchisees trend loan rates downward to a 
greater extent than company outlets do (i.e., β1<0). The main interest of the reporting bias 
hypothesis is whether salespeople, in anticipation of loan officers’ decision biases, 
underreport borrowers’ credit risk by setting lower loan rates. I use the full sample to assess 
whether franchise salespeople have a general tendency to set lower loan rates than outlet 
salespeople. The results of Model (2) are summarized in Table 6. Column (1) of Table 6 
reports the results using the full sample, and the significantly negative coefficient for 
fChannel (-0.504, p<0.01) is consistent with the reporting bias hypothesis that franchise 
salespeople tend to set lower loan rates than those in outlets do. 
        <Insert Table 6 here> 
However, not all loan applications in the full sample result in a loan being extended to 





borrowers, and some are rejected by loan officers. Only those loans that are not withdrawn by 
borrowers and also approved by loan officers are actually executed. I conjecture that 
franchisees’ tendency to lower a loan rate is weaker when they do not expect the loan to be 
executed. This conjecture predicts that the coefficient in fChannel (i.e., β1) will differ 
between the executed and non-executed loans.  
I split the full sample into executed and non-executed loans in two different ways. 
First, the full sample is split into “borrower non-withdrawal” and “borrower withdrawal” sub-
samples, and the results of the sub-sample analyses are reported in columns (2) and (3), 
respectively. Second, results are shown for the loan applications that were accepted by both 
borrowers and loan officers, as well as the loan applications that were either withdrawn by 
borrowers or rejected by loan officers in columns (4) and (5), respectively.  
Consistent with the results in column (1), the coefficients for fChannel are 
significantly negative across all sub-samples (i.e., executed and non-executed loans), 
suggesting that, in general, franchise salespeople have a stronger tendency to skew loan rates 
downward than salespeople in outlets do. What’s more, the magnitude of the negative 
coefficient for fChannel is significantly larger for executed loans than for non-executed loans, 
regardless of how the executed or non-executed loans were characterized (χ2=11.32, p<0.01; 
χ
2=18.16, p<0.01, respectively). This finding supports the conjecture that when franchise 
salespeople do not expect the loan to be executed, for whatever reason, there is less need to 
skew the loan rate to offset loan officers’ decision biases.  
The finding that franchise loans have lower loan rates than outlet loans might be 
driven by unobservable differences in the levels of borrower credit risk. It is possible that 
franchise borrowers are systematically less risky than outlet borrowers. However, the 





higher for franchisees than for outlets. This statistic on loan defaults is inconsistent with that 
alternative explanation. Therefore, it is less likely that any fundamental difference in 
borrower credit risk between the two channels is driving the empirical findings. The formal 
test on loan defaults in the next section further corroborates the descriptive statistics on the 
default rate and discredits the idea that the levels of credit risk are lower for franchise 
borrowers than for outlet borrowers. 
4.4.3. Outcome of Loans: Default  
I conduct an additional analysis on loan defaults using the approval sample. This 
serves two purposes: (1) it offers additional evidence for salespeople’s downward reporting 
bias in setting the loan rate; and (2) it assesses the net consequence of loan officers’ decision 
biases and salespeople’s reporting biases on loan outcomes.  
Reporting Biases and Information Content         
In addition to resulting in different loan rates between the two channels, the 
downward reporting bias affects the information content of those loan rates. When 
salespeople are reluctant to report a borrower’s credit risk, they only slightly adjust the loan 
rate even though the borrower’s credit risk warrants a more considerable adjustment. In other 
words, loan rates developed by franchisees contain more information about the borrower’s 
credit risk than those set by outlets. To test the implication of reporting bias on the 
information content of loan rates, I include loan defaults (Default) as the dependent variable 
and Rate as the variable of interest. I am interested in seeing whether the information content 
of the loan rates differs between the two channels, so I include fChannel and the interaction 
term between Rate and fChannel in the specified Model (3). 
Defaulti= γ1Ratei+γ2fChannelj + γ3 Ratei *fChannelj +Σγi Controli+LocationFEk 





where subscript i represents each loan application, j the business channel (i.e., 
franchisee or outlet), k the location that indexes the geographic district, and t the calendar 
year in which salespeople filed the application.  
Model (3) is also estimated at the loan application level using a linear probability 
model with standard errors clustered by salesperson. Year and location fixed effects are both 
included; loan characteristics are also included in Model (3). As described, not all approved 
loans have complete payment histories. Panel A of Table 7 reports the results of Model (3) 
using the approval sample that includes approved loans having both complete and incomplete 
payment histories.  
<Insert Panel A of Table 7 here> 
Column (1) in Panel A of Table 7 reports the results with an interaction term, and 
columns (2) and (3) present the results for franchisees and company outlets, respectively. The 
two sets of results are consistent with each other. Column (1) reports significantly positive 
coefficients for both Rate (0.266, p<0.01) and the interaction term between Rate and 
fChannel (0.177, p<0.01). Columns (2) and (3) likewise show a positive association between 
Default and Rate for franchisees and outlets (0.447, p<0.01; 0.258, p<0.01, respectively). 
What’s more, the coefficient for Rate is higher for franchisees than for outlets (χ
2
=21.01, 
p<0.01). These findings corroborate the idea that loan rates are a measure of the borrower’s 
credit risk and also suggest that franchise loan rates contain more risk information than loan 
rates set by salespeople in outlets. This additional evidence supports the implication of the 
reporting bias hypothesis that franchisees are more reluctant to report credit risk and include 
more risk information in the same unit of loan rates than outlets.  





Another important question, besides determining whether there is an association 
between Default and Rate, is whether salespeople’s biases in setting the loan rate offset loan 
officers’ overvaluation of the level of risk contained in loan rates. In order to examine the net 
effect on loan outcomes, I estimate Model (3) excluding the interaction term between Rate 
and fChannel. Column (4) in Panel A of Table 7 presents the results of a linear probability 
model. The primary interest of this specification lies in whether the ultimate loan 
performance (i.e., Type II decision errors) differs between the two channels. The positive 
coefficient for fChannel (0.008, p<0.01) indicates that franchise loans have a higher default 
rate than outlet loans. This finding demonstrates that the reporting biases on the part of 
franchisees have a negative consequence: loan officers fail to reject the risky loans with 
underreported risk measures, and this leads to more defaults for the franchisees. It seems that 
the franchisees’ downward reporting bias is greater in magnitude than the loan officers’ 
decision bias and results in more decision errors (i.e., acceptance of bad loans).  
I re-estimate Model (3) using only approved loans with complete histories as a 
robustness check: the results summarized in Panel B of Table 7 are qualitatively the same as 
the results using the entire approval sample (in Panel A of Table 7). 
<Insert Panel B of Table 7 here> 
I re-estimate Models (1) and (3) with a non-linear probability model (i.e., logit 
regressions) as a robustness check. The coefficients are reported in Panel A of Table 8. Based 
on these results, I compute the average marginal effects of loan rates on the probabilities of 
LoanAccept and Default for each channel, but test the “interaction effect” with the method 
proposed in Ai and Norton (2003).
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8 are generally consistent with the coefficients of the interaction terms of the linear 
probability model reported in Tables 5 and 7.  
 <Insert Table 8 here> 
4.4.4. Discussion 
This study investigates the role of so-called reporting uncertainty in the interaction 
between loan officers and salespeople by examining the differences between two specific 
business channels with regard to (1) the relationship between loan approval decisions and 
loan rates and (2) loan rates. An obvious weakness in the empirical analyses is the lack of a 
direct measure of reporting uncertainty. The empirical tests rely on the premise that the 
business channels are subject to different degrees of reporting uncertainty and therefore serve 
as an appropriate proxy. I discuss whether other differences between the two channels could 
explain the documented findings.   
Endogenous Choice for Franchisees and Company Outlets 
Prior studies suggest that when information asymmetry between headquarters and 
local units is great and monitoring is problematic, firms tend to run their businesses through 
franchising, rather than establishing their own outlets (Campbell et al. 2009; Martin 1988). 
Information asymmetry and monitoring difficulty are associated with geographic distance. As 
the geographic distribution of loan applications in Appendix 2 shows, there is at least one 
company outlet and one franchise in each county. To account for this endogenous choice 
between franchisees and outlets, I include location fixed effects in all of the empirical tests. 
The location fixed effects control for the distance between headquarters and the local units 
and thus reduce concerns about differences in the initial information asymmetry and 
monitoring difficulties across all units.  





The incentive structures for franchisees and outlets suggest a difference in the extent 
to which CAR is compensated for accepting risky loans. As described, CAR is the residual 
claimant in the case of company outlets but not for franchisees. The direct implication is that 
CAR can be compensated with a higher loan rate for accepting risky outlet loans. When a 
risky borrower arrives at a company outlet, CAR, as the residual claimant, may bear a higher 
risk in providing the loan, but it also shares the profit generated by the attendant higher loan 
rate. The same is not true for deals struck by franchisees, however. CAR only charges them 
the capital charge rate, so its payoff is independent of the loan rates set for applications 
received through franchisees. In other words, CAR does not earn risk premiums for 
approving risky borrowers conducting business through the franchise operations. In that 
sense, loan officers are more willing to accept risky loans from outlets than they are to accept 
ones from franchisees. Accordingly, the extent to which CAR can be compensated for 
borrowers’ level of risk might explain the difference in correlation between LoanAccept and 
Rate between the two channels.  
In the current set of empirical analyses, the business channels coincide with the 
incentive structures, so I cannot discern whether the finding is driven by loan officers’ 
uncertainty about the quality of reporting or the risk premiums argument presented above. In 
an attempt to parse out these two explanations, I analyze whether decision biases decrease in 
relation to salespeople’s tenure by only using data from applications obtained from company 
outlets. Salespeople’s tenure captures the variations in loan officers’ reporting uncertainty 
within CAR. Following the same reasoning, I expect decision biases to decrease with tenure. 
The results are reported in Table 9. I sort salespeople into senior and junior groups based on 
the mean of EmpTenure. Indeed, I find that the negative relationship between LoanAccept 





<Insert Table 9 here> 
Salespeople’s tenure might also reflect their ability to evaluate borrowers’ levels of 
risk. However, I do not find a significant difference in the default rate between senior and 
junior salespeople. I take this finding as an indication that seniority on the part of salespeople 
does indeed impact loan officers’ reporting uncertainty. Since all salespeople in CAR outlets 
are subject to the same incentive structure, this finding is consistent with the decision bias 
hypothesis that the association between loan officers’ approval decisions and loan rates varies 
according to salespeople’s seniority, a proxy for reporting uncertainty. In sum, I do not find 
direct evidence suggesting that it is the incentive structure rather than reporting uncertainty 
that explains the documented differences between the two channels.  
Differences in Borrowers’ Underlying Credit Risk 
Data on borrower characteristics are not available for this study, so it is important to 
discuss whether there could be some unknown, systematic difference in the borrowers’ 
underlying credit risk driving the empirical results. This systematic difference might emanate 
from self-selection on the borrowers’ part or salespeople’s preferences in terms of selecting 
borrowers. This data limitation poses a serious threat to the empirical test for the reporting 
bias hypothesis, since lower franchise loan rates might simply represent less risky borrowers. 
I exclude this possibility by showing that franchisees have a higher default rate than outlets.  
In terms of testing the decision bias hypothesis, the data limitation is less of a 
concern. The primary interest of that hypothesis is the quality of the reporting, which 
concerns the way in which loan rates reflect a borrower’s credit risk. Suppose that there were 
indeed some fundamental differences in borrowers’ credit riskiness that were not captured by 
the researchers. As long as loan officers viewed a franchisee’s reporting quality the same as 





officers’ opinions about how salespeople reflect borrower credit risk in the loan rate, not the 
borrower’s credit risk per se. In other words, differences in borrower credit risk are less likely 
to be a cause driving the difference in loan officers’ responses to the information received.    
4.5. Conclusion  
The prevalence of information transmission in decision making comes from the 
separation of information supply and decision rights. Firms ex ante design mechanisms for 
inducing truthful reporting, but ex post evaluation of the quality of that reporting remain 
difficult for DMs, especially when they lack sufficient knowledge about the providers of 
information (IPs). The primary purpose of this study is to examine the effects of “reporting 
uncertainty” on both the use and the reporting of information. I use data on used-car loan 
applications from a car dealership in Taiwan (CAR) where (1) IPs work in either 
franchisees or company outlets and (2) available data on sequential decisions (i.e., loan 
rates, loan approval decisions, and loan defaults) allows for inferences about the interaction 
between DMs and IPs. I rely on working relationships shaped by different organizational 
structures to capture the degree of reporting uncertainty and argue that reporting uncertainty 
is associated with two types of biases in the processing of information.  
The documented empirical evidence suggests that loan officers are more uncertain 
about the quality of reporting received from franchisees than from outlets and bear greater 
decision biases toward them by overweighting franchise loan rate information when 
approving loans. At the other end of the interaction, franchise salespeople anticipate loan 
officers’ decision biases and slant their loan rates downward (i.e., underreport risk) to reduce 
the foreseen likelihood of loan rejections. However, the higher default rate for franchisees 





each other. In sum, this study documents the cost of reporting uncertainty that arises from 
DMs’ insufficient general knowledge about IPs.  
Prior literature on issues related to information transmission has focused on either 
information use or information supply (reporting). This study investigates the implications of 
both simultaneously and sheds some light on their interaction. In addition, it highlights the 
role of reporting uncertainty and documents its cost (i.e., a higher default rate), which is all 
associated with organizational design. In particular, the finding that franchisees are associated 
with higher default rates demonstrates the real effect of reporting uncertainty. Although I 
document the costs associated with franchisees, there might also be benefits to franchising 
(e.g., increased business revenues) which have not been examined in this study. This study 
does not suggest that CAR made a suboptimal decision in franchising its loan business. 
This study uses field data from one particular car dealership in Taiwan. I exploit 
several features of this research site, such as the fact that it possesses two business channels 
with different organizational structures and the organizational separation between 
information supply and decision rights, so as to document evidence on decision biases and 
reporting biases. The evidence is limited to one particular organization, but the underlying 
issue associated with the effects of reporting uncertainty on decision making and reporting 
has broader implications. Recognizing that internal information flow, decision rules, and 
organizational designs vary across firms, the empirical evidence specific to a given firm 
substantiates the general understanding of the interrelation between information use and 
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Appendix 1: Variable Descriptions 
This table provides descriptions of the primary variables used in this study. 
Variables Description 
BorrWithdrawal =Dummy variable: 1 if the loan application is withdrawn by the 
borrower; 0 otherwise 
LoanAccept =Dummy variable: 1 if the loan application is approved by the loan 
officer; 0 otherwise 
Default =Dummy variable: 1 if a loan default occurs; 0 otherwise. For loans 
with complete payment histories, Default represents the occurrence 
of bad debt expenses; for loans without complete payment histories, 
it refers to cases where payment is overdue.  
fChannel =Dummy variable: 1 if the application was submitted through a 
franchisee; 0 if it was received from a company outlet 
Rate =The loan rate: the proxy for the borrower’s credit risk, which is set 
by salespeople 
Amount =The approved loan amount 
Term =The loan payment term, ranging from 1 to 5 years 
BorrGender =Dummy variable: 1 if the borrower is male; 0 otherwise 
EmpGender =Dummy variable: 1 if the salesperson is male; 0 otherwise 
EmpTenure =The number of years employed at CAR 
logEmpTenure =Log of EmpTenure 







Appendix 2: Geographic Distribution of Loan Applications 
This map shows the relative geographic position of each county in Taiwan and identifies the location of CAR’s 
headquarters. The table below presents descriptive statistics on the number of company outlets in each county 
and the number of loan applications received, by county and channel. The statistics are based on the full sample, 
all of the loan applications.  
 
County Number of 
Company Outlets 
Number of Loan Applications 
Franchisees Company Outlets Total 
Taipei 20 11738 53% 10520 47% 22258 
Taoyuan 5 4220 71% 1739 29% 5959 
Hsinchu 3 1956 62% 1177 38% 3133 
Miaoli 2 978 49% 1027 51% 2005 
Taichung 8 8882 63% 5129 37% 14011 
Nantou 2 1505 67% 748 33% 2253 
Changhua 3 2585 68% 1201 32% 3786 
Yunlin 3 1796 62% 1086 38% 2882 
Chiayi 2 2484 66% 1304 34% 3788 
Tainan 5 5528 72% 2142 28% 7670 
Kaohsiung 8 6442 70% 2707 30% 9149 
Pingtung 2 2647 72% 1036 28% 3683 
Yilan 1 1352 68% 650 32% 2002 
Hualien 1 1256 69% 559 31% 1815 
Taitung 1 1236 75% 410 25% 1646 







Figure 1 CAR’s Organizational Structure 
Figure 1 presents CAR’s organizational structure for its used-car loan business. At the bottom of the structure 
are two business channels: company outlets and franchisees. Franchisees are designated with a dashed line since 
they are independent organizations separate from CAR. Regional offices are positioned between the company 
headquarters and the two business channels in the hierarchy. The term “loan officers” as used in this paper refers 
to the employees responsible for dealing with loan approvals at either the regional offices or headquarters; 








Figure 2 Sample Construction 
Figure 2 illustrates the mapping for the loan application process and the sample construction. The full sample 
includes all applications received from borrowers, those both withdrawn and not withdrawn. The application 
sample includes only those applications that were not withdrawn, which were then either approved or rejected 
by loan officers. The approval sample includes the approved loans, which may or may not ultimately be in 





















Table 1 Summary Statistics for the Full Sample  
This table presents the descriptive statistics for loan applications in the full sample. Each variable is defined in 
Appendix 1. The full sample includes all loan applications, some of which were subsequently withdrawn by 
borrowers. Panel A outlines the summary statistics for loans from both franchisees and company outlets. 
Separate statistics for franchisees and outlets are reported in Panels B and C, respectively. Panel D reports the 
differences between franchisees and outlets. The symbols *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Panel A: Full Sample with Both Channels Included (N=86,040) 
Variable Mean P25 Median P75 Std. Dev. 
BorrWithdrawal 0.157 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.364 
fChannel 0.635 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.482 
Rate 0.134 0.111 0.131 0.171 0.034 
Amount (in 100,000) 2.847 1.500 2.500 3.500 1.918 
Term 2.635 2.000 3.000 3.000 1.051 
BorrGender 0.665 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.472 
Panel B: Statistics for Franchisees in the Full Sample (N=54,605) 
Variable Mean P25 Median P75 Std. Dev. 
BorrWithdrawal 0.155 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.362 
Rate 0.133 0.111 0.131 0.161 0.032 
Amount (in 100,000) 2.851 1.500 2.500 3.600 1.854 
Term 2.701 2.000 3.000 3.000 1.071 
BorrGender 0.668 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.471 
Panel C: Statistics for Company Outlets in the Full Sample (N=31,435) 
Variable Mean P25 Median P75 Std. Dev. 
BorrWithdrawal 0.161 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.368 
Rate 0.137 0.111 0.132 0.178 0.035 
Amount (in 100,000) 2.841 1.500 2.400 3.500 2.025 
Term 2.519 2.000 2.500 3.000 1.007 
BorrGender 0.660 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.474 
Panel D: Differences between the Two Channels  
Variable Franchisees Company Outlets t-test 
 Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Diff. in Mean 
BorrWithdrawal 0.155 0.362 0.161 0.368 -0.004 ** 
Rate  0.133 0.032 0.137 0.035 -0.005 *** 
Amount (in 100,000) 2.851 1.854 2.841 2.025 0.010  
Term 2.701 1.071 2.519 1.007 0.183 *** 







Table 2 Summary Statistics for the Application Sample  
This table presents the descriptive statistics for loan applications in the application sample. The application 
sample includes only those loan applications that were not withdrawn by borrowers. Panel A outlines the 
summary statistics for loans from both channels. Separate statistics for the franchisees and company outlets are 
reported in Panels B and C, respectively. Panel D reports the differences between franchisees and outlets. 
Descriptions of the variables can be found in Appendix 1. The symbols *, **, and *** indicate statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Panel A: Application Sample with Both Channels Included (N=72,515) 
Variable Mean P25 Median P75 Std. Dev. 
LoanAccept 0.860 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.347 
fChannel 0.636 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.481 
Rate 0.133 0.111 0.131 0.162 0.034 
Amount (in 100,000) 2.790 1.500 2.400 3.500 1.835 
Term 2.603 2.000 3.000 3.000 1.042 
BorrGender 0.652 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.477 
Panel B: Statistics for Franchisees in the Application Sample (N=46,149) 
Variable Mean P25 Median P75 Std. Dev. 
LoanAccept 0.863 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.344 
Rate 0.131 0.111 0.131 0.161 0.032 
Amount (in 100,000) 2.803 1.500 2.500 3.500 1.789 
Term 2.673 2.000 3.000 3.000 1.066 
BorrGender 0.656 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.475 
Panel C: Statistics for Company Outlets in the Application Sample (N=26,366) 
Variable Mean P25 Median P75 Std. Dev. 
LoanAccept 0.853 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.354 
Rate 0.136 0.111 0.132 0.178 0.035 
Amount (in 100,000) 2.766 1.500 2.300 3.500 1.913 
Term 2.479 2.000 2.000 3.000 0.988 
BorrGender 0.644 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.479 
Panel D: Differences between the Two Channels  
Variable Franchisees Company Outlets t-test 
 Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Diff. in Mean 
LoanAccept 0.863 0.344 0.853 0.354 0.010 *** 
Rate 0.131 0.032 0.136 0.035 -0.005 *** 
Amount (in100,000) 2.803 1.789 2.766 1.913 0.037 *** 
Term 2.673 1.066 2.479 0.988 0.194 *** 





Table 3 Summary Statistics for the Approval Sample 
This table presents the descriptive statistics for approved loan applications. Some loans have complete payment 
histories and some do not. The loans with complete payment histories are separated out as a sub-sample of the 
approval sample. Panel A separately outlines summary statistics for all loans that were approved (i.e., the entire 
approval sample) and only those with complete payment histories. Panels B and C report the differences in 
statistics between franchisees and company outlets within the approval sample and the sub-sample with 
complete payment histories, respectively. Descriptions of the variables can be found in Appendix 1. The 
symbols *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Panel A: Approval Sample 
Variable Approval Sample Complete Histories 
 (N=62,332) (N=19,159) 
 Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Default 0.020 0.141 0.012 0.110 
fChannel 0.639 0.480 0.595 0.491 
Rate 0.131 0.033 0.131 0.034 
Amount (in 100,000) 2.794 1.793 2.178 1.846 
Term 2.584 1.043 1.521 0.479 
BorrGender 0.638 0.481 0.648 0.478 
Panel B: Differences between the Two Channels (Approval Sample) 





 Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Diff. in Mean 
Default 0.023 0.150 0.016 0.124 0.007 *** 
Rate 0.129 0.032 0.134 0.035 -0.005 *** 
Amount (in100,000) 2.815 1.770 2.757 1.833 0.059 *** 
Term 2.658 1.068 2.453 0.985 0.205 *** 
BorrGender 0.642 0.480 0.630 0.483 0.012 *** 
Panel C: Differences between the Two Channels (Complete Histories) 
Variable Franchisees Company Outlets t-test 
   (N=11,404) (N=7,755) 
 Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Diff. in Mean 
Default 0.010 0.097 0.014 0.118 -0.005 *** 
Rate 0.135 0.035 0.129 0.033 0.006 *** 
Amount (in100,000) 2.168 1.777 2.185 1.892 -0.018  
Term 1.530 0.480 1.515 0.479 0.015 ** 





Table 4 Pearson Correlation Table (Full Sample) 
Table 4 reports Pearson correlation coefficients among variables using the full sample. Some correlations are 
null because some loans stop in the application process. For example, “borrower-withdrawn loans” cannot be 
approved by loan officers, so the correlation between LoanAccept and BorrWithdrawal is not valid. P-values are 
in parentheses. Please refer to Appendix 1 of this study for descriptions of each variable. 
  (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i) (j) 
(a)Rate 1.00                   
                      
(b)Amount -0.33 1.00                 
  (0.00)                   
(c)Term -0.04 0.403 1.00               
  (0.00) (0.00)                 
(d)BorrGender 0.09 -0.04 -0.01 1.00             
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.06)               
(e)EmpGender -0.03 -0.01 -0.02 0.01 1.00           
  (0.00) (0.12) (0.00) (0.11)             
(f)EmpTenure -0.02 -0.01 -0.03 0.00 0.14 1.00         
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.18) (0.00)           
(g)fChannel -0.07 0.00 0.08 0.01 -0.02 -0.02 1.00       
  (0.00) (0.46) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)         
(h)BorrWithdrawal 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.06 -0.03 -0.03 -0.01 1.00     
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01)       
(i)LoanAccept -0.17 0.01 -0.04 -0.07 0.00 0.02 0.01 . 1.00   
  (0.00) (0.08) (0.00) (0.00) (0.51) (0.00) (0.00) .     
(j)Default 0.09 -0.01 0.06 0.04 0.00 -0.01 0.02 . . 1.00 







Table 5 Loan Approval Decisions (Application Sample) 
LoanAccepti=α1Ratei+α2fChannelj+α3Ratei*fChannelj+ΣαiControli+LocationFEk+YearFEt+εi,        (1) 
Table 5 presents the results for the regression of the loan approval decisions based on loan rates. This model is 
estimated by a linear probability model at the loan application level using the application sample. Columns (1), 
(2), and (3) report results based on the application sample pooled with each of the two business channels. 
Columns (4) and (5) report regression results for franchisees and company outlets, respectively. A Wald test is 
performed to test the difference in the coefficients for Rate between the two channels and the chi-squared value 
is reported. Standard errors are clustered at the salesperson level and reported in parentheses. Please refer to 
Appendix 1 and Figure 2 of this study for descriptions of each variable and a definition of the sample 
construction, respectively. The symbols *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels, respectively. 
Variables Application Sample Franchisees Company Outlets 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Rate -1.875*** -1.873*** -1.613*** -2.034*** -1.617*** 
  (0.058) (0.058) (0.071) (0.072) (0.078) 
fChannel  0.002 0.061***   
   (0.003) (0.010)   
Rate*fChannel   -0.441***   
    (0.083)   
Amount -0.792*** -0.790*** -0.790*** -0.706*** -0.892*** 
  (0.097) (0.097) (0.096) (0.111) (0.159) 
Term -0.126*** -0.126*** -0.126*** -0.096*** -0.193*** 
  (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.016) (0.025) 
BorrGender -0.042*** -0.042*** -0.043*** -0.042*** -0.045*** 
  (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) 
Constant 1.192*** 1.190*** 1.155*** 1.198*** 1.185*** 
  (0.017) (0.017) (0.018) (0.018) (0.026) 
            
Test of the difference: Rate    
χ
2
 statistics       
 -0.417***  
20.00 
      
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Location fixed 
effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R
2
 0.043 0.043 0.043 0.048 0.038 






Table 6 Loan Rate Setting Decisions (Full Sample)  
Ratei=β1 fChannelj+ΣβiControli+ LocationFEk+YearFEt +νi,                                                                (2) 
Table 6 presents results for the regression of loan rates based on business channels. This model is estimated by 
OLS regressions at the loan application level using the full sample. Column (1) reports the results based on the 
full sample. Columns (2) and (3) show the results for each sub-sample, split according to whether the borrowers 
withdrew their applications or not. Columns (4) and (5) report regression results for loans approved by loan 
officers and for loans rejected by either borrowers or loan officers, respectively. A Wald test is performed to test 
the difference in the coefficients for fChannel between the two sub-samples, and the chi-squared values are 
reported. Standard errors are clustered at the salesperson level and reported in parentheses. Please refer to 
Appendix 1 and Figure 2 of this study for descriptions of each variable and the definition of the sample 
construction, respectively. The symbols *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels, respectively. 
Variables Full Executed Non-Executed Executed Non-Executed 
 Sample (BorrWithdrawal=0) (BorrWithdrawal=1) (LoanAccept=1) (LoanAccept=0) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
fChannel -0.504*** -0.540*** -0.274*** -0.546*** -0.309*** 
 (0.049) (0.047) (0.088) (0.047) (0.066) 
Amount -0.654*** -0.699*** -0.532*** -0.743*** -0.507*** 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.025) (0.015) (0.023) 
Term 0.337*** 0.327*** 0.336*** 0.318*** 0.265*** 
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.038) (0.020) (0.033) 
BorrGender 0.522*** 0.506*** 0.299*** 0.471*** 0.208*** 
 (0.022) (0.025) (0.061) (0.027) (0.045) 
Constant 14.49*** 14.50*** 15.30*** 14.41*** 15.66*** 
 (0.206) (0.217) (0.271) (0.208) (0.239) 
      









      
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Location fixed 
effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R
2
 0.189 0.193 0.196 0.206 0.169 







Table 7 Loan Default  
Panel A: Approval Sample with Both Complete and Incomplete Payment Histories 
Defaulti=γ1Ratei+γ2fChannelj+γ3Ratei*fChannelj+ΣγiControli+OutletFEk+YearFEt+δi,                         (3) 
Table 7 shows results for the regression of loan default based on loan rates. This model is estimated by either 
OLS or logit regressions at the loan application level using the approval sample. Columns (1), (4), and (5) report 
results based on the application sample pooled with each of the two business channels. Columns 2 and 3 report 
regression results for franchisees and company outlets, respectively. A Wald test is performed to test the 
difference in the coefficients for Rate between the two channels, and the chi-squared value is reported. Standard 
errors are clustered at the salesperson level and reported in parentheses. Please refer to Appendix 1 and Figure 2 
of this study for descriptions of each variable and the definition of the sample construction, respectively. The 

















Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Rate 0.266*** 0.447*** 0.258*** 0.370*** 20.38*** 
  (0.030) (0.029) (0.031) (0.022) (1.005) 
fChannel -0.016***   0.008*** 0.439*** 
 (0.004)   (0.001) (0.074) 
Rate*fChannel 0.177***     
 (0.038)     
Amount 0.020 -0.029 0.106 0.019 -79.62*** 
 (0.335) (0.465) (0.491) (0.334) (30.57) 
Term 0.795*** 0.872*** 0.604*** 0.795*** 49.28*** 
 (0.063) (0.078) (0.089) (0.063) (3.352) 
BorrGender 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.583*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.068) 
Constant -0.049*** -0.066*** -0.044*** -0.062*** -8.897*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.005) (0.360) 
     
Test of the difference: Rate  
χ
2
 statistics      
0.189*** 
21.01   
      
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 





 0.015 0.015 0.014 0.015 0.084 






Table 7 Loan Default (continued) 
Panel B: Approval Sample with Complete Payment Histories Only 
















 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Rate 0.147*** 0.261*** 0.144*** 0.209*** 0.145*** 
 (0.035) (0.037) (0.036) (0.027) (0.036) 
fChannel -0.010*     
 (0.005)     
Rate*fChannel 0.113**     
 (0.046)     
Amount -0.162 -0.229 0.004 -0.202 0.006 
 (0.273) (0.331) (0.459) (0.274) (0.460) 
Term 0.769*** 0.830*** 0.641** 0.769*** 0.641** 
 (0.177) (0.236) (0.259) (0.177) (0.261) 
BorrGender 0.006*** 0.006** 0.007*** 0.006*** 0.007*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Constant -0.032*** -0.044*** -0.027*** -0.040*** -0.026** 
 (0.008) (0.007) (0.010) (0.007) (0.010) 
      
Test of the difference: Rate  
χ
2
 statistics        
     0.117** 
     5.56   
      
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Location fixed 






 0.008 0.007 
 
0.010 0.008 0.102 







Table 8 Re-estimation with Non-linear Probability Models 
Panel A: Loan Withdrawal and Approval Decisions 
Panel A reports the results of Models 1 and 3, re-estimated at the loan application level by logit regressions. 
Standard errors are clustered at the salesperson level and reported in parentheses. Columns 1 and 2 present the 
results for loan approval decisions and loan defaults, respectively. Panel B reports the average marginal effects 
of loan rates on loan approval decisions and loan defaults by channel based on the results of Panel A. Please 
refer to Appendix 1 and Figure 2 of this study for descriptions of each variable and the definition of the sample 
construction, respectively. The symbols *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels, respectively. 
  LoanAccept Default 
Variables (1) (2) 
Rate -13.77*** 19.73*** 
 (0.593) (1.918) 
fChannel 0.624*** 0.301 
 (0.106) (0.330) 
Rate*fChannel -4.247*** 0.893 
 (0.709) (2.135) 
Amount -5.817*** -79.78*** 
 (0.789) (30.61) 
Term -1.201*** 49.32*** 
 (0.120) (3.359) 
BorrGender -0.404*** 0.583*** 
 (0.0251) (0.0677) 
Constant 4.476*** -8.797*** 
 (0.160) (0.444) 
Year fixed effect Yes Yes 
Outlet fixed effect Yes Yes 
Pr > χ
2
 0.000 0.000 
Pseudo R
2
 5.66% 8.43% 
Log-likelihood -27785.346 -5682.7136 
Observations 72,515 62,332 
Panel B: Average Marginal Effect of the Loan Rate 
  Pr(LoanAccept) Pr(Default) 
Franchisees -2.019*** 0.454*** 
 (0.064) (0.029) 
Company outlets -1.648*** 0.300*** 
 (0.074) (0.036) 
Interaction effects -0.371*** 0.154*** 







Table 9 Effect of Salespeople’s Tenure 
These results are estimated at the loan application level by OLS regression. All analyses are limited to the loan 
applications received from company outlets. Columns (1) and (2) use the outlet applications from the approval 
sample. The median of salespeople’s tenure is six years, according to which I split the sample into senior and 
junior salespeople. A Wald test is performed to test the difference in the coefficients for Rate between the sub-
samples, and the chi-squared value is reported. The sample used for Column (3) includes outlet approved loans. 
Standard errors are clustered at the salesperson level and reported in parentheses. Please refer to Appendix 1 and 
Figure 2 of this study for descriptions of each variable and the definition of the sample construction, 
respectively. The symbols *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively.  







Rate -1.393*** -1.958*** 0.258*** 
  (0.093) (0.131) (0.031) 
Senior   -0.0002 
   (0.002) 
Amount -0.606*** -1.417*** 0.107 
  (0.183) (0.275) (0.494) 
Term -0.216*** -0.141*** 0.604*** 
  (0.029) (0.043) (0.088) 
BorrGender -0.040*** -0.052*** 0.010*** 
 (0.005) (0.008) (0.002) 
Constant 1.157*** 1.228*** -0.044*** 
  (0.035) (0.041) (0.006) 
    
Test of the difference: Rate 
χ
2




   
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes 
Location fixed effect Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 16,430 9,936 22,495 
Adjusted R
2
 0.034 0.047 0.014 
 
 
